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ABSTRACT 
This report documents all of the activities on Contract No. 
NASw-3737. This contract was initiated in July 1983 and 
extended through December 1987. The primary objectives of this 
study were to: evaluate ways to maximize the information yield 
from the current Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) condition 
monitoring sensors, identify additional sensors or monitoring 
capabilities which would significantly improve SSME data, and 
provide continuing support of the Main Engine Cost/Operations 
(MECO) model. In the area of SSME condition monitoring, the 
principal tasks were a review of selected SSME failure data, a 
general survey of condition monitoring, and an evaluation of the 
current engine monitoring system. A computerized data base was 
developed to assist in modeling engine failure information 
propagations. Each of the above items is discussed in detail in 
this report. Also included is a brief discussion of the 
activities conducted in support of the MECO model. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is 
currently funding a number of research programs in condition monitoring. 
The primary goals of these efforts are to increase the safety and 
reliability of the Space Shuttle and to reduce the cost associated with 
vehicle turnaround. This study provides an independent assessment of the 
condition monitoring priorities for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) 
and evaluates potential improvements to the present SSME condition 
monitoring system. 
Studv Supports SSME Development and Operation 
The objectives of this study, performed from July 1983 through 
December 1987, were directed at generating results which would support 
program planning for improved SSME condition monitoring. The study 
included both flight and ground test operations. Specifically, the study 
objectives were: 
Evaluate ways to maximize the information yield from the 
current SSME condition monitoring sensors 
Identify additional sensors or monitoring capabilities which 
would significantly improve engine data. 
Reviewed SSME Failure Data and Surveved Status of Condition Monitorinq 
The review of SSME failure information concentrated on the 
Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCRs) generated and tracked by 
Rocketdyne from January 1980 through November 1983. This activity 
included collection and reduction of the UCRs to determine SSME failure 
modes, categorization of the failure modes, ranking of the failure modes, 
identification and evaluation of measurable parameters for each failure 
mode, and identification of parameters for possible trending of engine 
condition. This review established an understanding of the SSME operating 
characteristics and failure modes. 
The condition monitoring survey included devices and approaches 
for collecting, processing, and interpreting degradation and/or failure 
i 
information. The task determined the status of condition monitoring in 
the areas of liquid rocket engines, aircraft gas turbines, and heavy 
machine industries (refining, power generation, etc.) . This survey 
identified new diagnostic sensors, signal processing techniques, and 
condition monitoring approaches which might be useful for the SSME. 
Developed Failure Information Propagation Model Data Base 
and Modeled SSME Components 
A data base and supporting software was developed to store, 
maintain, and manipulate failure information propagation data for major 
SSME components. The information generated and entered in this data base 
is part of a systematic evaluation of failure data available at various 
test points in the component. The data base can be used to evaluate ways 
to extract additional condition monitoring information from the current 
engine sensors. The data base can also be used to analyze potential 
locations for new sensors. 
A complete failure information propagation model (FIPM) was 
developed for the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) . The HPOTP 
FIPM consists of a drawing of the turbopump and a set of data base files 
containing all of the information generated for this engine component. 
The HPOTP FIPM consists of 105 modules (piece parts or functions), 198 
connections, 260 failure modes, and 8213 failure information propagations. 
FIPM drawings were also prepared for the following engine 
components: high-pressure fuel turbopump, 1 ow-pressure oxidizer 
turbopump , 1 ow-pressure fuel turbopump, heat exchanger , oxidizer 
preburner, fuel preburner, main injector, main combustion chamber, and 
nozzle. 
Results and Conclusions Emphasize Continued Development 
of Specialized SSME Sensors and Techniques 
Turbopumps Have Hiqh-Priority for Condition Monitorinq. The 
review of the SSME failure data included in this study indicated that the 
engine turbopumps are very high on the list of components to be monitored. 
A major item of interest in the turbopumps is the condition of the 
bearings. This review also indicated that there is a distinct division 
between monitoring for safety and maintenance purposes. This distinction 
i i  
is the result of the time constants involved in major engine failures. 
Most failure modes currently cannot be detected early enough to safely 
shut down the engine. Hydrogen leak detection was also shown to be a 
major area of concern from the standpoint of engine turnaround and launch 
processing. 
SSME Represents State of the Art in Rocket Enqine Condition 
Monitorinq. The survey of condition monitoring found no sensors or 
techniques associated with other rocket engines which would improve the 
availability of SSME degradatiodfailure information. However, several 
promising techniques such as gas-path analysis and pattern recognition 
could provide future improvements in engine monitoring. Improvements in 
computer processing speed would be required before these approaches could 
be used in flight. Image processing was identified as a means for 
improving the quality o f  internal visual inspections conducted on SSME 
components. 
Inteqrated Svstem Needed to Track and Analyze SSME Condition 
Data. A major finding of this study was the need for an integrated system 
to store, evaluate, and report information related to SSME condition 
monitoring. This system must include both the flight and ground test 
operations conducted by NASA and Rocketdyne. 'Once collected, the 
information must be reviewed and analyzed to identify significant trends 
or patterns which indicate engine condition. This data tracking system 
must include historical data on engine operations and performance. 
FIPM Useful in Evaluating Enqine Monitorinq Requirements. The 
FIPM approach was successfully modified to model the flow of information 
in the SSME components. The data base format allowed a substantial amount 
of data to be stored and manipulated. The records contained in the data 
base were used to analyze the failure information detectable by current 
HPOTP sensors and to evaluate several locations for new monitoring 
devices . 
Recommendations Encouraqe Continued Research and Development of 
SSME Condition Monitorinq System 
The recommendations provided below were formulated during the 
conduct of this study: 
i i i  
Continue the development and testing of new sensing 
techniques which target specific SSME failure modes 
(fi beroptic deflectometer, optical pyrometer, etc .) 
Design and develop an integrated condition monitoring system 
which includes both safety (real-time) and maintenance (off- 
line or ground-based) elements 
Pursue pattern recognition as a means for improving on-board 
engine condition monitoring 
Establish a condition monitoring data base to collect and 
integrate SSME historical and operational information 
Increase the computational capability of the SSME controller 
to expand engine monitoring 
Utilize the oxygen/hydrogen technology test bed engine to 
test and validate promising condition monitoring 
improvements. 
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STUDIES AND ANALYSES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE 
Contract Number NASw-3737 
FINAL REPORT 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has 
increasingly stressed condition monitoring and failure diagnostics as a 
major element of the Space Shuttle program. The overall importance of 
condition monitoring has been elevated by the reusability of key Space 
Shuttle hardware elements such as the Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main Engines 
(SSMES), and Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). Valid condition and failure 
data is needed to verify the proper functioning of the Space Shuttle 
during its mission as well as to evaluate the maintenance required between 
flights. The principal NASA goals for monitoring and diagnostic systems 
are increased Space Shuttle reliability and safety coupled with reduced 
maintenance and turnaround costs. To accomplish these goals, NASA is 
exploring the entire spectrum of monitoring and diagnostic techniques. 
Research is being conducted in the areas of instrumentation, data 
acquisition, data analysis, automated decision making, and automated 
record keeping. These investigations are being carried out by several of 
the NASA field centers with the support of a number of contractors. 
NASA is emphasizing the SSME as a key candidate for condition 
monitoring and diagnostics. The need for accurate SSME data is the direct 
result o f  the engine's vital role during Space Shuttle launch and ascent. 
The ability to monitor, diagnose, and control degradations or failures of 
an operating engine is important to both safety and mission success. I t  
is also desirable to obtain an accurate assessment of the engine's overall 
condition following each launch or ground test. Decisions concerning an 
engine's suitability for a subsequent mission or test and the extent of 
any post-operation maintenance or repairs require detailed data on major 
engine components. However, the goal of accurately monitoring and 
diagnosing conditions in the SSME is complicated by a number of factors 
including: the general engine design which maximizes performance while 
minimizing size and weight; the severe thermal and acoustic environments 
during engine operation; the physical properties of the liquid oxygen and 
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liquid hydrogen propellants; and the extremely small time constants 
associated with major degradations and failures. 
This study was initiated by the NASA Headquarters, Office of 
Shuttle Operations, Propulsion Division in July 1983 to evaluate various 
means for improving the condition monitoring (diagnostic) system for the 
SSME. The effort was to include both flight and ground test operations. 
The primary objective of the study was to maximize the information yield 
which could be obtained from the current engine sensors. The secondary 
objective was to identify additional sensors or diagnostic capabilities 
which would significantly improve the available engine data. The study 
also included continued development and support of the Main Engine 
Cost/Operations (MECO) model. 
The statement of work for this study included the following five 
tasks: 
SSME failure data review 
Diagnostic survey 
SSME diagnostic evaluation 
Diagnostic implementation plan 
MECO refinement and support. 
The SSME failure data review involved the collection, review, and 
assessment o f  available information on the engine failure modes and 
failure history. The results o f  this task would be used to determine 
engine monitoring priorities. The diagnostic survey was to collect and 
review information on a broad spectrum of sensors and techniques used in 
aerospace and other heavy industrial applications. The output would be 
used to identify promising candidates for application to the SSME. The 
SSME diagnostic evaluation was to combine the results of the failure data 
review and the diagnostic survey to determine ways to improve the SSME 
condition monitoring system. The diagnostic implementation plan was to 
suggest a programmatic and budgetary framework to accomplish the 
recommendations o f  this study. The MECO refinement and support task 
included continued user support for NASA Headquarters and program 
modifications to provide new capabilities. 
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NASA Headquarters decided in late 1984 to continue the effort 
begun under this contract by expanding the scope of the activities 
included in the SSME diagnostic evaluation. The task to develop a 
diagnostic implementation plan was deferred until the completion of the 
analysis activities. A contract modification added the following five 
tasks to the statement of work: 
Continuation of SSME di agnostic eval uat i on 
- Failure information propagation model ( F I P M )  data base 
development 
- SSME F I P M s  
Assessment of candidate diagnostics 
Analysis of existing engine data 
On-board diagnostic imp1 ications 
Diagnostic implementation plan (deferred from previous phase) 
MECO analysis and programming support. 
The task to continue the SSME diagnostic evaluation was focused on 
developing F I P M s  for the major SSME components. As a precursor to this 
activity, it was necessary to develop a computerized data base system to 
store and manipulate the associated information. The assessment of 
candidate diagnostics was to use the F I P M s  to analyze the failure 
information available at current sensor locations. This assessment was 
also to examine potential monitoring system improvements on the basis of 
the new failure information obtained. The analysis of existing engine 
data was directed at comparing the output of the F I P M  against recorded 
information from engine sensors. The on-board diagnostic implications 
task was to identify the potential controller and telemetry impacts which 
might result from suggested changes in the SSME condition monitoring 
system. The implementation plan was to provide a suggested schedule and 
funding level required to develop any candidate improvements resulting 
from this study. The final task was to provide continued support of the 
MECO model to NASA Headquarters. 
This report summarizes all of the work performed under NASA 
Contract Number NASw-3737. The major sections o f  this report correspond 
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t o  the study tasks mentioned i n  the preceding paragraphs. I t  should be 
noted tha t  this contract was transferred from NASA Headquarters t o  the 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Science and Engineering Directorate, 
Propulsion Laboratory i n  March 1986. Most of the work d u r i n g  the second 
phase of this study was accomplished under the direction of the Marshall 
Space Flight Center (MSFC) technical s t a f f .  
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SSME FAILURE DATA REVIEW 
The first task of the SSME study was to develop an understanding 
of the engine operating characteristics and failure modes. The task 
included collection and reduction of data on SSME failure modes, 
categorization of the failure modes, ranking of the failure modes, 
identification and evaluation of measurable parameters for each failure 
mode, and identification of parameters for possible trending information. 
This information is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of diagnostic 
monitoring systems. 
Failure Modes Analysis 
Data Collection 
Most of the data necessary for the failure modes analysis was 
supplied by the Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International Corporation, 
Canoga Park, CA. The main source of information was the Unsatisfactory 
Condition Reports (UCRs). Since there were many UCRs written and 
Rocketdyne's previous study had included UCR information through 1979, it 
was decided in the present study to review all UCRs in a three-line format 
from January 1980 through November 1983. After the preliminary data 
reduction had taken place, selected full-page UCRs were collected for 
review. Other supplemental information received from Rocketdyne included 
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Report and Accident/Incident 
Reports for 1980 through 1983. 
To provide Battelle personnel with additional information, 
engine data from a recent test firing and a Shuttle flight were obtained 
from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) along with general 
information on the SSME program. A diagnostics overview presentation was 
given by NASA Lewis Research Center (LeRC) personnel along with other 
general information needed to educate the Battel le researchers about 
various aspects of the SSME program. Information was also obtained from 
Rocketdyne personnel at NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) with regard to 
maintenance procedure and history. 
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UCR Review 
To 
importance, a 
ident i fy the SSME failure modes and their relative 
1 three-1 ,,le UCRs wr, tten from January 1980 through November 
1983 were reviewed and categorized. Approximately 3000 UCRs were used in 
the review process. Each UCR had a criticality factor associated with it 
which ranged from one to three, one being the most dangerous. The only 
UCRs that were eliminated on the basis of their low criticality factor 
were those that had criticality N ,  or no criticality factor. These were 
very minor problems for which a UCR should not necessarily have been 
written. Some UCRs of criticality three were eliminated because the 
problem described could not possibly cause any failures. Examples of this 
type include UCRs written on normal discolorations of the main combustion 
chamber or small contaminants on the nozzle that could not affect engine 
performance. Approximately 2900 UCRs were included in the first-cut 
review. 
The complete listing of the UCRs and their criticalities by 
component is contained in Reference 1, Appendix A. A sample of the UCR 
listing is shown in Figure 1. The high-pressure fuel turbopump had the 
most UCRs followed by the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump and the 
nozzle, respectively. The high-pressure oxidizer turbopump had the most 
criticality one UCRs, followed by the main injector, heat exchanger, and 
high-pressure fuel turbopump, in that order. 
A breakdown of the failure modes, cause, and recurrence control 
for each component is contained in Reference 1, Appendix B. A sample 
failure table mode is given in Figure 2. There were literally hundreds of 
failure modes identified, many having several causes. A large percentage 
of the problems were assembly or manufacturing problems. Most listed 
design, assembly, or manufacturing changes to correct the problems. 
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Component Oescri pt ion 
No. of CRITICALITY 
UCR'S  1 2 3 N* 
A100 
A150 
A200 
A330 
A340 
A600 
A700 
8200 
8400 
Hot Gas Manifold 
Heat Exchanger 
Main Injector 
Main Combustion Chamber 
Nozzle 
Fuel Preburner 
Oxidizer Preburner 
Hign Pressure Fuel Turbopuq 
Hign Pressure Oxidizer Turbopunp 
80 2 77 1 
18 4 12 2 
175 5 3 162 5 
105 1 3 9 8  3 
296 2 285 9 
171 2 165 4 
13 13 
457 3 11 429 14 
331 7 11 302 11 
F IGURE 1. SAMPLE OF F I R S T  UCR REVIEW L I S T I N G  BY COMPONENT 
Fai 1. Fallure Mode - Failure Cause - Total Criticality 
ID Recurrence Control NO. 1 2 3 N 
1 Leak 
(a) Pin Plug Leak--Inadequate Seal--Add 
Leak Test 1 
(b)  Wireway Leak--Epoxy Old Not Adhere-- 
(c) Internal Leak--Tolerance Stackup-- 
(d) Hyd Oil Leak--Excessive Proof Test 
(e) Static Seal Leak--8urr Induced Scratch-- 
(9) Wireway Leak--Inadequate Epoxy Coverage-- 
Process Change 3 
Oetectable in Test 2 
Cycling--None 2 
New Inspectlon 1 
2 
Spec. Change 2 
( f )  Vent Port Leak--Defective 0-Ring--Open 
2 Hydraulic Lockup Orift--Mfg. Error--0etectable-- 
None 5 
3 Slew Rate Error--Contamjnation--None 2 
2 
5 
2 
FIGURE 2. SAMPLE OF F I R S T  UCR REVIEW FAILURE MODE TABLES 
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The next step in data reduction was to chart the failure modes 
over time to see whether the recurrence control procedures had remedied 
the problems. Also, the failure mode listings were revised to combine 
like failure modes and to eliminate those that were minor, had occurred 
only once or twice, and where the corrective action showed that there were 
no recurrences. The results o f  this review are contained in Reference 1, 
Appendix C. A sample second-cut UCR table is shown in Figure 3 .  After 
this step, the number of UCRs remaining was approximately 1900 from the 
original 3000 reviewed including 260 failure modes. 
Description - Cause 
variations-evaluation 
FIGURE 3 .  SAMPLE OF SECOND-CUT UCR TABLES 
The final step in the UCR data reduction was to collect the 
significant full-page UCRs and review the detailed information. At least 
one full-page UCR was requested from Rocketdyne for each failure mode 
identified. As a result of this step, several more failure modes were 
eliminated because they were minor problems of an aesthetic nature or were 
items which quality control and/or engine pretesting would eliminate. 
Some failure mode descriptions were modified using the more detailed 
information in the full-page UCRs. The full-page UCRs also provided more 
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information as to the severity of the failure mode for use in the ranking 
of the failure modes. At the conclusion of the full-page UCR review, some 
failure modes were found to be similar enough to be grouped together. 
With some of the failure modes being eliminated, there were 1440 of the 
original 3000 UCRs and approximately 190 failure modes. 
Many of the failure modes in the UCR review were of an 
infrequent nature and were the result of assembly, procedure, or repair 
mistakes. Only a few of the failures were recurrent in nature and posed 
an important safety risk. (Among these were turbopump bearing wear, 
turbine blade cracking, nozzle leaks, injector erosion, and sensor system 
f ai 1 ures . ) 
The failure modes were then placed into fifteen categories and 
tabulated for each component. This categorization resulted in a matrix 
which is found in Reference 1, Appendix D. Figure 4 gives one dimension 
of the matrix, the number of UCRs versus failure type after the completed 
screening process. Cracking, usually caused by vibration or thermally 
induced fatigue, was shown to be the dominant failure type followed by 
various leakage problems. Most of the leakage UCRs were written on the 
nozzle coolant tubes which are mainly a time consuming maintenance item. 
The electrical problems mostly related to the sensors and their associated 
wiring. Contamination was a significant problem and was found on many of 
the components; it was usually caused by assembly errors and some 
contamination could precipitate many other failures depending upon the 
type of contaminant and location involved. Erosion was mainly a problem 
in the high temperature areas such as the injectors, turbines, and 
igniters. Wear was typically a problem for the high-pressure oxidizer 
turbopump bearings and this has been a continuing problem on the SSME. 
Torque, vibration, and excess travel problems are measurements made on the 
turbopumps to check for problems before they lead to catastrophic 
failure. The rest of the categories are not indicative of any particular 
component of the SSME. 
Figure 5 shows the number of UCRs versus individual SSME 
components. The dominance of the two high-pressure turbopumps along with 
the disparity between the preburners are the most striking features in the 
graph. A detailed listing of the failure types and causes for each 
component is found in Reference 1, Appendix E. 
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A brief description of the fa 
for most of the major components follows: 
lure modes and general prob ems 
High-pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP) - The turbine area of the 
HPFTP is subjected to higher temperature and pressure than the 
other turbopumps in the SSME and consequently has more 
problems. Erosion and fatigue cracking were the subject of many 
UCRs for the turbine blades, turbine sheetmetal , and preburner 
to turbine joint area. The pump inlet and diffuser had a few 
failures along with some minor bearing problems. Seal leakage 
and rubbing has been more of a problem than in the high-pressure 
oxidizer turbopump. Vibration due to cavitation and possible 
near resonance vibration conditions have been the subject of 
several UCRs. 
High-pressure Oxidizer Turbopump (HPOTP) - Bearing problems have 
been a major source of UCRs for the HPOTP including severe 
vibration levels during testing as well as bearing ball and race 
wear. Bearing cage del amination has a1 so occurred several 
times. Turbine blade cracking and erosion has been a lesser 
problem on this turbopump than for the fuel turbopump. 
Contamination and erosion of the turbine area is also a 
concern. Turbine area rubbing and minor sheetmetal cracking 
have also been reported. 
Nozzle - Unlike the rotating machinery, the nozzle has only a 
few problems. Cracking and leakage in the small nozzle coolant 
tubes that line the inside of the nozzle are the most common 
source of UCRs. Nozzle coolant tube leakage i s  caused by 
vibration fatigue, thermal fatigue, and brazing anomalies in 
assembly or repair. While these leaks are usually a nuisance 
item, the nozzle has been the source of at least one 
catastrophic failure. A steerhorn rupture caused by the use of 
incorrect weld wire during fabrication destroyed an engine on 
the National Space Technology Laboratories (NSTL) test stand. 
Sensors and Electrical Harnesses - Sensor or sensor output 
failures were a frequent problem and are to be expected in view 
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of the environmental 
Typical ly , temperature 
fa i lure  rate.  Sensor 
extremes associated with the SSME. 
and pressure sensors had the highest 
r e l i ab i l i t y  i s  an extremely important 
factor in designing an on-board diagnostic system. To date, the 
only specific action taken with respect t o  a post-flight data 
review i s  t o  replace faulty sensors or sensor cabling. 
Fuel Preburner (FPB) , Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) , and Main 
Injector - All three of these components have similar problems 
even though the fuel preburner dominates the number of UCRs. 
This i s  probably due t o  the higher temperature and pressure in 
the FPB. Erosion and cracking of the LOX posts and injector 
faceplates are the most frequent subject of the UCRs on the 
injectors.  Vibration, temperature, and nonconcentricity of the 
LOX posts are the primary causes of injector fa i lures .  
Hot-Gas Manifold ( H G M )  - Cracking and rupture of ducting was the 
primary fa i lure  mode and t h i s  i s  caused by vibration loading or 
assembly error.  Leakage a t  the jo in ts  along with loose 
fasteners which could cause leakage was also a problem. 
Main Combustion Chamber (MCC) - Most of the UCRs were written 
for  erosion or cracking on the hot-gas wall of the MCC. Low- 
pressure fuel turbine drive manifold leaks were the only major 
f a i lu re  occurrences for  this component. 
Heat Exchanger ( H E )  - There were few UCRs written for  the heat 
exchanger, probably because of the extreme precautions taken 
during assembly. Small leaks of oxygen from the HE would be 
catastrophic, so even minor tolerance and clearance 
discrepancies were reported in UCRs. 
Low-Pressure Turbopumps (LPFTP)  and (LPOTP) - These had problems 
similar t o  those for  the high-pressure turbopumps, b u t  they were 
minor in nature and much less frequent. 
Valves and Actuators - Leaks were the common thread throughout 
the UCRs on these components. Internal leakage and ball seal 
leakage occurred in various valves and actuators. A 1  so,  valves 
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did not function properly due to contaminants or a noisy or 
erratic position transducer signal. 
Igniter - The igniter UCRs usually dealt with either the 
electrical connection or tip erosion failures. 
Fuel Line, Oxidizer Line, and Drain Line Ducts - Joint problems 
and joint leakage were the focus of most of these UCRs. Weld 
and seal cracks also occurred. 
Gimbal - Wear of the gimbal and cracks in the bushing were the 
two failure modes which caused UCRs to be written for the 
gimbal. 
SSME Accident/Incident ReDorts Review 
Major failures of the SSME or its components are subjected to a 
rigorous review with the results summarized in Accident/Incident Reports. 
The eight reports written between January 1980 and 
reviewed for failure mode information and the 
instrumentation for failure detection. Summaries 
reports are contained in Reference 1, Appendix F. 
During this four-year period, there were no 
December 1983 were 
value of present 
of the individual 
dupl ications of any 
of these major failures. This indicates the complexity of the SSME and 
the degree o f  randomness involved in the failures. The nonrepetitiveness 
of the failures is also  influenced by the detailed analysis o f  the 
incidents and the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. 
Certain reports showed that human error in the SSME fabrication 
and assembly cannot totally be eliminated. The use of the wrong weld wire 
on the steerhorn portion of the nozzle caused a catastrophic failure and a 
welding mistake on the heat exchanger coil could have destroyed an engine 
or worse had it gone undetected. The UCR data reviewed has shown that 
human error in fabrication, assembly, and repair has been a constant 
source of problems. 
Most of the catastrophic failures occurred on test stands after 
the instrumentation had indicated an unsafe condition and shutdown 
procedures had been started. In these cases, the time between detection 
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of the measured failure condition and the consequent engine destruction 
was much shorter than the time to safely shut down the engine. To 
correctly and safely shut down the SSME, deteriorating conditions must be 
detected earlier than is presently being done. Because of the random 
causes of these major failures, the diagnostic system design should 
include as many of the engine parameters as is economically and 
technically possible. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analvsis ReDort Review 
The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Report prepared by 
Rocketdyne was reviewed to evaluate failure modes to help in ranking them. 
Although it was some help for major failure types and valve procedure 
problems, the FMEA Report did not contain a sufficiently thorough analysis 
of the failure modes and their propagation paths. 
Fault tree diagrams are very helpful in charting failure modes 
and their effects on the engine. Figure 6 shows an example of such a 
diagram for the hot-gas manifold. Reference 1, Appendix G contains fault 
tree diagrams for each of the major components. The diagrams provided in 
this report are not at a detailed piece-part level, but at the level 
shown, they can help with two major tasks. They show the cause and effect 
of particular failure modes in a simple graphical fashion which determines 
their relevant importance and provides a means for diagnosis. Another 
important aspect of the fault tree diagram is that they allow the 
representation of failure propagation times for each step in the failure 
process, and this is important in structuring a diagnostic system, as 
indicated below. 
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F I G U R E  6.  FAULT TREE DIAGRAM FOR HOT-GAS MANIFOLD 
Because the time between the duct rupturing and engine fire 
(Figure 6) could be practically instantaneous, detection o f  such ruptures 
is too late for shutdown and would not be an effective diagnostic 
measurement. The diagram shows that cracking precedes rupturing of the 
duct and may be detectable for many seconds before rupture occurs. If the 
failure could be detected at this level, the engine could be safely shut 
down and repaired. To detect all the causes of cracking, however, might 
take a prohibitive amount of time and be very costly. 
I n  many cases, the most desired failure mode to detect may be 
real istical ly undetectable because of the advanced level of technology 
needed or because the environment within the engine would preclude 
measurement. In these cases, ground inspection techniques for the failure 
modes may be necessary. The fault tree diagram can be used to check the 
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completeness of the diagnostic system. If the system checks for cracking 
of the ducts, but fails to detect loose bolts, the diagram in Figure 6 
indicates that an engine fire would still be a possibility. Thus, if a 
particular failure mode propagates very quickly and there is presently no 
method for detection, then it may be cost effective to develop an 
appropriate sensor. 
To conclude, the FMEA report should be greatly expanded with 
inputs from the Rocketdyne design groups for each particular component by 
assessing the thermal and vibration environment in conjunction with the 
design parameters. 
Test Firinq Cutoff UCRs Review 
The UCRs that resulted from test firing cutoffs (shutdowns) from 
early 1975 through late 1983 were reviewed to assist in determining the 
usefulness of the present sensors on the SSME for the design of a 
diagnostic system. Even though the sensors produced a significant number 
of improper cutoffs, as shown in the tables in Reference 1, Appendix H, 
there were also many shutdowns that were due to valid measurements. These 
shutdowns were usually due to simple signal-level-activated commands. 
However, several catastrophic failures occurred after some safety 1 imits 
("red 1 ines") had been exceeded but before shutdown could be completed. 
Figure 7 is an example of the tables of the reduced UCR data. 
The data are organized by the measurement that caused shutdown. The year 
of occurrence, the number of improper cutoffs, the criticality of the UCR, 
the place they occurred, and the determined cause and action taken are 
included in the table. If there was a valid reason for the measurement to 
have exceeded the appropriate "red line" level, it was not an improper 
cutoff. Of over 255 test firing cutoffs, 41 (16 percent) were the fault 
of the test facility or the controller; 130 (51 percent) of the UCRs 
involved cutoffs for valid reasons. 
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This does not, however, mean that a similar event would result 
in an engine shutdown during flight. The importance of engine power 
output to the safety of a flight is such that many undesirable conditions 
would be accepted, but the basis for an overall diagnostic system may well 
reside with these previously used basic sensors. Other activities, 
moreover, will be required to adapt these sensors. For example, signal 
processing techniques, such as frequency domain and trend analysis, may be 
utilized to locate specific failures. Outputs from several sensors may 
indicate a unique failure mode (pattern recognition). Downstream and 
upstream sensors can be used to validate sensor output to improve the 
reliability of any diagnosis. Some of these techniques can be used for 
prognostic monitoring, and with the inclusion of a ground-based data 
acquisition and maintenance computer system, the results can be in the 
maintenance personnel ' s hands before the Shutt 1 e returns. Such an 
"expert system" would be too slow for on-board diagnosis using today's 
computer technology, but may become a viable on-board tool in the future. 
For the most part, fast-propagating and high-criticality failure 
modes are key targets for any on-board diagnostic or shutdown decisions. 
The present sensors should be helpful , but optimized placement of these 
sensors may be necessary. Also, knowledge of the background signal levels 
and expected signal levels of the failure modes is important. 
Failure Mode Rankinq 
To assess the importance of each failure mode to the design of a 
diagnostic monitoring system, a procedure for ranking the failure modes 
was developed. Three factors were given equal weighting for the ranking: 
Cost Factor - estimated cost per year of the failure after 
subtracting the cost that diagnostics could not eliminate 
Risk Factor - based on the criticality factor 
Time Factor - estimated time for failure mode to propagate to a 
catastrophic failure. 
A detailed explanation of the ranking procedure can be found in Reference 
1, Appendix I along with the tabulated results. The failure modes are 
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ranked in categories of importance from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most 
critical and 10 the least. 
Failure modes in Categories 1 through 5, listed in Table 1, are 
most important and must be considered in the design of an on-board 
diagnostic system. In Categories 6 through 10, some failure modes may 
still be economically included in an on-board system although they are not 
ranked very high. Their inclusion should depend on the additional cost 
involved to detect each failure mode. Due to economic and technical 
considerations, some highly-rated failure modes may be impossible to 
include in an on-board system in the near future, but they are important 
areas for research and development of either in-flight or ground-based 
detection methods. 
Measurement Parameter Analvsis 
Once the importance of the failure modes to the design of a 
diagnostic system has been evaluated, the measurements that can detect 
each failure mode must be identified and evaluated. To evaluate the 
measurement parameters, certain factors must be assessed such as signal 
level, background noise, existence of commercially available transducers, 
feasibility of developing special transducers, and the information 
necessary to uniquely identify the failure modes. 
Signal level and background noise can only be roughly evaluated 
by experience and engineering judgment. An important step in evaluating 
signal levels quantitatively is to review the real-time data recordings 
of test stand and flight engine firings. Analyzing the real-time analog 
data should provide enough information to assess signal and noise levels, 
and may also indicate signal processing enhancements that would 
discriminate particular failure occurrences. 
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TABLE 1. FAILURE MODE RANKING RESULTS FOR RANK 5 OR ABOVE 
RANK COMPONENT FAILURE MODE 
1 
2 
5 
HPOTP 
Heat Exchanger 
Hot-Gas Man i fo ld  
Hot-Gas Man i fo ld  
Main I n j e c t o r  
HPOTP 
MCC 
HPFTP 
Sensors 
Nozzle 
Fuel Preburner 
HPFTP 
HPFTP 
HPFTP 
B a l l  Valves 
Poppet Valves 
Sensors 
Main I n j e c t o r  
Fuel Preburner 
Fuel Preburner 
Fuel Preburner 
HPFTP 
HPFTP 
HPFTP 
HPFTP 
HPOTP 
HPOTP 
Check Valves 
I g n i t e r  
E l e c t r i c a l  Harnesses 
E l e c t r i c a l  Harnesses 
E l e c t r i c a l  Harnesses 
Duct Seals 
HPOTP 
V ib ra t i on  - bear ing load ing  
Cracks, leak i n  c o i l  
Cracks, rup tu re  i n  duct  
Leak i n  MCC i g n i t i o n  j o i n t  
AS1 supply l i n e  cracks 
Bearing b a l l  and race wear 
Turbine d r i v e  man i fo ld  leak 
6-5 j o i n t  eros ion 
Temp. and press. output  f a i l u r e s  
Steerhorn rup tu re  
Faceplate eros ion 
D i f f u s e r  f a i l u r e  
I n l e t  f a i l u r e  
Missing s h i e l d  nuts  
B a l l  seal leak and b a l l  me l t i ng  
Cracked poppet 
Temperature sensor debonding 
Heat s h i e l d  r e t a i n e r  cracks 
B a f f l e  and LOX post  eros ion 
B a f f l e ,  molyshie ld ,  and l i n e r  
cracks 
Miss ing lex t ra  support p i n s  . 
Turbine blade and p l a t f o r m  
eros ion 
Seal crack ing 
Cool ie  cap nu t  c rack ing  
Broken t u r b i n e  blades 
Turbine blade cracks 
Bearing cage delaminat ion 
Check va lve leaks 
I g n i t e r  t i p  eros ion 
B i  rdcaged harness 
Loose, de fec t i ve  connector 
Debonded torque lock  
Seal damage 
V ib ra t i on  l e v e l  - c a v i t a t i o n  
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With reference to Figure 4, the several hundred failure modes 
for the entire engine can be reduced to about fifteen failure types. In 
particular leaks and cracks are by far the most common failure type among 
all the failure modes. Each failure type has a unique signature, but 
since many failure modes have the same failure type, it may be difficult 
to identify a particular failure mode. A brief description of each 
failure type, the nature of the signal produced, and the possibility of 
identifying individual failure modes follows: 
Leaks - Leakage of a liquid or gas from the system, or from one 
component to another within the system, can occur in several 
ways. It may be due to a crack in a structure, a bad seal, or 
possibly a malfunctioning valve. Presently, leaks are detected 
between flights by pressurizing the system with helium. The 
signals produced by leakage for possible in-flight detection are 
sound, vibration, optical, and possibly, in some cases, 
temperature or engine performance. In most cases, the sound and 
vibration signals will be low when compared to the background 
noise, probably even at ultrasonic frequencies (acoustic 
emission frequencies). An acoustic emission method for leak 
detection would moreover require many transducers to detect a1 1 
the possible places that leaks can occur even if selected as a 
between-flight method of leak detection. Optical methods such 
as holographic leak detection are still in the developmental 
stages and also have resolution problems in detecting small 
leaks and are moreover only applicable where easy access i s  
possible (e.g., for external leakage). In many cases, indirect 
measurements such as temperature, flow, or pressure may infer 
leakage. For example, leakage of hot gas into coolant passages 
could be detected by temperature measurements. Also if the 
leakage is severe enough, it will affect the downstream pressure 
and flow. 
Cracks - Cracking of a structure i s  usually caused by mechanical 
or thermal loading which can eventually lead to failure of the 
structure with possible secondary effects such as fluid 
leakage. One present method of detecting cracking is by 
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measuring the acoustic signal in the structure's material caused 
by the energy released through the cracking phenomena. These 
signals are detected by acoustic emission transducers at a 
frequency dependent upon material properties. High background 
noise, however, may be a problem in the application of this 
technique to many parts of the SSME. Other detection methods 
include magnetic, electric potential , and mechanical impedance 
methods. When the cracking leads to other problems, detection 
of these failure modes may be easier. But, since these are 
secondary effects, catastrophic failure of a component may be 
imminent, and the ability to shut down the SSME with minimal 
damage at this point may be impossible. Nevertheless, 
predicting cracking by trending vibration and temperature data 
should be useful in monitoring structural fatigue life. 
Erosion - Erosion o f  surfaces usually occurs in the hot-gas 
turbine sections of turbopumps and in injectors. In the case of 
injectors, local hot spots may indicate erosion. In the case of 
both turbine and injector erosion, the performance of the 
turbopump and downstream components wi 1 1  directly be affected 
and should give rise to indicative measurements. Temperature 
trending of these components may be the most useful measurement 
possible in flight. Detection of ablated particles or, more 
likely, surface wear is possible in the case of erosion. 
Isotope wear detection, presently being developed by Rocketdyne, 
is considered to have the best chance of success for erosion 
detection. 
Wear - Wear is caused by surface friction on a component due to 
mechanical contact or flow impingement. Erosion is a special 
case of wear, but it has been considered in a separate category 
of its own. Wear was considered, in this study, to result from 
mechanical contact between components with relative motion. 
Wear in the SSME generally occurs in the rotating machinery, 
e.g. the turbopumps. Bearings are the most critical parts 
affected by wear, followed by seals. Rubbing usually causes 
vibration, and in many cases the nature of the vibration signal 
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can be used to identify which parts are involved. For example, 
seal rubbing may involve some RPM related vibration as well as 
indirect measurements such as reduced shaft RPM and torque. 
Wear is usually detected at high frequencies where the ambient 
noise is relatively low. More accurate measurements may be made 
by isotope wear detection (but not for pitting) , magnetic wear 
detection, or ultrasonic doppler transducer. Magnetic wear 
detection measures the ball passage frequency. Ultrasonic 
doppler transducers can detect the shaft vibration, and should 
be more sensitive to bearing wear than vibration of the housing. 
Detection of worn particles or surface wear is also possible, 
as in the case of erosion. Isotope wear shows the most promise 
in this category. All these wear detection methods, moreover, 
are nonintrusive. Another possible wear measurement device, the 
fiberoptic deflectometer, however, would be intrusive. 
Dings, Dents, and Damage - This is a general category that 
usually relates to debris impacting a part of the SSME. This 
can usually be detected by vibration sensors as a high-energy 
impulse signal. 
Electrical - Electrical problems in this study relate to 
sensors, sensor cabling, and electrical connections. Many 
systems presently can self-check for continuity and other 
transducers can be used to verify the validity of a sensor's 
output (analytic redundancy) , rather than using multiple sensor 
redundancy to increase sensor reliability. 
Contamination - Contamination is a broad category o f  foreign 
deposits or objects present in a component. In most cases there 
is little or no effect, but problems such as reduced coolant 
flow through passages and impaired valve operation can occur. 
The effects of contamination can manifest themselves in 
different ways, but temperature, flow, and pressure 
measurements generally provide a good indication of a serious 
con t am i n a t i on pro b 1 em. 
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Del ami nat i on and 
extensions of 
previously disc 
vibration signal 
catastrophic f ai 
Loose Parts - 
involving bolts 
Broken Parts - These failure types are further 
cracking and several other failure types 
ssed. When a part fails structurally, the 
will increase dramatically in most cases, but 
ure of the engine may also be imminent. 
This category usually refers to connections 
or other fasteners. The possibilities for 
detection include increased vibration levels, an optical method, 
and measurement of torque on the bolt. 
Missing/Extra Parts - This failure type is usually a problem 
with stud keys or other small parts that are installed in large 
quantities. Inspection and verification during assembly or 
between firings is the only way to directly detect missing or 
extra parts. One verification method might involve accurately 
weighing subcomponents before final assembly. Miss i ng/extra 
parts may also result in another failure type that may be 
detected in flight, e.g. loose bolts. 
Torque, Vibration, and Excess Travel - These measurements have 
all been used as criteria for assessing turbopump condition. 
All three have the potential for being performed in flight and 
could be used in combination to adequately evaluate turbopump 
condition. 
Tolerance - Tolerance problems can possibly be detected in 
flight by optical methods, but ground inspection is usually 
required. Optical methods for enhancing ground-based inspection 
o f  injector parts could possibly save time, but these techniques 
will need extensive development. 
Information on potentially useful transducers for detecting 
particular failure modes came from several sources including the 
diagnostic survey conducted as part of this study, the Rocketdyne Reusable 
Rocket Enqine Maintenance Study, Final Report, and Battel le's past 
experience. Detailed descriptions of several promising sensors and 
diagnostic techniques are included in this section's recommendations or in 
the section covering the diagnostic survey. 
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To evaluate diagnostics for detection of particular failure 
modes, a Battell e devel oped tool, the Fai 1 ure Information Propagat ion 
Model (FIPM), has been used and is described in detail in a subsequent 
section of this report. This tool can be used to evaluate the information 
at a transducer location and to assess the ability of the entire 
transducer set to identify engine failure modes. 
The results of the measurement parameter analysis for each 
component are described in tabular form in Reference 1, Appendix J. A 
sample table of results is shown in Figure 8. The failure modes, their 
causes, rankings, and effects are listed in the tables. The possible 
measurable parameters for each failure mode are listed along with possible 
in-flight and between-flight sensors or techniques. Additional comments 
are also supplied to indicate relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
measurement techniques. 
For most failures, the possibility exists to trend or detect 
their occurrence with conventional transducers that are already being used 
on the SSME. The problem is that current engine transducers may not be 
strategically located for detection of many of these failures. Knowledge 
of the signal content is also insufficient to differentiate between the 
many possible failure modes detectable by a given transducer. There are 
also some transducing methods that need development, but which have 
excellent promise for detecting failure modes which are undetectable by 
conventional methods. 
The use of sensor data for failure trending could reduce the 
amount of between-flight inspections. Any failure mode that involves a 
slow degradation or fatigue type of failure could be trended. Detailed 
descriptions of measurements that can be used for trending particular 
failure modes are included in the measurement parameter tables found in 
Reference 1, Appendix J. Many fatigue failures in the turbopumps and 
other components can be trended with mechanical and thermal load history 
information obtained by accelerometers, other vibration transducers, and 
temperature sensors. Injector and hot-gas component erosion can be 
trended with temperature measurements and, in some cases, pressure 
measurements. 
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Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from the failure modes and measurement 
parameter analyses are: 
Turbopumps have the highest priority for in-flight 
monitoring, but many other components also have high-ranking 
failure modes which must be considered. 
Major accident failure modes have been random in nature and 
the commonly recurring failure modes general ly have not been 
to blame. Many of the major accidents were due to either 
assembly, manufacturing, or design problems which must be 
considered in the development of a diagnostic system. 
Presently, many failure modes are detected too late to safely 
shut down the SSME with minimal damage. The propagation rate 
of many failure modes provides an extreme challenge in 
designing an effective diagnostic system. 
Test firing cutoff UCR data reveal that the present sensors 
can be valuable for reliably diagnosing many failure modes. 
This could and should be achieved with proper signal 
processing, pattern recognition (unique combination of sensor 
outputs) , analytical redundancy (correlate outputs from 
upstream and downstream sensors) , and development of more 
rugged sensors and cab1 i ng . 
Some recently developed and novel sensors could be useful for 
detection of critical failure modes, especially in the high- 
speed turbopumps. Some of these can target key failure modes 
that may be masked from conventional sensors. They are 
described in the diagnostic survey discussion or in this 
section's recommendations. In many cases, there will be a 
great deal of development required before these new sensors 
are flight ready. The most immediate gains may be made by 
improving the use of the present sensors. 
Many slow-developing fatigue or wear related failures can be 
trended by information from conventional sensors, both to 
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predict eventual failure and to reduce the amount of between- 
flight inspections. Such applications are possible for many 
turbopump and injector failure modes. 
Recommendations 
Diagnostic monitoring o f  the SSME can be improved by better use 
of present instrumentation, installation of more conventional sensors, and 
use of some recently developed sensing techniques which target specific 
failure modes. Three important steps for improving flight safety and 
maintenance costs are: 
Design of an integrated diagnostic system including both in- 
flight monitoring and ground inspection and maintenance. 
Improving failure diagnosis with conventional sensors by 
analysis of present flight and test firing data as well as 
assessment of signal processing and enhancement techniques to 
identify failure modes. 
Further development and testing of promising sensing 
techniques which target costly and hazardous failure modes 
that are difficult to detect with conventional sensors. 
To design an effective diagnostic system for reduction of 
maintenance costs, turnaround time, and catastrophic failure risk; failure 
information in the entire SSME must be evaluated. The Failure Information 
Propagation Model (FIPM) is being used to evaluate failure information for 
all possible failure modes on the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump and 
assess sensing opportunities at various locations in the turbopump. Once 
the FIPM is completed for all components, a qualitative evaluation of a 
complete SSME diagnostic system can be made. The FIPM will help determine 
how better to use conventional and advanced technology sensors for in- 
flight monitoring and trending of information in conjunction with 
necessary ground inspections. An important aspect in the design of the 
complete diagnostic system is to incorporate an effective computerized 
information system for data processing and retrieval. Such a system would 
give maintenance personnel the relevant information to quickly assess and 
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complete between-fl ight inspection and maintenance and would also be 
adaptable to incorporate new diagnostic developments. 
There are many opportunities to improve the capabilities of the 
present sensor set as well as possible additional conventional sensors. 
The key to developing the use of these sensors is analyze the recorded 
analog flight and test firing data. By looking at the full bandwidth of 
the sensors, combining various sensor outputs, and correlating the signals 
with the known failure occurrences, diagnosis of many failure modes may be 
improved. Also, the FIPM can be useful in identifying possible 
applications for the present sensors and situations where additional 
conventional sensors would be helpful. The reliability problems of the 
present conventional sensors can be attacked by technological gains in 
hardening the sensors and through analytical redundancy in checking the 
validity o f  the sensor outputs. Analytical redundancy could reduce the 
number of sensors needed and thus reduce the amount of sensor repair and 
replacement. Specific applications are detailed in the measurement 
parameter tables in Reference 1, Appendix K. 
Some new sensors may see applications' on 'the SSME in the next 
couple years and others could be developed for use on the engine within 
five years. Most of these new or additional sensors target specific 
failure modes that are both costly and not presently detectable by 
conventional sensors. A list o f  the most promising sensors or sensing 
techniques follows: 
Partially Developed and Tested 
Isotope Wear Detection - Between-flight nonintrusive 
detection of slowly developing wear-related failure modes. 
Potential uses, mainly in the turbopumps, include bearings, 
seals, and turbine blades. Cannot detect cracking or 
pitting. Presently being tested by Rocketdyne with funding 
from NASA LeRC. 
Ultrasonic Doppler Transducer - Nonintrusive means of 
detecting shaft vibration through solid and liquid 
interfaces. Extremely sensitive to imbalance and other RPM 
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related vibration and may be useful for detecting other 
failure modes on the information rich shaft assemblies of the 
turbopump. It can detect cavitation, bearing wear, and seal 
rubbing. Developed by Battelle and tested at NASA MSFC in 
the mid-70's. 
Fiberoptic Deflectometer - Possibly more durable than 
conventional accelerometers and can potentially target 
specific vibration problems that need intrusive measurement 
capabilities such as bearing wear. Presently being tested at 
NASA LeRC by Rocketdyne. 
Ultrasonic Flowmeter - Has been tested as a means of 
nonintrusively measuring flow through ducts. The mounting 
conditions, however, have caused a duct to rupture. With 
proper design o f  the duct and transducer mounting, this 
sensor is believed to be a reliable method of detecting flow 
rate. 
Optical Pyrometer - For possible trending, of turbine blade 
cracking . May have resol uti on and cal i brat i on probl ems , but 
there is no other acceptable method of detecting this failure 
mode at present. Under test by Rocketdyne with funding by 
NASA LeRC. 
Borescope Image Processor - Off-the-shelf packages are 
available to enhance the visual inspection o f  internal 
parts. New generation borescopes may be much better for low- 
light situations. 
Devices with Major Development Efforts Needed 
Magnetic Wear Detector - A small experiment at Battelle 
showed that the ball passage rate can be monitored by a Hall- 
effect sensor. Bearing ball wear will change the contact 
angle and thus the ball speed. If the signal can be cleaned 
up enough, higher order effects may also be detected. Could 
be used as either a flight sensor or ground inspection 
met hod. 
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Acoustic Emission Detectors - Possible in-flight applications 
for detecting cracks and leaks of quickly propagating failure 
modes. May have resolution problems in high background noise 
environment. Cracks and leaks are by far the most 
predominate types of failures. 
Laser Doppler Velocimeter - Can measure flow speed and 
direction, but needs access via an optic fiber through a hole 
or "window" . 
Tracers Added to Helium Leak Detection - A radioactive tracer 
(Krypton, Tritium, etc.) could improve leak detection for 
ground-based applications. 
Holographic Leak Detection - Has the possibility of detecting 
and locating leaks faster and more effectively than the 
present helium method. Being investigated in a detailed 
Rocketdyne study. 
Exo-Electron Emission - May be useful, in ground inspection 
for cracked parts. Also detailed in Rocketdyne study. 
All o f  the above measurement applications should be evaluated for cost 
effective means of improving the present diagnostic system, but the most 
immediate improvements should come through studying the on-board sensors. 
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DIAGNOSTICS SURVEY 
A survey of the state of the art of machine diagnostics was 
performed as the second task in the SSME study. In this survey, a general 
look was taken at the area of machine diagnostics across three rather 
broadly defined application areas: 
1. Diagnostics for liquid-fueled rocket engines, 
2. Diagnostics for aircraft engines, 
3 .  Diagnostics in relevant non-aerospace industries. 
The survey involved interviews with experts in a broad range of 
industries, NASA, and the military. In addition, relevant Battelle 
experts were interviewed and the literature was reviewed. The current 
diagnostic methods for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) were also 
examined and the relevant survey findings were identified for potential 
use on the SSME. 
Survev Approach and Methodoloqy 
Aporoach 
This diagnostic survey has two objectives: (1) the 
determination o f  the state-of-the-art of machine diagnostics, and (2) the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  new, candidate  d iagnost ic  techniques and/or approaches 
for potential application to the SSME. Throughout this effort, the focus 
is on those techniques that are considered to be off-the-shelf, or mature 
areas of research and development. 
The intent of the diagnostic survey is to be broad, spanning as 
wide a spectrum of industries as possible. Within the general area o f  
machine diagnostics, three topics are considered: 
1. Maintenance logistics and strategies, 
2. Diagnostic techniques, 
3 .  Design approaches for diagnostic systems. 
Because of its breadth, this study does not attempt to focus on 
any specific technique or approach in great detail. Throughout the 
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survey, only enough detail was sought to permit an assessment of the 
usefulness of the techniques under study. 
Methodoloqy 
There are two phases in diagnostics survey, a state-of-the-art 
survey and the subsequent assessment of the survey findings. For the 
survey phase, we selected three application categories: 
1. Diagnostic systems for liquid rocket engines, 
2. Diagnostic systems on civil and military aircraft, 
3 .  Diagnostic systems in non-aerospace industries. 
Information was gathered using 1 iterature reviews and interviews 
with a number of industry, government, and military experts. Figure 9 
depicts the overall survey strategy. 
WNUFACTURERS /
INTERVIEWS 
BATTELLE' EXPERTS 
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LITERATURE 
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AIR CARRIERS MANUFACTURERS INTERVIEWS INTERVIEWS LITERATURE 
FIGURE 9. STRATEGY FOR STATE-OF-THE-ART SURVEY OF MACHINE DIAGNOSTICS 
The second phase of the Diagnostics Survey was a preliminary 
assessment of the survey findings to screen out those that were not 
considered relevant to the SSME. This was done in two steps: 
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1. The diagnostic systems and maintenance strategy currently 
employed for the SSME were reviewed. 
2. The survey findings were reexamined in light of the current 
SSME environment, and those that were not considered useful 
were dropped. 
Information sources for the review of current SSME diagnostic 
systems and maintenance practices were NASA and Rocketdyne experts, and 
selected published reports. 
Diaqnostics Backqround 
By its very nature, machine diagnostics encompasses a broad set 
of disciplines. Much of the scientific knowledge necessary to design and 
fabricate machines, as well as to understand the physics of their 
failures, falls under the technological umbrella of machine diagnostics. 
Because of this breadth, it is necessary to provide an organization 
through a hierarchy of related functions. This organization results in a 
logical, manageable set of elements. 
Definitions 
We begin our discussion with a set of definitions to remove 
ambiguity in terminology. The following are taken from Reference 3-8: 
FAULT DETECTION - the act of identifying the presence of an 
unspecified failure mode in a system resulting in an 
unspecified mal function. 
MALFUNCTION - an inability to operate in the normal manner or 
at the expected level of performance. 
FAULT ISOLATION - the designation of the materials, 
structures , components , or subsystems that have 
malfunctioned. Fault isolation extends fault detection to 
the detection/identification of the specific part that must 
be repaired or replaced in order to restore the system to 
normal operation. 
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fying a fa 
signs and 
FAILURE DIAGNOSIS - the process of ident 
or condition from an evaluation of its 
lure mode 
symptoms. 
The diagnostic process extends fault isolation to the 
detection/identification of the specific mode by which a part 
or component has failed. 
FAILURE MODE - a particular manner in which the omission of 
an expected occurrence (or performance of a task) happens. 
By examination, the universe of states for any given system may 
be partitioned into two overlapping regions, operational states and faulty 
states (see Figure 10). This partitioning does not, however, produce a 
dichotomy, and there is overlap between the two regions. 
CONTROL 
M I N  
ALL SYSTEM 
STATES 
WRAiN OF 
ERROR DETECTION, FAULT ISOLATION, 
AND FAILURE DIAGNOSIS 
AREA OF DEGRADED 
SYSTEM PERFORWNCE 
FIGURE 10. PARTITIONING OF SYSTEM STATES INTO OPERATIONAL 
AND ERRONEOUS STATES. 
Notice the Overlap. 
This area of overlap represents states o f  degraded system 
performance. In general , the region of operational states represents the 
control domain, whereas the faulty states, constitutes the domain of fault 
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detection, fault isolation, and failure diagnosis. The above definitions 
can now be rewritten so that they are in terms of these states. 
FAULT DETECTION - the identification of 
within the region of faulty states. 
FAULT ISOLATION - identification of a c 
within the region of faulty states 
malfunction of a specific module or comp 
a system state lying 
ass of system states 
which classify the 
ment. 
FAILURE DIAGNOSIS - identification of a system state within 
the region of faulty states which classifies a specific 
failure mode of the malfunctioning module or component. 
STATE IDENTIFICATION - the determination of the condition or 
mode of a system with respect to a set of circumstances at a 
particular time. 
In addition to redefining some of the diagnostic-related 
elements, one can also express the concept of control in terms of system 
states. 
CONTROL - the identification of a current system operational 
state and the subsequent adjustment of the system so as to 
maneuver it to another desired operational state. 
From the above discussion the following, self-evident conclusion 
results: 
All types o f  detection associated with error perception, fault 
isolation, failure diagnosis, and system control are classes of 
state identification. 
This conclusion is quite important in that it allows the 
grouping of the various facets of machine diagnostics, fault detection, 
fault isolation, and failure diagnosis under the more general topic of 
state identification. Additionally, since detection for control purposes 
is also a class of state identification, the importance of considering 
both the machine diagnostics and control in an integrated fashion is 
emphasized. Therefore, there exists a common denominator, state 
identification, around which this study is logically focused. 
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State Identification Process Hierarchy 
One can specify a hierarchy of elements that are necessary for 
the state identification process. First, at the lowest level, information 
about the system or machine in question must be gathered. Second, once 
this information has been gathered, it must somehow be reduced to a 
manageable set of relevant features. Finally, at the highest level, that 
set of features can be used to perform the state identification. This 
hierarchy of functions is shown in Figure 11. 
STATE IDENlIFICATION 
I INFORH4TION REDUCTION I 
I INFORMTI ON ACOUI S IT ION 
I MCWIME OR SYSTEM I 
FIGURE 11. THE HIERARCHY OF PROCESS REQUIRED FOR STATE 
IDENTIFICATION 
Information Acqui sit ion 
The potential sources of information about a given system or 
machine necessary for state identification are: specifications , hi story, 
sensors, and inspection. Optimally, all of these are utilized in the 
state identification process for machine diagnostics. 
Specifications. Specifications are those documents which define 
the normal operating characteristics of the system or machine. Deviations 
from this norm may be caused by component failures, design errors, or 
both. 
If a given system is operating according t o  specifications, it 
is in that sector within the region of operational states which does not 
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overlap with the region of faulty states (see Figure l o ) ,  otherwise it is 
in the region of faulty states. The specifications define the 
performance explicitly for the system controller, and implicitly for the 
system fault detection mechanism. 
History. History about a system or machine's performance can be 
of a short-term or long-term nature. Short-term history represents those 
events which are related to one another and take place within the physical 
or characteristic time cycles of the machine. For example, all events 
occurring within the decay time for a pendulum might be considered short- 
term history. Long-term history consists of those events which occur in a 
time frame greater than that considered to be short-term (as previously 
defined). Observation of all events, whether they are of short-term or 
long-term historical nature are made using sensors or by inspection (see 
below). 
Sensors. The transducers that measure the various physical 
parameters. Sensors may either be permanently instal led on-board a 
machine or used as part of test instrumentation. The sensor output 
information i s  often called raw data. This raw data must be reduced to a 
set of features in order to perform state identification for diagnostic or 
control purposes. 
Inspection. Inspection techniques are often used in lieu of 
sensors. In effect, a human serves the function of a wide-band sensor. 
Some tools are available to assist the human during the inspection 
process. The physician's stethoscope is an example of such a tool. 
Information Reduction 
Having acquired information about the performance of a machine 
or system, it must be subsequently processed and reduced to produce a set 
of features from which to perform the state identification. Usually, this 
part of the process involves the reduction of the information by removing 
that which is redundant or irrelevant. Sometimes data from several 
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sources are combined to generate features which cannot be or which have 
not been physically measured at a single place or time. A commonplace 
example of this is the combination of sensory data about a machine, along 
with its long-term history, in order to derive a feature which describes a 
machine's failure trends. 
There are two principal means by which this reduction of 
information takes place, signal processing and/or human expert analysis. 
The difference between these two approaches may be seen simply as the 
difference between machines and humans. Signal processing can be 
accomplished in a number of machine domains: 
Analog electronics (continuous or discrete), 
Other analog domains, 
Digital electronics (hardware only), 
Hardware and software. 
Human expert analysis may be accomplished with or without the 
assistance of mechanized tools. A mechanic listening to the noise of an 
automobile engine to discern the tapping of a valve exemplifies the later 
case. An automotive engineer observing the output of an acoustic spectrum 
analyzer to make the same determination represents the former case. 
State Identification 
Having acquired information about a system or machine, and 
subsequently generating a set of relevant features, the state 
identification must be performed. As is the case with information 
reduction, the same identification can be carried out either by humans or 
automated devices. 
In general, there are three approaches for automated state 
identification : 
1. Pattern recognition (with the most trivial case being a table 
1 ookup) 
2. Nonlinear filters (with the simple algorithm representing the 
most trivial case) 
3. Expert systems. 
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In the specific cases where state identification is used for 
error detection or fault isolation, a fourth technique is at our disposal, 
i.e., voting. In the voting process, a society of identical hardware 
modules operate in parallel to high1 ight any nonconformists 
(malfunctioning modules) . 
Human-based decisions (state identifications) are the most 
common in the diagnostic/maintenance areas. In the vast majority of these 
cases, the expert has no assistance (other than perhaps another human 
expert). Recently however, the use of computer expert systems as decision 
aids is gaining acceptance. Witness, for example, the increasing 
commercialization of computer-based expert systems to assist in medical 
diagnosis. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In an effort to find a common denominator for the various 
aspects of machine diagnostics (namely fault detection, fault isolation, 
and failure diagnosis), it was determined that all were classes of the 
more general process of state identification. In addition, it was 
concluded that detection for control purposes was also a class of state 
identification. 
The process of state identification can be thought of as a 
hierarchy. First information must be gathered about the system in 
question. Then, the information must be reduced to a set of features. 
Finally, based upon those features, an identification of the system state 
may be accomplished. 
Viewing this hierarchy from the perspective of machine 
diagnostics versus machine control, we can gain insight into the 
interaction between those two functions. Revising the pyramid of 
Figure 11 we obtain that of Figure 12. It is evident from the above 
discussion that machine control requires many of the same elements as do 
machine diagnostics. As shown in Figure 12, there is every reason to 
expect that a sharing of hardware between the control and diagnostic 
functions is both possible and desirable. Reliability theory tells us 
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that the addition of any component into a system will always increase the 
likelihood of failure--even though the component may serve a diagnostic 
purpose (it is possible that system reliability could be increased if the 
addition of the component in question added redundancy of some type). By 
allowing control and diagnostic functions to share resources, system 
reliability is kept to a maximum. Because diagnostics help to reduce 
system down-time, once a failure has occurred, system availability is 
improved. 
FIGURE 12. MACHINE CONTROL VERSUS MACHINE DIAGNOSTICS. 
NOTE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SHARING RESOURCES 
Taking the elements from the above hierarchy and using the 
classifications discussed earlier in this section, Table 2 is formulated. 
We are now in a position to use this classification as a tool for 
organizing the results of our diagnostic survey. 
SSME Diaqnostic and Maintenance System Overview 
This section presents a brief description o f  the SSME diagnostic 
and maintenance system. It should be noted that the current maintenance/ 
diagnostic structure is highly complex. In the interest of brevity, the 
elements chosen represent rather coarse groupings of the numerous re1 ated 
components. Nevertheless, it is felt that the categorizations are 
accurate and that the description is therefore a good representation of 
the diagnostic system. 
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TABLE 2. BREAK-DOWN OF THE DIAGNOSTIC HIERARCHY 
AUTMTED 
OECISION 
HUUN EXPERT 
OP IN I ON 
SIGNAL PROCESSING 
HI" EXPERT 
ANALYSIS 
DIAGmKTIC 
PAlTERN RECOGNITION 
MONLEAR FILTERS 
EXPERT s v s m  
VOTING SYSTEMS 
HUUN ONLY 
MCHINE ASSISTED 
MALOG ELECTRON ICs 
OTHER ANALOG M I N S  
DIGITAL ELECTRON1 CS 
HUMN ONLY 
MCHINE ASSISTED 
INFOR(UT1ON 
REDUCTION 
t 
~~ 
I SPECIFICATIONS I 1 
I 
- -. . . . . . I 
SHORT TERM 
LONG TERn 
TEST INSTRUMENTATION 
HISTORY 
SENSORS 
INFORMTION 
SOURCES ON-BOARD 
I H W  ONLY MACHINE ASSISTED INSPECTION 
The diagnostic system elements for the SSME may be broadly 
categorized as either "on-board" or "ground-based". For the sake of this 
discussion, by the term "on-board" we mean those diagnostic elements that 
are physically close to the engine, whether it is flying on a Space 
Shuttle or operating on a test stand. "Ground-based" elements of the 
diagnostic and maintenance system are those that are not considered to be 
on-board ("everything else"). 
In addition to the "ground-based" versus "on-board" 
categorization of the SSME diagnostic elements, they may also be 
classified according to the diagnostic hierarchy discussed in the previous 
section. There are a number of levels in the hierarchy, the lowest of 
which is the plant level (the level containing the engine itself). The 
next-to-the-bottom level can be thought of as the information gathering 
level. All elements which have a role in the acquisition of information 
about the plant's (engine's) performance belong to this level. Control 
actuators also reside at the information gathering level. The next-to- 
the-highest level is termed the information reduction level. It is here 
that any signal processing or conditioning occurs. Finally, the highest 
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level is termed the decision level. At this level, diagnostic and control 
decisions are made. 
Based upon the previously described hierarchical organization we 
can identify (albeit somewhat broadly) the various elements that comprise 
the diagnostic system for the SSME. Such an overview is given 
schematically in Figure 13. It must be noted that those elements which 
are classified as on-board (including crew) are meant to apply to test 
stand firings as well as in-flight service. 
I I b b  I -. 
nm 
L f U L  
FIGURE 13. OVERALL SSME DIAGNOSTICS AND MAINTENANCEPICTURE 
Information Gatherinq 
There are two on-board elements which provide the function of 
data acquisition: crew perceptions and on-board sensors. The crew 
perceptions are those observations of the flight crew on the Orbiter, and 
the support staff during test stand engine firings. These observations 
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are results of the physical senses and should not be confused with 
information presented to the crew by the diagnostic subsystems. 
A number of on-board sensors are used primarily for control 
purposes. The remaining sensors are dedicated to diagnostic functions. 
Some of the control related sensor outputs are also used for diagnostic 
purposes. 
Aside from the data acquisition function, there are on-board 
elements for data telemetry and data recording. Nearly all sensor outputs 
are ultimately telemetered for ground-based analysis. A number of these 
data are also recorded on-board the Orbiter. 
On the ground-based side, a large amount of diagnostic data 
comes from between-flight inspections. Data acquired by on-board 
subsystems are ultimately integrated with the results of ground-based 
inspections and engine repair actions to establish the engine flight and 
service history. This historical data represents a valuable information 
pool for detailed analysis. 
Information Reduction 
All of the data, whether acquired by sensor, observation, or 
between flight inspection must be reduced to a manageable set of features 
so that the appropriate diagnostic or control decision may be quickly and 
accurately made. Sensor data is characteristically reduced using signal 
processing techniques such as time integration or low-pass filtering. 
Observations and inspection results are typically reduced by the 
inspection specialists through the use o f  heuristics. 
Diaqnostic Decisions 
The on-board diagnostic subsystem uses a basic form of pattern 
recognition. A table of "red lines", dynamically adjusted for changes in 
the engine's operational modes, is employed to flag potentially dangerous 
conditions and dictate responses. Similarly, the crew reactions represent 
a human pattern recognition resulting in we1 1 practiced responses. 
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Currently, the ground-based analysis employs an analytical model 
of the engine combined with heuristic-based decisions to identify 
potential trouble spots. This information is used to some degree to 
direct the between-flight inspections, and aids in the maintenance 
evaluations and repair decisions. 
Summary 
This section has presented a high level overview of the SSME 
diagnostic and maintenance system. The various diagnostic and maintenance 
elements as well as their interactions (or possible interactions) have 
been described and are depicted in Figure 13. The intent of the state-of- 
the-art diagnostic survey is to identify possible techniques to improve 
the performance of those elements and/or to improve the quality of their 
interconnections. 
Survev Fi ndi nqs 
This section presents the significant findings and highlights of 
the state-of-the-art diagnostic survey. These findings are broken down 
into three major application areas: 
1. Liquid-fueled rocket engines, 
2. Aircraft, 
3. Non-aerospace industries. 
Within each application area, the findings are further organized 
according to the hierarchical classification discussed in the previous 
sections . 
Liquid-Fueled Rocket Enqines 
The principal sources of information for this part of the survey 
were rocket engine manufacturers, instrumentation vendors, Battel le 
experts, and NASA reports. 
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The SSME is unique in that is the first truly reusable rocket 
engine not on an experimental vehicle. This fact, combined with a design 
which allows for smaller error margins than previous rocket engines, has 
dictated a much more comprehensive diagnostic and maintenance philosophy 
than any of its predecessors. 
Data Acquisition. The vast majority of the sensing and 
instrumentation techniques are based upon well-seasoned approaches. In 
the case of on-board devices, such well-established transducers as 
thermocouples, pressure sensors, accelerometers, etc. are typically used. 
The data from these transducers are usually telemetered for ground-based 
analysis. Historically, manufacturers have not had a great deal of 
confidence in on-board instrumentation. Rocketdyne is currently under 
contract with NASA to develop new instrumentation as a part of an advanced 
condition monitoring system. 
Ground-based inspections are characteristically manual in 
nature. Some instruments such as mass spectrometers have found 
application in the isolation of gas leaks. Some new techniques for data 
acquisition have been proposed and/or are under development, but none o f  
those are yet considered to be mature products. 
Siqnal Processinq. Because of the basic nature of the 
diagnostic systems employed on prior rocket engines, minimal on-board 
signal processing techniques were used. The techniques used are basic in 
nature and have as their objective the enhancement of the signal-to-noise 
ratio or sensor signals. Ground-based analyses of telemetered data 
characteristically employ more sophisticated approaches. 
Diaqnostic Techniques. The sophistication o f  the diagnostic 
techniques used on-board previous rocket engines has been minimal. The 
most common real-time monitoring technique was based upon the violation o f  
limits or "red lines". Post-flight analyses, were usually more thorough, 
relying on tools such as computer simulations. 
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Hiqhliqhts. Items of particular interest which were obtained 
during.the liquid rocket engine portion of the survey include: 
Awareness of Need for Diagnostics. All of the manufacturers of 
rocket engines that were interviewed (Rocketdyne, Pratt and Whitney, and 
Aerojet) indicated an awareness of the need for comprehensive diagnostics 
on reusable engines. Rocketdyne, due to its involvement with the SSME, 
has already embarked on the development of a comprehensive condition 
monitoring system. Both Aerojet and Pratt and Whitney intend to develop 
such systems on future engine programs. 
Current SSME Diagnostics. The engine monitoring system 
currently employed on the SSME has been successful from the standpoint of 
crew/vehicle safety. However, it is labor intensive and does not lend 
itself well to the quick turnaround objectives of the STS program. The 
on-board diagnostics are based upon violations of a series of safety 
limits ("red lines") some of which are dynamically allocated. The on- 
board sensor set includes the following: 
temperature - resistive temperature detectors, thermocouples 
pressure - strain gauge, piezoelectric 
tachometer - magnetic pickup 
position - potentiometers, RVDT, LVDT 
vibration - piezoelectric accelerometer 
flowmeter - turbine 
calorimeter - thermopile 
radiometer - foil. 
These sensors are considered by Rocketdyne to be adequately 
reliable. Data from some of these sensors are telemetered for ground- 
based recording at 20 millisecond intervals during engine firings. The 
ground-based portion of the diagnostic system is centered around a series 
of routine and periodic inspections. The routine inspections include the 
following: 
external inspection 
internal inspections - HPFTP, HPOTP, MCC 
49 
leak tests 
automatic/electrical checkouts. 
Borescopes are used for some of the internal inspections. 
Instrumentation required for leak tests includes flowmeters and mass 
spectrometers. The periodic inspections involve the removal of either the 
HPOTP, HPFTP, or both. During this activity turbine blades are inspected 
using optical microscopy, and the respective preburner sections are 
inspected visually and with concentricity gauges. In addition to the 
physical inspections of the various engine components, the recorded flight 
sensor data is reviewed to identify anomalies. The results of this 
review are communicated to the inspection team when any action is deemed 
necessary. 
Future SSME Condition Monitoring System. Rocketdyne is 
currently under contract with NASA LeRC to develop an advanced engine 
condition monitoring system. The first phase of this study involved an 
analysis of failure reports for a number of liquid-fueled rocket engines, 
including the SSME, 5-2, H-1,  F-1, RS-27, Thor, and Atlas. The failure 
reports were reduced by successive screening and the resulting reports 
categorized into sixteen general failure types. 
bolt torque relaxation 
coolant passage splits 
joint leakage 
hot-gas manifold transfer tube cracks 
high torque 
cracked turbine blades 
failure of bellows 
loose electrical connectors 
bearing damage 
tube fracture 
turbopump face seal  
lube pressure anomalies 
valve fails to perform 
valve internal leakage 
regulator discrepancies 
contaminated hydraulic 
1 eakage 
control assembly. 
Sensors were subsequently evaluated based upon their ability to 
aid in the detection of the sixteen failure groups. An implicit 
philosophy during this selection process was that one sensor (or group o f  
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sensors) would be dedicated to each failure mode. A number of state-of- 
the-art and novel concepts were identified. The sensors selected from 
those concepts were: 
fiberoptic deflectometer 
optical pyrometer digital quartz pressure 
isotope wear detector holographic leak detector 
tunable diode-laser spectrometer thermal conductivity leak 
ultrasonic thermometer exo-electron fatigue 
optical tachometer connector continuity 
ultrasonic flowmeter 
sensor 
detector 
detector 
checking 
particle analysis. 
Ultimately, the first three of these concepts were identified 
for development and testing. This program is currently in progress. 
Another of the sensors mentioned above, an ultrasonic flow meter, was 
tested during an NSTL test firing. Because of problems arising from the 
sensor mounting, a duct rupture occurred precipitating a catastrophic 
engine failure. 
In addition to the identification of applicable sensors, the 
study identified and evaluated the required signal processing techniques 
for use with sensors to isolate the various failure modes. These 
techniques are: 
amplitude histogram 
RMS histogram 
filtered histogram 
cross correlation 
transfer function integral over threshold 
product histogram 
ratio histogram Cambell diagram 
differentiated histogram 
phase diagram histogram 
time profile 
power spectrum density 
RPM profiles 
The various instrumentation vendors interviewed provided 
information regarding many of the currently implemented SSME and aircraft 
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test programs. However, little information was obtained regarding new or 
novel instrumentation concepts. 
Ultrasonic Doppler Vibration Sensor. Under contract with NASA 
MSFC, Battelle's Columbus Division developed a shaft vibration sensor and 
successfully tested it on a 3-2 rocket engine. The sensor was of a non- 
invasive nature and determined the velocity of shaft vibrations by 
measuring doppler shifting from reflected ultrasonic waves. Although a 
success, this sensor was never developed further or utilized. 
Aircraft 
Sources for this part of the survey included interviews with 
experts from the military, commercial air carriers, airframe 
manufacturers, engine manufacturers, and instrumentation vendors. 
Information was also gathered from literature and interviews with Battelle 
experts. 
Aircraft engines and their diagnostics have received 
considerable attention over the years. This attention is due to a number 
of factors, including the military's emphasis on weapon system 
availability, the civilian air carriers' push to minimize maintenance 
costs, and the FAA's desire to assure safety and reliability. 
Consequently, this part of the survey yielded a good deal of relevant 
information. 
The current diagnostic/maintenance phi losophies in the Air Force 
and the civilian air carriers are similar. The Air Force is attempting to 
establish a policy termed "retirement for cause". This concept is most 
easily described as an interactive preventative maintenance program. 
Component failures are carefully analyzed and accurate life indicators are 
derived for the engine components. The components will then be replaced 
only when a component is deemed to have degraded sufficiently that it 
will not last until the next periodic maintenance cycle. 
The air carriers have a slightly different approach to 
maintenance. Given the need to reduce ground time and keep the aircraft 
flying as much as possible, a modified life limit approach to maintenance 
seems to prevail. An engine is used until a component failure occurs, 
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albeit in some cases an incipient failure, or until life limits dictate a 
scheduled repair cycle. If the engine is being repaired after a component 
failure, additional components which would exceed their life limit prior 
to the next scheduled repair cycle may be replaced. 
Both the military and the commercial carriers employ a multi- 
tiered maintenance structure. The first level is that of the flight line 
at which major modules are replaced. A second level is responsible for 
troubleshooting the modules that have been replaced so that they may be 
quickly placed back in inventory. The third (ultimate) repair level is 
that of the specialized shops. This level may also include the equipment 
vendors. Here the damaged components are repaired and returned to the 
inventory o f  good parts. 
Data Acquisition. Commercial aircraft engines all come equipped 
with an array of accelerometers, temperature sensors, flow meters, 
pressure transducers, and tachometers. The presence of some of those 
transducers is due to FAA requirements placed on the manufacturers. While 
all of the airlines use the majority of the installed sensors, there has 
been some mistrust of the accelerometers. Historically, they have 
experienced high false alarm rates. As such, at least one airline 
removes them upon receipt of new engines. The sensor manufacturers 
insist that the current generation of sensors exhibit high reliability. 
Their claims seem to be substantiated by the number of airlines that do 
use the entire sensor package for sophisticated analyses such as trending. 
Military aircraft engines usually carry many o f  the  same 
transducers as commercial engines. They serve both control and diagnostic 
purposes. 
In the area of ground-based test, vi sua1 inspections, borescope 
inspections, x-ray checks, eddy current checks, and oil analyses all find 
application. Some sophisticated instrumentation systems are employed to 
acquire data from engines in test cells. Temperatures, hot-gas flows and 
pressures, and other similar data are gathered for off-line analysis. 
Siqnal Processinq. The signal processing employed for data from 
on-board sensors is centered around the enhancement of signal -to-noise 
ratios. Techniques such as low-pass, high-pass, and band-pass filtering 
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are common place. Features are sometimes generated using straight- 
forward approaches such as integrating acceleration signals to derive 
velocity information. Ground-based instrumentation employs similar signal 
processing approaches. 
Diagnostic Techniques. The most common approach employed for 
on-board jet engine diagnostics relies on a table of limits. When a limit 
has been exceeded, the appropriate alarm is signaled and the response, if 
any, initiated. Recently, this approach has been extended or 
supplemented by some carriers who perform limited on-board trend 
analysis. Data gathered by on-board sensors are recorded at regular 
intervals (ranging from several seconds to several minutes). Trends are 
calculated in order to estimate when the measured parameters will exceed 
their "red lines". This estimate may be modified to allow for changes in 
the rate o f  degradation. Some air carriers are now relying on information 
from ground-based trend analyses to conveniently schedule engine repair. 
One diagnostic technique used by both the military and the 
civilian air carriers merits discussion. This technique is referred to as 
"gas path analysis". Developed and popularized by Hamilton Standard, the 
approach involves the optimal estimation of the state, and subsequently 
the health, o f  jet engines. In practice, a mathematical model is 
developed which represents a simulation of a particular engine. Sensor 
data are then used as a gauge for the optimal adjustment of the model 
parameters. When those parameters exceed acceptable limits, a failure i s  
decl ared . 
At Kelly Air Force Base, the Air Force uses such a system for 
test cell analysis of engines. TWA has also recently purchased such a 
system from Hamilton Standard. In addition, TWA has initiated a program 
whereby sensor data is telemetered from their latest generation of 
aircraft, and a quasi-real-time analysis is performed to assess engine 
performance. The air carriers rely heavily on an integrated system where 
in-flight data is analyzed and used in conjunction with ground-based test 
results to plan maintenance actions. 
An on-going research and development effort is focused on the 
concept of an expert system (artificial intell igence based computer 
program) for jet engine diagnostics. This concept is based on the 
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transfer of human expertise to the expert system computer program. 
Although these systems are maturing very rapidly, they are not yet 
considered to be off-the-shelf. 
Hiqhliqhts. Items o f  particular interest which were obtained 
during the aircraft portion of the survey include: 
USAF Retirement for Cause. The USAF is in the process of 
implementing a maintenance policy referred to as "retirement for cause". 
In short, this policy requires that an experimental analysis be performed 
on each batch of engine components in order to accurately understand and 
predict the life limits in the presence of the potential failures. For 
example, the level of propagation that a crack in a turbine vane must 
attain before failing will be empirically determined. Once these life 
limits are known (or at least estimated), the engine monitoring systems 
and periodic inspections are used to track engine component failures. 
Only when the life limits are approached are the faulty components 
rep1 aced. 
USAF On-Board Diagnostic System. An on-board engine monitoring 
system similar to the AIDS (see below) was experimentally implemented on 
five tactical F-15A aircraft (F100 Engines). The parameters monitored 
were : 
augmenter fuel pump discharge rear compressor 
augmenter permission fuel pressure fuel pump inlet temperature 
burner pressure main oil temperature 
fan/core mixing pressure compressor exit static 
fan exit duct pressure 
fuel pump boost pressure fan exit duct temperature 
fuel pump inlet pressure 
fuel pump discharge pressure 
main breather pressure power level angle 
number four bearing scavenge 
pressure variable vane pressure 
temperature 
diffuser case vibration 
inlet case vibration 
position. 
pressure 
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The on-board data acquisition system monitored these parameters 
and subsequently transferred the data for ground-based analysis. Such 
analyses, in conjunction with ground-based tests were used as the basis 
for a maintenance program. On the whole, the experiment was considered to 
be successful. 
Experience with Commercial Carriers. Three domestic air 
carriers were interviewed in addition to making a review of literature 
describing some of the maintenance policies of European air1 ines. 
Nearly all carriers utilize a variation of the aircraft 
integrated data system (AIDS). This data system was specified by ARINC 
and has the following attributes: 
diagnostic information is centralized 
some data is available for in-flight analysis 
data is recorded on a cassette tape for later ground-based 
analysis. 
A number of carriers have implemented engine monitoring systems 
which are also integrated with the AIDS. In these systems, important 
engine parameters are monitored in-flight such as gas pressures and 
temperatures, fuel flows, rotor velocities, lubricant temperatures, and 
vibrations. Engine condition reports are available during flight to the 
flight engineer for short-term trending analyses. Long-term trending is 
performed using the AIDS data tapes during ground-based analyses. 
In addition to the engine monitoring systems, ground tests and 
inspections are used to identify failures and trends. Ground-based 
inspections may include: 
visual inspection eddy current checks 
borescope inspections spectrographic oil analysis 
x-ray checks ferrographic oil analysis 
The general consensus in the European air carrier community is 
that such sophisticated diagnostic and maintenance programs are cost 
justified. The domestic air carriers are not quite so aggressive. TWA, 
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however, has a maintenance and diagnostic program which is very much along 
the lines of the European carriers. United Air Lines on the other hand, 
seems to employ a more conservative, people intensive approach to 
maintenance and diagnostics. 
Gas Path Analysis. Hamilton Standard Division of United 
Technologies has been marketing a computer software package called Gas 
Path Analysis. This software relies upon a linearized mathematical model 
of a specific jet engine to estimate the performance characteristics of 
the engine's constituent modules using measured input parameters such as 
temperatures, pressures, spool speeds, and fuel consumption. The program 
also estimates the performance of the various sensors that are used to 
acquire the data used in the analysis. 
The mathematics of gas path analysis is based on the premise 
that it is possible to linearize any thermodynamic cycle model by deriving 
matrices of influence coefficients which relate deviations in measured 
parameters and component per 'ormances to coefficients describing component 
faults for each of the eng ne's operating points. The equations solved 
are: 
A = H X + B  
Y = Ge Xe 
where X = (E) and H = (HelHs) 
The significance of the various variables is as follows: 
Z is a column vector of measurement deviations or deltas 
Y is a column vector of performance deltas for the engines' 
constituent modules 
Xe is a column vector of engine fault deltas 
Xs is a column vector of apparent sensor errors 
He and Ge are the matrices of coefficients derived from the 
engines' mathematical model 
Hs is a matrix of sensor fault coefficients 
B is a random vector denoting sensor non-repeatability. 
The dimensions are such that there is an over-specified set of 
equations which are a result of analytical redundancy in the measured 
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parameters. 
errors as well as engine component malfunctions. 
It is also this fact which allows the determination of sensor 
A number of air carriers use this technique for ground-based 
analysis. Some European carriers and TWA use the gas path analysis 
program for analysis of flight data. Other carriers and the USAF use it 
only for test cell analysis of engine performance. 
Sensors and Instrumentation Development. The area of sensor 
development receiving the greatest amount of attention for flight 
applications is that of fiber optic sensors. These sensors are especially 
desirable from the standpoint of weight and noise immunity. At this stage 
of development, however, the fiber optic connector technology is not 
sufficiently robust to allow widespread use on flight engines. A recent 
NASA study has examined applications for fiber optic sensors such as: 
rotary encoders 
optical tachometers 
rotor blade tip clearance 
optical temperature sensors (pyrometers) . 
Optical pyrometers have also been used in experiments to 
accurately determine turbine blade life. Solar Turbines Incorporated has 
provided such instrumentation for a number of these experiments. Optical 
clouding due to the presence of combustion products has been the principal 
operational drawback o f  this type o f  instrumentation. 
In the more general area of data acquisition, a number o f  
instrumented engine core test programs have been carried out. An off-the- 
shelf system for telemetering data from an engine rotor is available from 
Acurex Corporation. These systems are not considered to be sufficiently 
robust for flight applications. 
Expert Systems. There are at least two programs underway for 
the development of rule-based expert systems for jet engine diagnosis. On 
the military side, the Air Force has been funding such a development at 
General Electric. In the commercial sector, Boeing has also been 
developing an expert system for jet engine diagnosis. 
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Non-Aerospace Industries 
Information sources for this part of the survey included 
interviews with experts in fields ranging from medical electronics to 
transportation systems. In addition, interviews were conducted with 
Battelle experts and relevant publications were reviewed. 
In general, the industrial sector has been somewhat slow in 
recognizing the potential of machine diagnostics, but recently, there has 
been an increasing emphasis in this area. The motives for this interest 
are varied. For example, NRC regulations have had a strong influence on 
the nuclear power industry while customer support issues have had an 
impact on the use of diagnostics in the automobile industry. Whatever the 
motives, some interesting techniques have resulted which may ultimately be 
of value to the SSME program. 
Data Acquisition. In the area of transducers, most industries 
have embraced the proven sensors , e. g . , accel erometers , t hermocoupl es , 
etc. The manufacturers of those devices have been. developing more 
reliable and "ruggedized" transducers and recognize that their sensors 
will be located in progressively more hostile environments. 
In terms of sensing concepts, a number of techniques in 
development or use merit discussion. These concepts are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
In the nuclear power industry, a device known as a miniature 
accelerator or MINAC has been developed for radiographing pump housings. 
The device is placed inside the housing and photographic film is placed 
around the outside of the housing. Once activated, the MINAC generates 
radiation that penetrates the pump and exposes the film--from the inside- 
out. 
For the conventional power industry, Solar Turbines Incorporated 
is under contract with the Electric Power Research Institute to instrument 
a gas power turbine with an optical pyrometer. The pyrometer is 
positioned to scan the passing turbine blades and provide measurements 
leading to accurate predictions of the blades' life. 
A number of novel fiberoptic-based sensors have been under 
development . An exampl e of this is the 1 aser-doppl er-vel ocimeter (LDV) 
This device has simplified a difficult imaging problem. 
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which measures the velocity, not speed, of moving material. The material 
being measured can be a solid or a fluid. Because of its optical nature, 
the information can be communicated from the moving medium to the sensor 
by optical fibers. This sensor is already finding application in the 
manufacture o f  synthetic fibers. 
A new class o f  semiconductor devices for measuring the presence 
of various elements has been under development. This device is called an 
ion selective field effect transistor (ISFET). These devices have been 
proposed for measuring such parameters as hydrogen concentrations in 
gases, and glucose levels in human blood. ISFETs have certain stability 
problems that have not as yet been resolved. 
Cooperative sensing schemes are finding increased usage. The 
principal behind this concept is not new: the design o f  the system or 
component to be examined is altered so as to provide a clear, unmistakable 
signature which is easily monitored. Putting a tracer in a gas to measure 
concentrations and flows represents a well developed application of this 
technique. In a more recent example, bearing balls where magnetized to 
allow the monitoring of their behavior by simple magnetic field sensors. 
For the storage of performance data, the memory card, an 
extremely portable device, is gaining popularity. This device is 
comprised of a microcomputer and nonvolatile data memory in a very small 
package (typically the size of a credit card). Memory cards, because they 
are inexpensive and portable, can permit the highly accurate tracking and 
monitoring of modules and components as they progress through the repair 
cycles. Unfortunately, the storage capacities o f  the data memory are 
still limited. 
Vibration monitoring is common in numerous industries ranging 
from petrochemical plants to paper mills. For example, at Exxon's 
petrochemical plant in Baytown, Texas much of the machinery is 
continuously monitored using a minicomputer and on-board accelerometers. 
The signal levels of the accelerometers are analyzed to determine 
trends. Based upon such trends, maintenance can be optimally scheduled. 
In this same plant, such phenomena as pump cavitation were also detected 
by more careful analysis of the accelerometer signals. However, the 
ability to gather this additional information has not been integrated 
into the monitoring system. 
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Sianal Processinq. In the realm of signal processing, the most 
impressive developments have been in the area of hardware. Integrated 
circuits are now available which perform such functions as real-time 
digital filtering or real-time Fast Fourier Transforms. A manufacturer of 
charge-coupled-device (CCD) arrays , EG&G Reticon, a1 so manufacturers 
semiconductor devices which perform many of the filtering and analysis 
functions in the discrete time analog domain. Prior to the availability 
of those devices, these filtering techniques were only possible using 
digital electronics. 
In the continuous time domain, a number of sensors have been 
developed for specific applications to perform filtering functions in a 
non-electronic fashion. One well developed example o f  this approach is 
the use of a tuned acoustic transducer for the monitoring of predetonation 
in GM automobile engines. This approach was used by GM in a effort to 
minimize production costs. 
In the field o f  automated inspection systems a good deal of 
progress has been made in image processing and image interpretation. 
Commercial systems are now available for the automated inspection of 
pieces on an assembly line for manufacturing defects. Similar techniques 
have been developed for the autonomous inspection of printed circuit 
boards. This area will likely continue to evolve due to the recent 
successes. 
Recent research in the human factors associated with display 
technology is directed toward the presentation of high level information, 
rather than machine parameters, in a graphical format. In industries such 
as nuclear power, the operators of the systems need diagnostic information 
in a high-level and unambiguous format, thus, permitting the decisions to 
be made quickly and accurately via human pattern recognition. 
Diaqnostic Techniques. The approaches used in the industrial 
sector for making diagnostic decisions span the entire spectrum, from the 
simple table lookup technique employed on most automobiles, to expert 
system computer programs for the diagnosis of failures in train 
locomotives. Of the information gathered during this part of the survey, 
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there are several concepts worth mentioning. These make up the remainder 
of this section. 
General Electric Corporation has developed an expert system 
(computer program) for the diagnosis of failures on railroad locomotives. 
In this approach, the computer program was written to reason and draw 
conclusions based upon a set o f  rules. The set of rules is derived from 
interviews with human experts in the area (that of repairing GE's 
locomotives). In operation, the expert system guides the actions of a 
repair technician. This is only one of several diagnostic "experts" that 
have been developed: Westinghouse's Steam Turbines Division has developed 
a diagnostic expert system for steam turbines. The Westinghouse program, 
moreover, identifies sensor malfunctions as we1 1 as turbine component 
failures. 
On-going research in the area of non-linear diagnostic filters 
promises to improve their performance by increasing sensitivity and 
reducing false alarm rates. In one particular effort involving Case 
Western Reserve University and Bailey Controls Division of Babcock and 
Wilcox, an industrial heat exchanger will be the test bed for an improved 
non-linear diagnostic filter. The benefits of such research efforts are 
likely to be incremental in nature, but available in the relatively short 
term. 
The commercial application of pattern recognition based upon 
statistically derived and/or empirically determined features has been a 
reality for a number of years. The benefits of this approach is that the 
computation times for making decisions about a machine's performance can 
be very brief. Other computationally oriented techniques, non-linear 
diagnostic filters and expert systems, typically require substantially 
more time than pattern recognition. Historically, most pattern 
recognition systems have been custom tailored to the signatures of single 
specific machines, rather than, for example, other identical machines. 
This shortcoming has been addressed through the use of adaptive pattern 
recognition systems. 
Vibration trend analysis is becoming a commonly used technique, 
especially in industries such as petrochemicals and paper manufacturing. 
This technique usually involves the monitoring of vibration sensors (most 
often the integrated outputs of accelerometers) to watch for change. The 
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rate of increase is estimated, and repairs scheduled according to the 
estimated time until a failure occurs. 
Predictive diagnostics based upon ferrographic analysis of 
lubricant has been a reality for a number of years. This technique is 
based upon the gathering and analysis o f  wear particles to determine the 
mechanisms and severity o f  wear. While there are machine mounted sensors 
available for automated ferrographic analysis, the most thorough analyses 
are performed off-line using bichromatic microscopy. 
Voting systems have been used to address anticipated failures 
(i.e., those failures that result from known component failure modes). 
However, unanticipated faults due to such causes as design errors cannot 
be addressed by voting systems. The more complex a machine, the greater 
is the likelihood of latent design errors. 
Recommendations 
Given the nature of the SSME environment and maintenance 
structure, several of the approaches and techniques identified in the 
previous section are recommended. We will hold to the same organization 
that has been used throughout this report. These recommendations are 
further summarized in Table 3. 
Data Acquisition 
To the extent possible, those existing on-board sensors which 
have experienced reliability problems, should be considered for 
replacement. As existing sensors are continually improved for sensitivity 
and durability, they should be examined and, as warranted, tested and 
considered for use on the SSME. A sensor data base would be beneficial 
for both the SSME, and for future rocket engine development programs. 
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF DIAGNOSTICS RECOMMENDATIONS 
Diagnostics 
Category 
Recommendations 
On-Board Ground-Based 
Data Acquistion More Reliable Sensors 
Increased Bandwidth 
for Existing Accel er- 
ometers and Trans- 
ducers (pressure, 
temperature, flow, 
and speed) 
Additional Conventional 
Sensors 
Extensive Data 
Record i ng 
Continued Development 
of: 
Optical Pyrometer 
Fiber Optic Deflecto- 
meter 
Ultrasonic Doppler 
Transducer 
Ultrasonic Flow 
Meter 
Signal Processing Improve S/N Ratios 
by Spectral Fi 1 tering 
and Noise Cancellation 
Diagnostic 
Techniques 
Analysis and Development 
of Pattern Recognition 
D i agnost i c System 
Continued Development 
of Isotope Wear Detector 
Extension of Isotope 
Wear Detector Concept 
to Include Ferro- 
graphic Analysis 
Use o f  Tracer Elements 
(Tritium or Sulfur 
Hexafluoride) for 
Leak Detection 
Image Processing 
to Enhance 
Borescope Inspections 
Develop Gas Path 
Analysis Model of SSME 
Evolve Gas Path Analysis 
Model to Include Non- 
Linear Diagnostic Filter 
Establish and Maintain 
Integrated SSME Data 
Base (diagnostic and 
maintenance) 
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The on-board sensors should be more effectively used. For 
example, the accelerometers currently on the SSME are only used for the 
RMS values of their outputs. There is undoubtedly a great deal of 
information available in the higher frequency harmonics that is not being 
used. The full bandwidth of all existing sensors should be recorded on 
board and the data later used for detailed ground-based analysis. It 
also may be possible to telemeter this recorded data while the STS is on 
orbit. 
It is estimated that upwards of 85 percent of all failures are 
intermittent in nature. Over the course of our survey, two approaches to 
the isolation of intermittent failures were identified: marginal testing 
and extensive logging. The use of marginal testing techniques on the SSME 
is not feasible. Therefore, we recommend that extensive on-board 
recording of the engine be performed. By analyzing this extensive amount 
of data, either on the ground or on-board, intermittent problems may be 
identified and isolated. In addition, the extra sensors required for such 
monitoring will augment the analytical redundancy of the diagnostic 
system. 
The sensors proposed by Rocketdyne for the monitoring of 
turbomachinery should be carried through to application. Specifically, 
the optical pyrometer, fiberoptic deflectometer, and isotope wear 
detectors, will significantly improve the information available on the 
health of the turbopumps. In addition, the isotope wear detector program 
should be extended to encompass ferrographic analysis. Numerous 
precedents suggest that this type of analysis would be valuable for 
predictive diagnosis. 
For ground-based inspections, we recommend that tracing 
elements should be considered to aid in the detection of hydrogen and 
other fluid leaks. It is felt that this would result in the simplified 
sensing apparatus. 
Signal Processinq 
For ground-based tests, image processing should be used to 
augment certain inspection processes, especially the borescope 
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inspections. It is believed that such techniques could both improve the 
accuracy, and reduce the time required for inspections. 
For on-board instrumentation, more elaborate signal processing 
will be required. Given the noise environment of the SSME, both spectral 
filtering and statistical noise cancellation techniques could be used to 
provide improved signal-to-noise ratios. High signal-to-noise ratios are 
essential if the existing sensors are to be more fully utilized. 
Diaqnostic Techniques 
In the arena of diagnostic techniques there are three 
recommendations, one for on-board diagnosis and two for ground-based 
analysis. The principal purpose of the on-board diagnostics is to avert 
rapidly developing, catastrophic failures. Because of the speed of 
diagnosis and level of accuracy required, pattern recognition is the only 
realistic technique. To increase the coverage and accuracy of the on- 
board diagnostic system, a pattern recognition-based diagnostics should be 
considered. 
For ground-based analyses, an effort to improve the analytical 
model for the SSME should be undertaken. In conjunction with such a 
model, a non-linear diagnostic filter should be developed. This effort 
might begin by initiating a gas path analysis program, and improving the 
analysis on an incremental basis. It may even be possible to run such a 
program in real-time based upon telemetered data (given adequate computing 
resources). If the system is sufficiently accurate, detailed trend 
analysis capabilities could result. 
Finally, a thorough and highly integrated data base should be 
established to track and correlate information about engines and 
components. Information from on-board sensors, ground-based inspections, 
repair actions, and component histories should be included. Analysis of 
this data base must be made highly interactive to be most effective. 
Ultimately, such a data base could benefit the SSME maintenance staff, 
the operations staff, and the engine component manufacturers. 
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SSME DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION 
The third task of the SSME study assimilated the outputs of the 
SSME failure data review and the diagnostics survey and used this 
information to evaluate the current SSME diagnostic system. The 
principal objective of this task was to identify potential means for 
improving the availability of high-quality, pertinent engine data. This 
information could be used both in-flight and on the ground to assess the 
condition of the SSME and its respective components. To accomplish this 
objective, an analysis tool (Failure Information Propagation Model) was 
selected to perform a systematic examination of the diagnostic information 
in the SSME. The Failure Information Propagation Model (FIPM) is 
discussed in this section. Also included is a description of the initial 
application of the FIPM to an SSME component. 
Issues and Approach 
To evaluate the overall SSME diagnostic system, the information 
gathered during the failure data review and diagnostic survey was 
integrated and analyzed. At the outset of this evaluation task, the 
following data were available: 
Results of the SSME failure data review 
Knowledge of the existing SSME inspection and maintenance 
Information on sensor research and development underway for 
process 
Knowledge of the current SSME sensors 
the SSME 
Results of the diagnostic survey. 
This information provided a sol id foundation for performing the required 
evaluation. 
The first step in the analysis was to select the actual tool or 
technique to be used. To facilitate selection of a suitable analysis 
method, an overall approach was defined for the task. The approach 
adopted centered on addressing several key diagnostic issues. These 
issues included the following: 
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What additional diagnostic information 
exi sting SSME sensors? 
s ava lable to the 
Are there any information rich test points on the SSME that 
should be instrumented? If so, which sensors should be 
considered? 
How can we optimize the placement of additional sensors so 
as to minimize their total number and cost while maximizing 
their information gathering potential and reliability? 
Which instrumentation research and development areas 
represent the best investment relative to the diagnostic 
needs of the SSME? 
The common denominator for all of the issues mentioned above is an 
understanding and characterization of the engine failure information and 
its flow paths. 
The major focus of the initial effort on this task was directed, 
therefore, at finding a suitable means to represent the SSME failure 
information and at developing a data format which could be easily 
manipulated to address each of the above issues. The tool which appeared 
to satisfy all of the proposed requirements was the Failure Information 
Propagation Model (FIPM). The FIPM concept is discussed in the following 
subsection. 
Failure Information Propaqation Model 
The Failure Information Propagation Model (FIPM) is a technique 
developed by the Battelle Columbus Division to qualitatively evaluate the 
potential test points in a system. The objective of this qualitative 
evaluation is to assess the information bearing value of each test 
point. The FIPM basically divides the system under analysis into its 
principal components or functions, describes the failure modes for these 
components , catalogs the physical connections between the components , 
details the flow of failure information through the various connections, 
and groups the failure information according to signal properties. It 
must be emphasized at this point that the FIPM models the propagation of 
failure information and not the failure itself. The model assumes that 
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the system being depicted is in a near-normal state of operation. The 
failure information flow is described for the instant of time immediately 
following a given failure. 
The FIPM was initially developed to evaluate the factors 
affecting image quality in a photographic copy machine. This proprietary 
study was performed for an industrial client. Due to the nature of the 
system involved, this analysis was primarily concerned with the 
electronic functions of the device. Subsequent to this study, the FIPM 
was applied to an ion chamber and a home furnace. All of this work 
preceded the FIPM's consideration for this task. As a result of this 
early work, the FIPM has demonstrated the capability to adapt to a broad 
range of mechanical and electronic systems. 
Three principal applications exist for the output of this 
model. These applications are: 
Evaluation of existing sensor systems to maximize the 
Identification of sensor research and development needs to 
Design of sensor systems for new devices or components 
information yield 
target key diagnostic data. 
These important features o f  the FIPM made it especially attractive for use 
in the SSME diagnostic evaluation. 
FIPM Example 
The formulation of an FIPM must begin with the identification of 
the modules (components or functions) that comprise the system being 
evaluated. These modules may be piece parts, subassemblies, or subsystems 
depending on the level of detail sought. In the case of a typical 
exhaust fan, which is used here solely as an example, the constituent 
modules are subassemblies which have been selected to illustrate a top- 
level FIPM. In the case of the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) 
FIPM which will be discussed later in this section, the constituent 
modules general ly are piece parts. 
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The modules selected to illustrate the FIPM concept for the 
exhaust fan are the AC motor, the fan belt, the fan, the fan bearing, and 
the frame which supports these components. These elements are shown in 
Figure 14. The resulting model is very simple in that the AC motor 
actually has both electrical and mechanical parts, the fan has both 
blades and a pulley for the drive belt, etc. It is recognized that this 
model ignores many factors which would be considered in a thorough 
engineering analysis. 
The network of connections between the exhaust fan modules is 
depicted in Figure 15. As indicated in this figure, the motor is 
mechanically mounted to the frame and transforms electrical power into 
mechanical power through friction with the fan belt. The fan belt also is 
connected by friction to the fan. The fan and frame are joined through 
the bearing by means of rolling elements. A thermal connection also 
exists, in normal operation, between the AC motor and the frame. The 
final element in the network is an air flow path out of the fan. 
The failure modes of each of the exhaust fan modules i s  shown in 
Figure 16. It should be noted that these failure modes do not include 
-r,hanisms which are external to the module. Failures due to such outside 
,.AS as fire, explosion, or mechanical damage are not considered. 
Events such as fire in the fan motor also are not considered since these 
are actually effects of more fundamental failure modes. It should be 
reiterated that the FIPM is modeling the situation immediately following a 
failure and not the longer-term effects and consequences of that failure. 
The occurrence of any exhaust fan failure mode produces failure 
information which can be detected externally to the component and which 
will, in general, be transmitted to adjacent components. An assessment of 
the failure information propagations for the exhaust fan example i s  shown 
in Figure 17. It is interesting to note that, in this example, all of the 
failure modes transmit failure information to all of the other modules. 
The large amount of failure data which is available at any given 
connection in the system is evident in this figure. 
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The failure information in the current example can be further 
categorized at each connection according to the type of measurement or 
sensor required for detection. An open winding [lC] or breakage of the 
fan belt [ZB] could be detected by an ammeter on the electrical line. 
Similarly, binding o f  the motor [lA], a shorted winding [lD], or dirt on 
the fan [3B] can be detected by a voltmeter across the motor terminals. 
In Figure 18, the failure information for each connection has been 
grouped according to the type o f  measurement involved. This clustering of 
the failure information is the final step in the development of the FIPM. 
Analysis of the data in the model can now be initiated. 
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FIGURE 18. FAILURE INFORMATION GROUPED BY SIGNAL TYPE 
FOR THE EXHAUST FAN FIPM 
A sensor of the appropriate type would detect any or all of the 
failure modes within a particular group. It would be necessary, 
therefore, to provide additional information or to further process the 
signal to uniquely identify any single failure mode. The process of 
determining the failure signatures and respective sensor sets is highly 
detailed and has not been undertaken for the exhaust fan example. 
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Hiqh-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump FIPM 
The high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) was selected as the 
initial SSME component for evaluation using the FIPM. An HPOTP FIPM was 
graphically constructed using the steps outlined in the preceding example. 
The resulting model was quite large due to the complex nature of the 
HPOTP. A large portion of the initial representation also was color coded 
for ease of interpretation. Due to both of these factors, the initial 
HPOTP FIPM is unsuitable for inclusion in this report. An attempt will, 
however, be made to describe the significant features of this model and 
the subsequent analysis which was performed. The version of the FIPM 
which will be described in this section is no longer the baseline 
configuration for the HPOTP. The reasons for this situation will be 
discussed. The revised FIPM approach which is currently being used is 
out 1 i ned in a subsequent subsection. 
The original HPOTP FIPM had the following features: 
46 modules 
100 module failure modes 
59 connections 
2248 failure information propagations. 
A small black and white excerpt of this FIPM is shown in Figure 19. A 
key for this graphic is included as Figure 20. All of the data 
comprising the FIPM was displayed on the graphic representation. 
Subsequent to the development of the HPOTP FIPM, a preliminary 
analysis of the HPOTP failure information was performed using a failure 
information matrix. A portion of this matrix is shown in Figure 21. In 
this matrix, the rows represent connections (test points) between 
modules. The columns correspond to specific module failure modes. The 
data entered in the matrix at the intersection of a given row and column 
is the failure information types associated with the designated failure 
mode which can be detected at the designated connection. This matrix was 
used to develop a preliminary set of test signature equations for the 
HPOTP. 
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FIGURE 19. EXCERPT FROM I N I T I A L  HPOTP F I P M  
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The test signatures were formulated by marching through the 
columns of the matrix. For each column, the rows were examined to 
determine where failure information resided. The rows also were scanned 
to identify other failure data present at the connection which exhibited 
the same signal characteristics (i .e. , high temperature, low pressure, 
etc.). By careful evaluation of the matrix, it was possible to determine 
sets of signals which could be used to uniquely identify specific 
failures. Some examples of the initial results included: 
Failure mode 1B = rpm associated vibration Q test point 34 OR 
= rpm associated vibration Q test point 36 OR 
= rpm associated vibration Q test point 38 
Failure mode 2A = cavitation Q test point 5 AND NOT 
cavitation 8 test point 1 
Failure mode 28 OR 
Failure mode 3A OR 
Failure mode 5C = rubbing Q test point 4 .  
No attempt was made to determine a unique signature for certain classes of 
failure modes. In cases such as the turbopump bearings, it is not 
necessary to know which particular bearing is bad. An indication that any 
of the four bearings is experiencing degradation is sufficient cause to 
remove the turbopump from the engine and overhaul the bearings. 
Subsequent efforts to specify a set o f  diagnostic sensors which 
would target all of the high-priority HPOTP failure modes, as identified 
in the SSME failure data review, encountered difficulty due to the need 
for additional data. The model, as constructed, did not have sufficient 
detail to adequately describe the failure signals. It was determined that 
specifying high temperature was insufficient without some sort of 
associated range. This initial application of the F I P M  methodology to a 
complex mechanical system had also demonstrated the need for more formal 
definitions and standardized development rules. The definitions and 
development rules had previously been instituted on an ad hoc basis as the 
need arose. A decision was reached to restructure the HPOTP F I P M  based on 
a more formal development methodology. 
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Current FIPM Methodoloqy 
The current FIPM methodology was developed by the originator of 
the FIPM concept with major inputs provided by the participants in the 
initial SSME FIPM activity. A number of FIPM development tools resulted 
from this process. These tools are included in Appendix A of this 
report. The allowable types of physical connections, failure modes, 
signals, and signal parameters are included for use in constructing an 
FIPM. These allowable values have been selected with respect to 
fundamental physical properties and laws. Their intent is to reduce the 
number of arbitrary and possibly confusing choices which must be made 
during model formulation. Rules regulating the handling of potentially 
ambiguous situations are also included. It was decided that the new FIPM 
procedure should be implemented in a data base format. This step was 
necessary to accommodate the large amounts of information which were 
projected for the SSME models. 
The current FIPM methodology consists of two primary elements. 
These elements are: 
Simplified FIPM drawing 
FIPM data base. 
The present FIPM drawing format summarizes key information about the 
system being modeled for use during generation and input of appropriate 
data base records. The data base stores all of the information 
associated with the FIPM including the items shown on the drawing. The 
data base, however, permits substantial amounts of additional descriptive 
and qualifying information to be stored and accessed. 
FIPM Definitions 
The following terms are used in reference to a failure information 
propagation model: 
SYSTEM - The top-level item or component which is being modeled 
MODULE - A subelement or function of the system 
(analyzed) 
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CONNECTION - A path (mechanical, fluid, etc.) which exists 
between two modules 
FAILURE MODE - The physical mechanism or process by which a 
module ceases to perform its intended function 
FAILURE INFORMATION PROPAGATION - A description of specific 
signal characteristics associated with a given failure mode 
which can be detected at a particular connection. 
FIPM Drawinq 
The first step in formulating a failure information propagation 
model is to develop a graphical representation or drawing of the system 
being analyzed. The principal function of the FIPM drawing is to describe 
the constituent modules of the system and to identify the connections 
between these modules. The initial drafts of the FIPM drawing are 
prepared by technical analysts or engineers familiar with the system 
involved. The number o f  modules included is chosen to be consistent with 
the overall level of detail required for the. anadysis. The accurate 
depiction of the system is critical to the overall development of the 
FIPM. This illustration is the foundation for the entire data base 
associated with a given system. Careful construction and review of the 
FIPM drawing minimizes potential corrections and changes to the data base. 
The FIPM drawing is composed basically of boxes and lines which 
connect the boxes. Each box on the drawing represents a particular 
module. The 1 ines represent the physical connections between the various 
modules. Additional information is also shown for both the boxes 
(modules) and the lines (connections) to further identify specific 
physical details associated with both of these elements. The format 
selected for the FIPM drawing allows all of the necessary data to be 
displayed in black and white for ease of reproduction. The key for the 
current FIPM drawings is shown in Figure 22. 
An example of an FIPM module is shown in Figure 23. Each module 
on the FIPM drawing displays the following items of information: 
System code 
Module number 
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FIGURE 22. KEY FOR CURRENT F I P M  DRAWINGS 
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FIGURE 23. SAMPLE MODULE FROM AN F I P M  DRAWING 
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Module name 
Module failure modes. 
For a given system, the module number and name must be unique. 
An example of an FIPM connection is shown in Figure 24. 
Examination o f  the line type and symbols associated with specific 
connections enables the following items of information to be determined: 
General type of connection (solid, liquid, etc.) 
Additional data specifying exact type o f  connection 
Unanticipated connection 
Connection to external system. 
Symbols may be combined as required to completely describe a particular 
connection. 
1 - LIQUID 
2 - HYDROGEN 
3 - UNANTICIPATED 
4 - EXTERNAL 
FIGURE 24. SAMPLE CONNECTION FROM AN FIPM DRAWING 
FIPM Data Base 
After completing the FIPM drawing, the next step is to generate 
and enter data into the failure information propagation model data base. 
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The current FIPM data base and software are discussed in detail in later 
sections of this report. 
Space Shuttle Main Enqine FIPMs 
The initial approach to analyzing the SSME divides the engine 
into major components (systems) which are examined independently. This 
process reduces the size of the individual models to a manageable level 
and also eliminates the crossflow of failure information between systems. 
The idea behind the current method is to gain diagnostic insights 
relative to each high-priority item. This data subsequently will be used 
to make recommendations concerning monitoring requirements for a 
particular component. 
The "SSME Failure Mode and Effects Analysis and Critical Items 
List" compiled by the Rocketdyne Division, Rockwell International 
Corporation (Reference 3) includes over 200 SSME components. Developing 
an individual FIPM for each of these items would not be the most 
efficient way to analyze the entire engine. Certai.n components, such as 
propellant ducts and pressurant lines, are relatively simple in nature. 
These systems can be easily modeled with just a few modules and 
connections. SSME items of this type are included as modules in the FIPM 
of the appropriate major component. For example, the high-pressure 
oxidizer duct i s  included with the HPOTP FIPM. 
Each system (major component) i s  represented in the FIPM data 
base by a four-character code. These system designations coincide with 
the Rocketdyne FMEA item numbers (Reference 3, Table 2-1) whenever 
feasible. The record in the systems data file also indicates any 
additional Rocketdyne FMEA items which have been included in a particular 
FIPM system. Components which do not have a corresponding Rocketdyne FMEA 
number are given a similar four-character code. Confusion is avoided by 
selecting a number not used by Rocketdyne. 
The generation of data for the HPOTP FIPM demonstrated that a 
very large number of failure information propagation records can be 
associated with a major SSME component such as the HPOTP. This 
observation resulted in the creation of separate failure information 
propagation data files for each major SSME component (system). There is 
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one data file each associated with the systems, modules, connections, 
failure modes, and references. Information of the appropriate nature is 
stored in each of these five files for all of the various FIPMs. 
The FIPM methodology, as used for analyzing the SSME, includes 
special provisions f o r  hand1 ing the connections between major engine 
components (FIPM systems). This feature of the technique allows the data 
flows between systems to be evaluated on a preliminary basis. It also 
enables the future expansion of the SSME model to a higher level through 
the combination of various system FIPMs. 
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FIPM DATA BASE 
The FIPM data base is a computerized system which stores all of 
the data necessary to create the various SSME failure information 
propagation models. The information contained in the FIPM data base is 
divided into the following six categories: systems, modules, connections, 
failure modes, failure information propagations, and references. Each of 
these categories corresponds to a major element of the overall FIPM 
process as discussed in the previous section. The data base was designed 
to store the essential FIPM information, additional descriptive data 
pertinent to each category and entries which document data base 
operations. Details on the structure and contents of the FIPM data base 
are included in the following subsections. 
The FIPM data base has been implemented on a Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) VAX computer. The data base management system selected 
was DEC's VAX Datatrieve. The computer and data base system were selected 
based on the availability of these items at both Battelle and NASA MSFC. 
The data base design and development activities were performed on the 
Battelle computers. After entry and verification at Battelle, the initial 
FIPM data files were transferred to NASA MSFC in February 1987. 
Data Base Structure 
The fundamental elements required to create a Datatrieve data 
base are records, domains, and data files. Records are the detailed 
descriptions of the data fields (information) which are stored. Domains 
are sets of data which share a common record definition. The data files 
are the actual VAX RMS (record management services) files which contain 
the information. Each of these elements must be defined at the Datatrieve 
command level before information can be stored. A domain i s  logically 
related to the corresponding record and data file through the domain 
definition. The definition for one of the FIPM domains (SYSTEMS) is shown 
in Figure 25. An excerpt from the corresponding record definition 
(SYSTEMS-REC) is displayed in Figure 26. The file definition command for 
this domain is illustrated in Figure 27. 
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Q Q  
DEFINE DOMAIN SYSTEMS USING SYSTEMS-REC ON 
DEVf206 : [BCDSSMEP. DATA] SYSTEMS. DAT -0 
1 - Domain name 
2 - Record name 
3 - Data f i l e  
4 - D e f i n i t i o n  terminator  
F IGURE 25. DATATRIEVE D E F I N E  DOMAIN COMMAND 
DEFINE RECORD SYSTEMS-REC USING 
01 SYSTEMSJ~EC. 
- 
USAGE I S  DATE 
! 
05 SYSTEM 
QUERY-NAME IS DCREATED 
- EDIT-STRING I S  X(23). -@ 
PICTURE IS X(4)  
QUERY-NAME IS SYS. 
1 - Record name 
2 - Comnent l i n e  
3 - Group f i e l d  
4 - Level number 
5 - F i e l d  name 
6 - E l m n t a r y  f i e l d  
7 - F i e l d  d e f i n i t i o n  clauses 
8 - F i e l d  d e f i n i t i o n  terminator  
9 - Addi t ional  f i e l d  d e f i n i t i o n s  
10 - Record d e f i n i t i o n  terminator  
F IGURE 26. DATATRIEVE D E F I N E  RECORD COMMAND 
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Q Q 
DEFINE FILE FOR SYSTEMS KEY = DATLCREATED (DUP) , 4 
KEY = SYSTEM 
KEY = SYSTEM-NAME 
1 - Domain name 
2 - F i e l d  op t ion  t o  a l low 
dupl i c a t e  values 
3 - Primary key clause 
4 - Secondary key clauses 
FIGURE 27. DATATRIEVE DEFINE FILE COMMAND 
The FIPM data base i s  s t ruc tu red  around s i x  Da ta t r i eve  records. 
These include: 
SYSTEMS-REC 
MODULES-REC 
FA1 LUREMODES-REC 
CONNECT I ONS-REC 
PROPAGATIONS-REC 
REFERENCES-REC. 
Each o f  t h e  records SYSTEMS-REC, MODULES-REC, FAILUREMODES-REC, 
CONNECTIONS-REC, and REFERENCES-REC i s  associated w i t h  two FIPM domains. 
PROPAGATIONS-REC i s  t h e  bas is  f o r  a group o f  domains which s t o r e  SSME 
f a i l u r e  i n fo rma t ion  propagation records. Table 4 l i s t s  a l l  o f  t h e  F I P M  
records, domains, and data f i l e s .  
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The failure information propagations are not stored in a single 
domain (data file) due to the large number of data records involved. In 
the case of the HPOTP FIPM, there are 8213 failure information 
propagations. The access time for large files is a limiting factor on the 
overall size of the file. Experience with the HPOTP model indicated that 
a separate failure information propagation domain should be created for 
each SSME system (major component) being modeled. This format was adopted 
for the FIPM data base. As mentioned earlier, the same Datatrieve record 
definition is used for all of the propagations domains. 
The data file associated with each FIPM domain is a VAX RMS 
indexed sequential file. These files contain an index of pointers based 
on the specified primary and secondary keys. The index allows the file 
access system to rapidly locate a record with specific attributes. This 
feature significantly improves the time required for many input and output 
operations. A primary key and at least one secondary key have been 
defined for all of the FIPM domains. 
Data Description 
The data formats established for the various FIPM domains are 
described in the following subsections. The data fields, query names, 
field type, data class, field length, and total record length are 
discussed for each of the Datatrieve domains. A query name is an 
abbreviated form of the field name which can be used during Datatrieve 
operations. The field type is group, elementary, or redefines. A group 
field contains one or more additional fields while an elementary field 
contains a single item o f  data. A redefines field creates an alternate 
definition for either a group or an elementary field without increasing 
the total length of the record. The field class describes the nature of 
the data contained in that field. Three field classes were used to define 
the six FIPM records: alphanumeric, numeric, and date. An alphanumeric 
field can contain any member of the Datatrieve character set (letter, 
digit, or special). A numeric field is restricted to digits plus an 
optional sign (+ or - ) .  The date field is required for storing and 
manipulating dates in Datatrieve. The key fields which have been defined 
for the respective VAX RMS files are also identified. 
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Domains SYSTEMS and SYSTEMS FORM 
The domain SYSTEMS stores information which defines the top- 
level items or components (systems) being modeled. Each major engine 
component (high-pressure oxidizer turbopump, oxidizer preburner , etc .) has 
a corresponding FIPM system. A field has been provided for storing a 
descriptive name for each system. A total of 15 fields have been defined 
for identifying the Rocketdyne FMEA items which comprise each system. 
Fields also are included for specifying reference documents which were 
used in formulating each system model. Several additional fields are 
defined for storage of pertinent data relative to the creation and 
modification of each record. Domain SYSTEMS-FORM i s  used to display 
input/output forms on the computer terminal during data entry and 
modification. It is functionally identical to SYSTEMS but contains only 
one record. 
The domain definitions for SYSTEMS and SYSTEMS-FORM are included 
in Reference 4, Appendix A. The corresponding record definition, 
SYSTEMS-REC, is contained in Reference 4, Appendix B .  The major features 
associated with this record are summarized in Table 5. The Datatrieve 
file definition commands for both of these domains are included in 
Reference 4, Appendix C. The key fields for SYSTEMS and SYSTEMS-FORM are 
given in Table 6. 
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TABLE 6. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS-FORM 
Duplicate Change 
Values 
Key 
Field Type Values 
DATE-CREATED Primary Yes No 
SYSTEM A1 ternate Yes Yes 
SYSTEKNAME A1 ternate Yes Yes 
Domains MODULES and MODULES FORM 
The domain MODULES stores information which defines the 
subelements or functions comprising each of the systems (SSME components) 
being modeled. Each FIPM system has multiple modules which are identified 
by the combination of the system and a unique module number. Fields have 
been included for storing a descriptive name and the general function 
associated with each module. Several additional fields also are defined 
for storage of pertinent data relative to the creation and modification of 
each record. 
the computer 
functionally 
The 
in Reference 
MODULES-REC, 
Domain MODULES-FORM is used to display input/output forms on 
terminal during data entry and modification. It is 
dentical to MODULES but contains only one record. 
domain definitions for MODULES and MODULES-FORM are included 
4, Appendix A. The corresponding record definition, 
s contained in Reference 4, Appendix B. The major features 
associated with this record are summarized in Table 7. The Datatrieve 
file definition commands for both of these domains are included in 
Reference 4, Appendix C. The key fields for MODULES and MODULES-FORM are 
given in Table 8. 
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TABLE 8. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS MODULES AND MODULES-FORM 
F i e l d  
Key Dup l ica te  Change 
Type Values Values 
DATE-CREATED Primary Yes No 
SYSTEM-MODULE A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
SYSTEM-MODULE-NAME A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
Domains FA1 LUREMODES and FAILUREMODES-FORM 
The domain FAILUREMODES stores in fo rmat ion  which def ines the  
f a i l u r e  modes i d e n t i f i e d  f o r  each module. The i n d i v i d u a l  modules, i n  
general ,  w i l l  have m u l t i p l e  f a i l u r e  modes. The p r i n c i p a l  f i e l d  f o r  each 
record  i s  a 20-character code which s p e c i f i e s  t h e  source module, t he  
f a i l u r e  mechanism, and any accomplice module which may be involved. 
F ie lds  a re  prov ided f o r  t h e  en t r y  o f  t e x t  which descr ibes t h e  f a i l u r e  mode 
and i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  general e f f e c t s  associated w i t h  it. Several add i t i ona l  
f i e l d s  a l so  are  def ined f o r  storage o f  p e r t i n e n t  data r e l a t i v e  t o  the  
c rea t i on  and mod i f i ca t i on  o f  each record.  Domain FAILUREMODES-FORM i s  
used t o  d i s p l a y  input /ou tpu t  forms on the  computer te rmina l  dur ing  data 
e n t r y  and mod i f i ca t i on .  It i s  f u n c t i o n a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  FAILUREMODES bu t  
conta ins on ly  one record. 
The domain d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  FAILUREMODES and FAILUREMODES-FORM 
are  inc luded i n  Reference 4 ,  Appendix A. The corresponding record 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  FAILUREMODES-REC, i s  contained i n  Reference 4 ,  Appendix B. 
The major fea tures  associated w i t h  t h i s  record are summarized i n  Table 9. 
The Da ta t r i eve  f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  commands f o r  both o f  these domains are 
inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix C. The key f i e l d s  f o r  FAILUREMODES and 
FAILUREMODES-FORM are given i n  Table 10. 
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TABLE 10. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS FAILUREMODES 
AND FAILUREMODES-FORM 
Key Duplicate Change 
Field Type Values Values 
DATE-CREATED Primary Yes No 
FMCODE A1 ternate Yes Yes 
Domains CONNECTIONS and CONNECTIONS FORM 
The domain CONNECTIONS stores information which defines the 
physical paths which exist between modules. In general, each module will 
have multiple connections to the adjacent module(s). The principal field 
in each record is a 21-character code which specifies the two modules 
being connected and the exact nature of the connection. Several 
additional fields also are defined for storage of pertinent data relative 
to the creation and modification of each record. Domain CONNECTIONS-FORM 
is used to display input/output forms on the computer terminal during data 
entry and modification. It is functionally identical to CONNECTIONS but 
contains only one record. 
The domain definitions for CONNECTIONS and CONNECTIONS-FORM are 
included in Reference 4, Appendix A. The corresponding record definition, 
CONNECTIONS-REC, is contained in Reference 4, Appendix B. The major 
features associated with this record are summarized in Table 11. The 
Datatrieve file definition commands for both o f  these domains are included 
in Reference 4, Appendix C. The key fields for CONNECTIONS and 
CONNECTIONS-FORM are given in Table 12. 
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TABLE 12. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS CONNECTIONS 
AND CONNECTIONS-FORM 
Key Dup l ica te  Change 
F i e l d  Type Values Values 
DATECREATED P r i ma ry Yes No 
CODE-NUMBER A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
Domains PROPAGATIONS. A150 throuqh PROPAGATIONS,Z910 
and PROPAGATIONS FORM 
The domains PROPAGATIONS-A150 through PROPAGATIONS-Z910 s t o r e  
t h e  ac tua l  f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  propagat ion data. Each o f  t h e  items i n  
domain SYSTEMS has a separate propagations domain. One o f  t h e  f i e l d s  
i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  module f a i l u r e  mode which i n i t i a t e d  t h e  in fo rmat ion  f low.  
Another f i e l d  s p e c i f i e s  the  p a r t i c u l a r  connection t o  which the  data has 
passed. Most o f  t h e  f i e l d s  descr ibe the  s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  the  
f a i l u r e  s igna l .  Three t e x t  f i e l d s  have been inc luded f o r  e n t r y  o f  
comments p e r t a i n i n g  t o  the  f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  propagation. Three f i e l d s  
a l so  are  def ined f o r  storage o f  data concerning t h e  c rea t i on  and 
m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  each record. Domain PROPAGATIONS-FORM i s  used t o  d i sp lay  
i npu t /ou tpu t  forms on the  computer terminal .  It i s  f u n c t i o n a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  
t o  t h e  o the r  propagations domains bu t  conta ins on ly  one record.  
The domain d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  cu r ren t  f a i l u r e  
in fo rmat ion  propagations domains are inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix A. 
The corresponding record d e f i n i t i o n  , PROPAGATIONS-REC, i s  contained i n  
Reference 4 ,  Appendix B. The major features associated w i t h  t h i s  record 
are  summarized i n  Table 13. The Data t r ieve  f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  commands f o r  
a l l  o f  t he  domains are inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix C. The key 
f i e l d s  f o r  PROPAGATIONS-A150 through PROPAGATIONS-Z910 and 
PROPAGATIONS-FORM are given i n  Table 14. 
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TABLE 14. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS PROPAGATIONS-A150 
THROUGH PROPAGATIONS-Z910 AND 
PROPAGATIONS-FORM 
Key Dupl i c a t e  Change 
F i e l d  TY Pe Values Values 
DATE-CREATED Primary Yes No 
FMCODE A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
CODE-NUMBER A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
S I G N A L T Y P E  A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
The domain and f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  commands f o r  PROPAGATIONLA150 
through PROPAGATIONS-Z910 d i f f e r  from those used f o r  t h e  o the r  F I P M  
domains. The domain and f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  commands. associated w i t h  
PROPAGATIONSA150 are  shown respec t i ve l y  i n  Figures 28 and 29. The domain 
d e f i n i t i o n  uses t h e  Data t r ieve  l o g i c a l s  PROPAGATIONS and PROPAGATIONS-FILE 
w h i l e  t h e  f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  uses the  l o g i c a l  PROPAGATIONS. This process was 
se lected t o  a l l ow  automated d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  
propagat ion domain and f i l e  f o r  each new e n t r y  i n  domain SYSTEMS. 
FNf CREATE-LOG ( "PROPAGAT IONS" , "PROPAGATIONSJ\lSO") 
FNfCREATE-LOG( "PROPAGATIONS-FILE" , 
"DEVf206  : [BCDSSME2. DATA] PROPAGATIONS-AlSO. OAT") 
DEFINE DOMAIN PROPAGATIONS USING PROPAGATIONS-REC ON PROPAGATIONS-FILE 
I 
FIGURE 28. DOMAIN D E F I N I T I O N  COMMANDS FOR PROPAGATIONS-A150 
103 
FN$CREATE-LOG ("PROPAGATIONS",  "PROPAGATIONS-A150") 
DEFINE FILE FOR PROPAGATIONS KEY = DATE-CREATED (DUP), 
KEY = CODE-NUMBER (DUP) , 
KEY = SIGNAL-TYPE (DUP) 
KEY = FMCODE (DUP) 1 
FIGURE 29. FILE DEFINITION COMMANDS FOR PROPAGATIONS-A150 
Domains REFERENCES and REFERENCES FORM 
The domain REFERENCES stores in fo rmat ion  on t h e  var ious 
documents used dur ing  the  fo rmula t ion  o f  t he  FIPMs. The f i e l d s  i n  t h i s  
record  prov ide  f o r  t h e  i n p u t  o f  standard b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l  in fo rmat ion  such 
as author(s)  , t i t l e ,  company, company document number, data,  and con t rac t  
number. Another f i e l d  s to res  a unique reference number f o r  t he  document 
which i s  assigned by t h e  Data t r ieve  i n p u t  procedure. Several add i t i ona l  
f i e l d s  a l s o  are def ined f o r  storage o f  p e r t i n e n t  data r e l a t i v e  t o  the  
c r e a t i o n  and mod i f i ca t i on  o f  each record. Domain REFERENCES-FORM i s  used 
t o  d i s p l a y  input /ou tpu t  forms on the  computer te rmina l  dur ing  data en t r y  
and mod i f i ca t i on .  It i s  f u n c t i o n a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  REFERENCES but contains 
on ly  one record. 
The domain d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  REFERENCES and REFERENCES-FORM are 
inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix A. The corresponding record d e f i n i t i o n ,  
REFERENCES-REC, i s  contained i n  Reference 4, Appendix B. The major 
fea tures  associated w i t h  t h i s  record are  summarized i n  Table 15. The 
Da ta t r i eve  f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  commands f o r  both o f  these domains are inc luded 
i n  Reference 4, Appendix C. The key f i e l d s  f o r  REFERENCES and 
REFERENCES-FORM are  given i n  Table 16. 
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TABLE 16. KEY FIELDS FOR DOMAINS REFERENCES AND REFERENCES-FORM 
F i e l d  
Key Dup l ica te  Change 
TY Pe Values Values 
DATE-CREATED Primary Yes No 
REFERENCLNUMBER A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
DOCUMENT-TITLE A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
DOCUMENT-SOURCE A1 te rna te  Yes Yes 
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FIPM DATA BASE SOFTWARE 
The FIPM data base development software provides a controlled, 
interactive environment in which failure information propagation data can 
be stored, modified, and listed. The software allows the user to perform 
a number of predefined data base operations. Direct access to the data 
base is restricted to prevent inadvertent changes which can invalidate 
large portions of the data files. The software also performs an extensive 
number of validation tests on the information entered by the user during 
the storage and modification of FIPM records. The data base software was 
developed using the following three Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) 
software packages: 
VAX/VMS Digital Command Language (DCL) 
Datatrieve 
Terminal Data Management System (TDMS). 
DCL command procedures provide the overall control of the FIPM software 
through a series of four menus. VAX command files 'containing Datatrieve 
instructions are used in conjunction with the menus to initiate the 
storage, modification, or listing o f  FIPM information. The actual 
manipulation of the FIPM records is accomplished using Datatrieve 
procedures and tables. Terminal forms created using TDMS utilities 
provide the interactive user interface. The DCL, Datatrieve, and TDMS 
software elements are outlined in the following subsections. 
Diqi tal Command Lanquaqe Procedures 
The Digital Command Language enables the user to instruct the 
VAX/VMS operating system to perform various operations. DCL command 
procedures are files which contain a series of DCL commands. When a 
command procedure is executed, the computer processes a1 1 of the commands 
contained in the file and then returns to the point of origin. DCL 
command procedures are used in the FIPM data base to provide the top- 
level control of the software elements. 
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When a user i n i t i a t e s  a VAX computer session, t he  operat ing 
system searches t h e  d e f a u l t  f i l e  d i r e c t o r y  f o r  a f i l e  named LOGIN.COM. I f  
the  f i l e  i s  found, t h e  computer executes the  DCL commands i n  LOGIN.COM 
before  per forming any o the r  operat ions.  The FIPM data base development 
sof tware uses t h i s  i n t r i n s i c  VAX process t o  d i r e c t  t he  program f l o w  i n t o  a 
c a r e f u l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  environment. The user i s  channeled from one 
procedure t o  t h e  nex t  w i thout  going t o  t h e  DCL command l e v e l .  Prov is ions 
are incorporated f o r  users w i t h  specia l  access p r i v i l e g e s  t o  bypass these 
procedures and execute commands a t  the  DCL l e v e l .  
The LOGIN.COM f i l e  created f o r  t he  FIPM data base pauses f o r  a 
response from t h e  te rmina l .  I f  the  user enters  t h e  c o r r e c t  access code, 
the  procedure w i l l  prompt f o r  PASSWORD 1 
procedure e x i t s  t o  t h e  DCL command l e v e l  
passwords are entered c o r r e c t l y .  I f  e i t h e r  
no t  v a l i d ,  t h e  procedure loops back t o  the  
A l l  responses except f o r  t he  co r rec t  acce 
and then PASSWORD 2. The 
f the  access code and both 
PASSWORD 1 o r  PASSWORD 2 i s  
p o i n t  o f  t he  i n i t i a l  pause. 
s code w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  the  
computer execut ing the  DCL procedure FIPFLMENU.COM. FIPM-MENU.COM 
d isp lays  the  main FIPM menu t o  the  user. This menu i s  shown i n  F igure 30. 
The program f l o w  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  e i t h e r  FIPM_STORE.COM, FIPM_MODIFY.COM, o r  
FIPFLLIST.COM depending on t he  l i n e  number se lected (1, 2, o r  3 
respec t i ve l y ) .  The user can a l so  terminate the  cu r ren t  computer session 
by en te r ing  l i n e  number 4.  It i s  poss ib le  t o  e x i t  t o  t h e  DCL command 
l e v e l  f rom t h e  main menu by en te r ing  the  c o r r e c t  access code and 
passwords. The top - leve l  FIPM software f l o w  i s  depic ted i n  F i g u r e  31. 
L i s t i n g s  o f  t h e  DCL procedures LOGIN.COM and FIPlotMENU.COM are  inc luded i n  
Reference 4, Appendix D. 
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MAIN MENU 
1. S t o r e  FIPM Data 
2. M o d i f y  FIPM Data 
3.  L i s t  FIPM Data 
4. E x i t  Procedure and Logout  
P lease e n t e r  LINE NUMBER: 
F IGURE 30. MENU FOR CONTROLLED ACCESS TO F I P M  DATA BASE 
LOGIN. COM 
F I  PM-MENU. COM 
F I  PM-STORE . COM 
F I PM-MOD I FY . COM 
F I PM-LI ST. COM 
Terminate Session 
VAX DCL Comnand Level  
Invoke D a t a t r i e v e  
Invoke TDMS U t i l i t i e s  
Execute DCL Comnands 
Terminate Session 
F IGURE 31. TOP-LEVEL F I P M  SOFTWARE FLOWS 
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I f  t h e  user se lec ts  the  s to re  F I P M  data op t ion ,  t he  DCL 
procedure FIPM_STORE.COM i s  c a l l e d  t o  d i sp lay  t h e  menu shown i n  F igure 32. 
A response o f  1 through 6 w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  the  execut ion o f  t h e  Data t r ieve  
command f i l e  STORE-REF.COM, STORE,SYS.COM, STORE-MOD.COM, STORE-FM.COM, 
STORE-CON.COM, o r  S T O R L F I P . C O M  respec t ive ly .  A f t e r  execut ing the  
appropr ia te  Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e ,  t he  procedure FIPM_STORE.COM 
red isp lays  t h e  s t o r e  menu. The user may e l e c t  t o  cont inue s t o r i n g  data i n  
any o f  t h e  d isp layed domains o r  may r e t u r n  t o  the  main menu procedure by 
s e l e c t i n g  l i n e  number 7 .  The program f l o w  f o r  s t o r i n g  F IPM data i s  shown 
i n  F igure  33. A l i s t i n g  o f  t he  DCL command procedure FIPM_STORE.COM i s  
inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix D. 
I f  t h e  user  se lec ts  the  modify F IPM data opt ion,  t h e  DCL 
procedure FIPM-MODIFY.COM i s  c a l l e d  t o  d i sp lay  t h e  menu shown i n  F igure 
34. A response o f  1 through 5 w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  execut ion o f  t he  
Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e  MODIFY-REF.COM, MODIFY-SYS.COM, MODIFY-MOD.COM, 
MODIFY,FM.COM, o r  MODIFY-FIP.COM respec t ive ly .  The records i n  domain 
CONNECTIONS cannot be mod i f ied  from t h i s  menu. A f t e r  execut ing the  
appropr ia te  Data t r ieve  command f i l e ,  t he  procedure FIPM-MODIFY.COM 
red isp lays  t h e  modi fy  menu. The user may e l e c t  t o  cont inue modi fy ing data 
i n  any o f  t h e  d isp layed domains o r  may r e t u r n  t o  the  main menu procedure 
by s e l e c t i n g  l i n e  number 6. The program f l ow  f o r  modi fy ing F I P M  data i s  
shown i n  F igure  35. A l i s t i n g  o f  t he  DCL command procedure 
FIPM_MODIFY.COM i s  inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix D. 
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FIPM-STORE.COM (DCL) 4 
STORE-REF . COM (DTR) .) 
w STORE-SYS .COM (DTR) w 
t STORE-MOD . COM (DTR) h 
t STORE-FM. COM (DTR) D 
> STORE-CON. COM (DTR) w 
* STORE-FI P. COM (DTR) 
aaIIIIIIIIaIaIIIaIIaaIIaIaaaIIIaaa~aaIaIaaaxaIx 
FAILURE INFORMATION PROPAGATION MODEL 
STORE MENU 
1. D o m a i n  REFERENCES 
2. D o m a i n  SYSTEMS 
3. D o m a i n  MODULES 
4 .  D o m a i n  FAILUREMODES 
5. Domain  CONNECTIONS 
6.  D o m a i n  PROPAGATIONS 
7. E x i t  t o  MAIN MENU 
P l e a s e  enter L I N E  NUMBER: 
F I G U R E  32. MENU FOR STORING F I P M  DATA BASE RECORDS 
F I G U R E  33. PROGRAM FLOW FOR STORING F I P M  DATA 
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* MODI FY-REF . COM (DTR) w 
w MOD I FY-SY S . COM (DTR) * 
* MODI FY-MOD. COM (DTR) * 
w MODI FY-FM. COM (DTR) * 
* MODIFY-FIP.COM (DTR) 
MODIFY MENU 
1. Domain REFERENCES 
2.  Domain SYSTEMS 
3. Domain MODULES 
4. Domain FAILUREMODES 
5 .  Domain PROPAGATIONS 
6.  E x i t  t o  MAIN MENU 
P l e a s e  enter  L I N E  NUMBER: 
FIGURE 34. MENU FOR MODIFYING F I P M  DATA BASE RECORDS 
FIPM-MENU.COM (DCL) 4 I 
FIGURE 35. PROGRAM FLOW FOR MODIFYING F I P M  DATA 
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If the user selects the list FIPM data option, the DCL procedure 
FIPM-LIST.COM is called to display the menu shown in Figure 36 .  A 
response of 1 through 6 will result in the execution of the Datatrieve 
command file LIST-REF-l.COM, LIST-SYS-l.COM, LIST-MOD-l.COM, 
LIST-FM_l.COM, LIST-CON,l.COM, or LIST-FIP-1.COM respectively. After 
executing the appropriate Datatrieve command file, the procedure 
FIPM-LIST.COM requests a yes or no response to list the records in the 
domain. A response of yes results in a batch job being submitted to 
generate the listing. A 
no response causes the immediate redisplay of the list menu. The user may 
elect t o  continue listing data for any of the displayed domains or may 
return to the main menu by selecting line number 7 .  The program flow for 
listing FIPM data is shown in Figure 37 .  A listing of the DCL command 
procedure FIPM_LIST.COM is included in Reference 4 ,  Appendix D. 
The procedure then loops back to the list menu. 
FAILURE INFORMATION PROPAGATION MODEL 
L I S T  MENU 
1. Domain REFERENCES 
2. Domain SYSTEMS 
3 .  Domain MODULES 
4.  Domain FAILUREMODES 
5. Domain CONNECTIONS 
6 .  Domain PROPAGATIONS 
7 .  Exit to MAIN MENU 
Please enter LINE NUMBER: 
FIGURE 36 .  MENU FOR LISTING FIPM DATA BASE RECORDS 
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Data t r i eve  Command F i l e s .  Procedures, and Tables 
The ac tua l  storage, mod i f i ca t i on ,  and l i s t i n g  o f  FIPM 
in fo rma t ion  i s  performed us ing  Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e s  and procedures. 
Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e s  a re  VAX system-level f i l e s  which con ta in  a se r ies  
o f  Da ta t r i eve  commands and statements. These f i l e s  a re  invoked from 
i n s i d e  Da ta t r i eve  t o  perform t h e  desired operations. Da ta t r i eve  
procedures a l s o  conta in  a se r ies  o f  Data t r ieve  commands and statements. 
However, these procedures are  s to red  i n  t h e  VAX Common Data D ic t i ona ry  
(CDD). The CDD i s  used by Da ta t r i eve  t o  s t o r e  and access t h e  var ious 
elements associated w i t h  t h e  data base. 
The Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e s  and procedures developed f o r  t h e  
FIPM data  base use Da ta t r i eve  tab les  t o  v a l i d a t e  and supplement 
i n fo rma t ion  be ing  entered. An example o f  a Da ta t r i eve  t a b l e  i s  shown i n  
F igure  38. These tab les  are  used t o  v a l i d a t e  data by accept ing on ly  
values which a re  i n  t h e  tab le .  They a l so  prov ide  a d d i t i o n a l  da ta  through 
t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h e  value on t h e  l e f t -hand  s ide  o f  t h e  co lon  i n t o  t h e  value 
on t h e  r igh t -hand side. This l a t t e r  f unc t i on  was e s p e c i a l l y  use fu l  f o r  
c r e a t i n g  abbrev ia t ions  t o  represent key FIPM data. The o v e r a l l  record  
s i z e  was reduced by s t o r i n g  t h e  abbrev ia t ion  r a t h e r  than t h e  e n t i r e  value. 
DEFINE TABLE REFERENCE-ABBREV-TABLE 
1 
: IIAJ" 
: IIBA" 
"AEROJET" 
" BATTELLE" 
"MARTIN MARIETTA" : I'MM" 
"NASA HDQ" 
"NASA MSFC" 
"PRATT & WHITNEY" : "PW" 
: IINH" 
: IlNMIl 
"ROCKETDYNE" : IlRDIl 
1 
EN D-TAB LE 
FIGURE 38. SAMPLE DATATRIEVE TABLE 
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The Datatrieve command f i l e s ,  procedures, and tables used t o  
s tore  FIPM information are shown in Figure 39. The command f i l e s  
STORE-REF. COM , STORE-SYS . COM, STORE-MOD . COM , STORE-FM. COM , STORE-CON . COM , 
and STORE-FIP.COM are executed by the DCL command procedure FIPM,STORE.COM 
(s tore  menu). Each of these Datatrieve command f i l e s  opens a log f i l e  t o  
document the records being stored i n  the corresponding domain, prints the 
current date/time t o  the log f i l e  and then invokes the appropriate 
Datatrieve procedure(s). After completion of the storage ac t iv i ty ,  the 
program flow i s  returned t o  the command f i l e  where the current date/time 
i s  again printed before closing the log f i l e .  Execution i s  then returned 
t o  the DCL procedure FIPM-STORE.COM for  redisplay of the s tore  menu. The 
Datatrieve command f i l e s ,  procedures, and tables used t o  s tore  FIPM data 
are included i n  Appendixes E ,  F,  and G of Reference 4. 
The Datatrieve command f i l e s ,  procedures, and tables used t o  
modify FIPM information are shown in Figure 40. The command f i l e s  
MODIFY-REF.COM, MODIFY-SYS.COM, MODIFY-MOD.COM, MODIFY-FM.COM, and 
MODIFY-FIP.COM are executed by the DCL command procedure FIPM-MODIFY.COM 
(modify menu).  Each of these Datatrieve command f i l e s  opens a log f i l e  t o  
document the records being modified in the corresponding domain, prints 
the current date/time t o  the log f i l e  and then invokes the appropriate 
Datatrieve procedure(s). After completion of the modification ac t iv i ty ,  
the program flow i s  returned t o  the command f i l e  where the current 
date/time i s  again printed before closing the log f i l e .  Execution i s  then 
returned t o  the DCL procedure FIPM-MODIFY.COM for  redisplay of the modify 
menu. The Datatrieve command f i l e s ,  procedures, and tables used t o  modify 
FIPM data are included in Appendixes E ,  F, and G of Reference 4. 
1 1 7  
Command F i  1 es : 
STORLCON.COM 
STORE-FIP.COM 
S T O R L F M .  COM 
STORLMOD. COM 
S T O R L R E F  . COM 
STORE-FIP.COM 
P r o c e d u r e s :  
BELL  
CLRSCRN 
CON-STORE 
CREATLPROPAGAT I ONS-F I P-1 
CREATLPROPAGATIONS-FIP-2 
CREATE-PROPAGATIONS-SYS-1 
CREATE-PROPAGATIONS-SYS-2 
D T R N U L L  
FIP-STORE 
F I  P-STORE-1 
F I  P-STORE-2 
F K S T O R E  
MOD-STOR E 
REF-STORE 
SY S-STORE 
T a b l e s :  
ACCOMPLICLREQUIRED-TABLE 
CONNECTION-TABLE 
FAILURLMODLSUBMODE-TABLE 
FMEA-ITEM-NAME-TABLE 
FREQ-T I M L U N  I TS-TABLE 
MONTH-TABLE 
PARAMETERTABLE 
REFERENCE-ABBREV-TABLE 
REFERENCE-SOURCE-TABLE 
SIGNAL-TABLE 
FIGURE 39. DATATRIEVE COMMAND F I L E S ,  PROCEDURES AND 
TABLES USED TO STORE F I P M  DATA 
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Command Files: 
MODIFY-FIP.COM 
MODIFY-FM.COM 
MODIFYJIOD.COM 
MODIFY,REF.COM 
MOD I FY-SY S . COM 
Procedures : 
BELL 
CLRSCRN 
DTRNULL 
FI PJIOD I FY 
FIP-MODIFY-1 
FIP-MODIFY-2 
F I P-MOD I FY-3 
FIP-MODIFY-4 
F K M O D  I FY 
FM-MODIFY-1 
MOD-MOD I FY 
MODJIODI FY-1 
REF-MODIFY 
REF-MODI FY-1 
SY S-MOD I FY 
SYS-MODI FY-1 
SYSJIODIFY-2 
Tables: 
FAILURE-MODE-SUBMODE-TABLE 
FMELITEM-NAME-TABLE 
MONTH-TABLE 
NUMBERTABLE 
PARAMETERTABLE 
REFERENCLSOURCE-TABLE 
SIGNALTABLE 
SIGN-TABLE 
FIGURE 40. DATATRIEVE COMMAND FILES, PROCEDURES AND 
TABLES USED TO MODIFY FIPM DATA 
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The Data t r ieve  command f i l e s ,  procedures, and tab les  used t o  
l i s t  F IPM in fo rmat ion  are shown i n  F igure 41. The command f i l e s  
LIST-REF-l.COM, LIST-SYS,l.COM, LIST-MOL1 .COM, LIST-FKl.COM, 
LIST-CON-l.COM, and LIST-FIP-1.COM are executed by t h e  DCL command 
procedure FIPlrtLIST.COM ( l i s t  menu). Each o f  these Data t r ieve  command 
f i l e s  counts t h e  number o f  records i n  the  corresponding domain and 
ca l cu la tes  t h e  number o f  pages i n  the  l i s t  f i l e .  Th is  in fo rmat ion  i s  
p r i n t e d  t o  t h e  screen and program execut ion re tu rns  t o  FIPM-LIST.COM. I f  
an ac tua l  l i s t i n g  i s  desired, t h e  appropr ia te Data t r ieve  command f i l e  
LIST,REF,2.COM, L I  ST-SY S-2. COM, LIST,MOD,2.COM, LIST-FM2.COM, 
LIST-CON-2.COM, o r  LIST-FIP,Z.COM i s  submitted as a batch job t o  generate 
t h e  l i s t  f i l e .  Execution o f  t h e  DCL procedure FIPM_LIST.COM then 
cont inues w i t h  red i sp lay  o f  t he  l i s t  menu. The Data t r ieve  command f i l e s ,  
procedures, and tab les  used t o  l i s t  FIPM data are inc luded i n  Appendixes 
E, F, and G o f  Reference 4. 
A number o f  Data t r ieve  procedures were used dur ing  the  F I P M  data 
base sof tware development t o  simp1 i f y  c e r t a i n  funct ions.  As examples, t he  
procedure CREATLCONNECTIONS executes t h e  f i l e  d e f i n i t i o n  command f o r  
domain CONNECTIONS and the  procedure S132 sets  t h e  te rmina l  screen w id th  
t o  132 characters .  I n  add i t i on  t o  these procedures, t h e  Data t r ieve  t a b l e  
FMELITElrtPART-NO-TABLE was created t o  p rov ide  the  Rocketdyne p a r t  numbers 
(Reference 3, Table 2-1) associated w i t h  s p e c i f i c  FMEA items. These 
procedures and t a b l e  a re  shown i n  F igure 42. L i s t i n g s  f o r  t h e  procedures 
are  inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix F and the  t a b l e  i s  inc luded i n  
Reference 4 ,  Appendix G. 
I 
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Comand  F i l e s :  
LIST-CON-1. COM 
L I S T  CON 2.COM 
LIST-FIP 2.COM 
L I S T  FM T.COM 
L I STIFM-2. COM 
LIST MOB-l.COM 
LISTIMOD-2. COM 
L I ST-REF 1 . COM 
LIST-REF-2. COM 
LIST SYS-1.COM 
L I STISY S I2 .  COM 
LIST:FIP:~.COM 
Procedures :  
C L R S C R N 
DTR NULL 
FIPICOUNT 
FIP COUNT-1 
FIP LIST-2 
F I  P-L I S T I 4  
FIP-COUNT 2 
FI P ~ L  I ST-T 
FIP~LIST 3 
FIGURE 41. DATATRIEVE COMMAND F I L E S  AND PROCEDURES 
USED TO L I S T  F I P M  DATA 
Procedures :  
CREATE-CONNECTIONS 
CREATE CONNECTIONS FORM 
CREATE-FA1 LUREMODES-FORM 
CREATE MODULES FORM 
CREATE-FAILUREMODES 
CREATE~MODULES 
CREATE-PROPAGATIONS 
CREATE-PROPAGATIONS-FORM 
CREATE-REFERENCES 
CREATE-REFERENCES-FORM 
CREATE~SY STEMS 
FIPLOGTCALC 
CREATE SYSTEMS-FORM 
F I  PLOGICALD 
HDR 
PRNTOFF 
PRNTON 
5132 
580 
Tab les :  
FMEA-ITEM-PART-NO-TABLE 
F IGURE 42. MISCELLANEOUS DATATRIEVE PROCEDURES AND 
TABLES USED FOR F I P M  
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Terminal Data Manaqement Svstem Forms 
Two TDMS u t i l i t i e s  were used t o  c rea te  and compile terminal  
forms f o r  use w i t h  t h e  FIPM data base. These forms prov ide  the  
i n t e r a c t i v e  i n t e r f a c e  between the  data base user and the  under ly ing 
software. The s p e c i f i c  u t i l i t i e s  used were t h e  Form D e f i n i t i o n  U t i l i t y  
(FDU) and t h e  Request D e f i n i t i o n  U t i l i t y  (RDU). FDU was used t o  c rea te  
t h e  screen image, de f i ne  t h e  v ideo features,  assign a t t r i b u t e s  t o  the  
var ious  i n p u t  f i e l d s ,  es tab l i sh  t h e  f i e l d  access order ,  and save the  
completed form i n  t h e  Common Data D ic t i ona ry  (CDD). The FIPM form 
d e f i n i t i o n s  are  inc luded i n  Reference 4, Appendix H. The RDU was used t o  
c rea te  a request l i b r a r y  which i d e n t i f i e s  a l l  o f  t he  F IPM forms. The VAX 
computer f i l e  associated w i t h  the  compiled forms i s  a l so  s p e c i f i e d  i n  the  
request l i b r a r y  d e f i n i t i o n .  F i n a l l y ,  RDU i s  used t o  b u i l d  (compile) t he  
request l i b r a r y  and c rea te  the  l i b r a r y  f i l e  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  d e f i n i t i o n .  
The FIPM request l i b r a r y  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  shown i n  F igure 43. 
FORM I S  CONNECTIONS-STO-FORM; 
FORM I S  FA1 LUREMODES-FINLFORM; 
FORM IS FAILUREMODES-FIN2-FORM; 
FORM I S  FAILUREMODES-MODLFORM; 
FORM IS FA1 LUREMODES-MOD2-FORM; 
FORM I S  FA1 LUREMODES-STOLFORM; 
FORM IS FAILUREMODES-ST02-FORM; 
FORM I S  MODULES-FIN-FORM; 
FORM I S  MODULESJOD-FORM; 
FORM I S  MODULES-STO-FORM; 
FORM I S  PROPAGATIONS-FIN-FORM; 
FORM I S  PROPAGATIONS-MOD-FORM; 
FORM I S  PROPAGATIONS-STO-FORM; 
FORM IS REFERENCES-FIN-FORM; 
FORM IS REFERENCES-MOD-FORM; 
FORM I S  REFERENCES-STO-FORM; 
FORM I S  SYSTEMS-FIN-FORM; 
FORM I S  SYSTEMS-MOD-FORM; 
FORM I S  SYSTEMS-STO-FORM; 
FILE I S  "DEV$206: [BCDSSME2.FORMS] FORMSLIB.RLB"; 
END DEFINIT ION;  
FIGURE 43. F I P M  REQUEST LIBRARY DEFINIT ION 
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FIPM DATA BASE TRANSFER 
A magnetic tape conta in ing  the  FIPM data base development 
sof tware and t h e  high-pressure o x i d i z e r  turbopump (HPOTP) data f i l e s  was 
mai led t o  t h e  NASA Marshal l  Space F l i g h t  Center i n  February 1987. This 
tape was w r i t t e n  us ing the  VAX/VMS Backup U t i l i t y  and contained m u l t i p l e  
copies o f  60 f i l e s .  These f i l e s  are shown i n  F igure  44. The f i l e  
ACTIVATE.COM was a DCL command procedure developed t o  load and organize 
a l l  o f  t h e  requ i red  FIPM s t r u c t u r e  i n t o  a newly es tab l i shed VAX username. 
The 19 f i l e s  o f  t he  type *.DAT a re  the  data f i l e s  associated w i t h  the  
HPOTP FIPM. The 28 f i l e s  o f  t he  types FIPK*.COM, LIST-*.COM, LOGIN.COM, 
MODIFY-*.COM, and STORL*.COM are the  DCL command procedures and 
Da ta t r i eve  command f i l e s  discussed i n  the  prev ious sect ion.  The th ree  
f i l e s  o f  t h e  type  CDD-FORMS,*.BAK conta in  the  compiled form d e f i n i t i o n s  as 
ex t rac ted  from the  CDD. The n ine  f i l e s  o f  t h e  type DTR-*.COM conta in  the  
Da ta t r i eve  domain, record,  procedure, and t a b l e  d e f i n i t i o n s .  
ACTIVATE.COM 
CDD-FORMS-3.BAK 
DTRDOMAI  NS . COM 
DTRPROCS-3.COM 
DTRPROCS-6. COM 
FA1 LUREMODES. DAT 
FIPM_MENU.COM 
LIST-CON-1.COM 
LIST-FIP-2.COM 
LIST-MOD,l.COM 
LIST-REF-2.COM 
LOG I N . COM 
MODIFY,MOD.COM 
MODULES.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A200.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-B400.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS,FORM.DAT 
REFERENCES-FORM.DAT 
STORE-FM.COM 
STORE,SYS.COM 
CDD-FORMS-1. BAK 
CONNECTIONS.DAT 
DTRPROCS-l.COM 
DTRPROCS-4. COM 
DTRRECORDS . COM 
FA1 LUREMODES-FORM. DAT 
FIPKMODIFY.COM 
LIST-CON-2.COM 
LIST-FM-1.COM 
LIST-MOD-2.COM 
LIST-SYS-1.COM 
MODIFY,FIP.COM 
MODIFY-REF.COM 
MODULES-FORM.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A600. DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-B800. DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-Z910.DAT 
STORLCON.COM 
STOREJIOD.COM 
SYSTEMS.DAT 
Tota l  o f  60 f i l e s .  
CDD-FORMS-2.BAK 
CONNECTIONS,FORM.DAT 
DTR-PROCS-2.COM 
DTR-PROCS-5.COM 
DTRTABLES.COM 
F I  PM-LIST. COM 
FIPM-STORE.COM 
LIST-FIP-1.COM 
LIST-FM-2.COM 
LIST-REF-1.COM 
LIST-SYS-2.COM 
MODIFY-FM.COM 
MODIFY-SYS.COM 
PROPAGATIONS-A15O.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A700.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-C200.DAT 
REFERENCES.DAT 
STORE-FIP.COM 
STORE-REF.COM 
SYSTEMS-FORM.DAT 
FIGURE 44. VAX/VMS FILES USED TO TRANSFER F I P M  DATA BASE 
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The procedure ACTIVATE.COM created t h e  necessary VAX/VMS 
d i r e c t o r y  s t r u c t u r e ,  created a Data t r ieve  d i c t i o n a r y ,  loaded a l l  o f  t he  
Data t r ieve  elements (domains, records, procedures, and tab les)  def ined a 
TDMS request l i b r a r y  and b u i l t  t he  TDMS request l i b r a r y  f i l e .  A l i s t i n g  
o f  t h e  f i l e  ACTIVATE.COM i s  inc luded i n  Reference 4 ,  Appendix D. The 
r e s u l t i n g  VAX d i r e c t o r y  s t r u c t u r e  i s  shown i n  F igure  45. The top- leve l  
d i r e c t o r y ,  [BCDSSME2], conta ins the  o ther  d i r e c t o r y  f i l e s ,  t he  Data t r ieve  
d i c t i o n a r y  f i l e ,  and two DCL command procedures. The f i l e s  contained i n  
t h i s  d i r e c t o r y  a re  shown i n  F igure 46. The d i r e c t o r y  [BCDSSMEZ.DATA] 
conta ins t h e  FIPM data f i l e s  as shown i n  F igure 47. The d i r e c t o r y  
[BCDSSME2.DTR] i s  used as a ho ld ing  area f o r  t h e  command f i l e s  conta in ing  
t h e  Da ta t r i eve  domain, record,  procedure, and t a b l e  d e f i n i t i o n s .  The 
f i l e s  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t o r y  are shown i n  F igure 48. The d i r e c t o r y  
[BCDSSME2. FIPM] conta ins t h e  DCL command procedures and Data t r ieve  command 
f i l e s  which d i s p l a y  the  FIPM menus and i n t e r a c t  w i t h  the  data base. These 
f i l e s  a re  shown i n  F igure 49. The d i r e c t o r y  [BCDSSMEZ.FORMS] conta ins the  
compiled form d e f i n i t i o n  f i l e s  and the  request l i b r a r y  f i l e  as shown i n  
F igure  50. The d i r e c t o r i e s  [BCDSSME2. LISTS], [BCDSSMEZ.LOGS] I and 
[BCDSSMEZ.MISC] a re  i n i t i a l l y  empty. Any F IPM l i s t i n g  f i l e s  generated by 
t h e  FIPM sof tware w i l l  be w r i t t e n  t o  the  [BCDSSMEZ.LISTS] d i r e c t o r y .  The 
l o g  f i l e s  which are  created as FIPM records are s to red  o r  mod i f ied  are 
w r i t t e n  t o  t h e  d i r e c t o r y  [BCDSSME2.LOGS]. The f i n a l  d i r e c t o r y ,  
[BCDSSMEZ.MISC], was inc luded f o r  miscellaneous f i l e s  which may be created 
by t h e  user. 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 2 
Level 2 
Level 2 
Level 2 
Level 2 
Level 2 
F IGURE 45. F I P M  DIRECTORY STRUCTURE 
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ACTIVATE.COM 
DATA.DIR 
DTR.DIR 
F I  PM . D I  R 
FORMS. D I R 
L I S T S . D I R  
LOG1 N . COM 
LOGS. D I R 
MISC.DIR 
SSME. D I C  
T o t a l  of 10 files. 
FIGURE 46. DIRECTORY DEV$206: [BCDSSME2] 
CONNECTIONS.DAT 
CONNECT I ONS-FORM . D AT 
FAILUREMODES. DAT 
F A 1  LUREMODELFORM. DAT 
MODULES.DAT 
MODULES,FORM.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A150.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS4200.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A600. DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-A700. DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-B400.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-B800.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-C200.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-FORM.DAT 
PROPAGATIONS-Z910.DAT 
REFERENCES.DAT 
REFERENCES,FORM.DAT 
SYSTEMS.DAT 
SYSTEMS-FORM.DAT 
T o t a l  of 19 files. 
FIGURE 47. DIRECTORY DEV$206: rBCDSSME2. DATA] 
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DTRDOMAINS.COM 
DTRPROCS-1. COM 
DTRPROCS-2. COM 
DTRPROCS-3. COM 
DTRPROCS-4.COM 
DTRPROCS-5.COM 
DTRPROCS-6. COM 
DTRRECORDS.COM 
D T R T A B L E S  . COM 
T o t a l  o f  9 f i l e s .  
FIGURE 48. DIRECTORY DEV$206 : [ BCDSSME2 . DTR] 
FIPM-LIST.COM FIPM-MENU.COM 
FIPM_MODIFY.COM F I  PM-STORE. COM 
LIST-CON-1.COM LIST-CON-2.COM 
LIST-FIP- l .COM LIST-FIP-2.COM 
LIST-FM-1.COM LIST-FM-2.COM 
LISTJIOD-1.COM 
LIST-REF-1 .COM 
LIST-SYS-1 .COM 
MODIFY,FIP.COM 
MODIFY,MOD.COM 
MODIFY,SYS.COM 
STORE-FIP.COM 
STORLMOD. COM 
STORE-SYS . COM 
L I ST-MOD-2. COM 
LIST-REF-2.COM 
LIST-SYS-2.COM 
MODIFY,FM.COM 
MODIFY-REF.COM 
STORE-CON. COM 
STORE-FM.COM 
S T O R L R E F .  COM 
T o t a l  o f  27 f i l e s .  
F IGURE 49. DIRECTORY DEV6206:  [BCDSSMEZ. F I P M ]  
CDD-FORMS-1.BAK 
CDD-FORMS,Z.BAK 
CDD-FORMS-3.BAK 
FORMSLIB.RLB 
T o t a l  o f  4 f i l e s .  
F IGURE 50. DIRECTORY DEV$206: [BCDSSMEZ. FORMS] 
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HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP FIPM 
The first SSME component analyzed using the failure information 
propagation model (FIPM) was the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) . 
One of the reasons for selecting the HPOTP was the relatively high number 
of unsatisfactory condition reports (UCRs) associated with this component. 
The HPOTP also received a very high score in the failure mode ranking 
which considered the cost, risk, and time factors connected with various 
component failure modes. A major area of concern for the HPOTP is ball 
bearing wear and cage delamination. Another item which has received 
considerable attention is cracking of the hot-gas turbine blades. Both of 
these areas have been the focus of extensive efforts by NASA and 
Rocketdyne to identify and diagnose degradation of the respective parts. 
All of these factors made the HPOTP an attractive candidate for the 
initial FIPM. 
following items: 
The HPOTP failure information propagation model consists of the 
HPOTP FIPM drawing 
HPOTP data stored in the FIPM data base. 
Specific details concerning each of these elements are provided later in 
this section. 
Definition o f  Hiqh-Pressure Oxidizer TurboDurne 
The high-pressure oxidizer turbopump is designated in the FIPM 
The failure information propagation model f o r  data base as System 8400. 
this system includes the following Rocketdyne FMEA items: 
High-pressure oxidizer turbopump (8400) 
Low-pressure oxidizer turbopump turbine drive duct (K202) 
High-pressure oxidizer duct (K205) 
Fuel preburner oxidizer supply duct (K206) 
Preburner pump inlet duct (K208) 
Oxidizer preburner oxidizer supply duct (K212). 
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References 3, 5, and 6 of this report were the principal sources 
used during the preparation of this FIPM. 
Hiqh-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump FIPM Drawinq 
The HPOTP FIPM drawing is included in Appendix B of this report. 
The drawing for the HPOTP (System B400) includes the following features: 
105 modules 
198 connections 
260 failure modes. 
8 systems (B400 plus 7 adjacent) 
The actual HPOTP, including associated engine items such as ducts and 
lines, is depicted by 90 modules (boxes). The remaining 15 modules are 
piece-parts or functions of adjacent engine systems such as System A150 
(heat exchanger). The modules which are not part of the HPOTP are easily 
identified by the diagonal lines in the lower portion of the box. Of the 
198 connections (lines) shown on the diagram, 29 represent physical paths 
to the various external systems. The remaining 169 connections are 
internal to the HPOTP. 
Hiqh-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump FIPM Data 
The information which collectively defines the HPOTP FIPM is 
stored in a total of six domains. The domains which contain HPOTP FIPM 
information include: 
SYSTEMS 
MODULES 
FAILUREMODES (failure modes) 
CONNECTIONS 
PROPAGATIONS,B400 (failure information propagations) 
REFERENCES. 
13 1 
The key r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between records i n  t h e  var ious FIPM domains are 
i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F igure 51. The domains SYSTEMS, MODULES, FAILUREMODES, 
CONNECTIONS, and REFERENCES s to re  records f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  var ious engine 
components (systems) being modeled. The domain PROPAGATIONS-B400 inc ludes 
f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  propagations on ly  f o r  t he  HPOTP (System B400). 
D e t a i l s  concerning t h e  data content and number o f  HPOTP records f o r  each 
o f  these domains o r  f i l e s  are provided i n  the  f o l l o w i n g  subsections o f  
t h i s  repo r t .  
Svstems Data F i l e  
There are  e i g h t  records i n  t h e  domain SYSTEMS which are 
associated w i t h  t h e  HPOTP FIPM. The cu r ren t  data f o r  each o f  these 
records are  inc luded i n  Reference 7 ,  Appendix B. A l l  o f  t h e  records i n  
domain SYSTEMS conta in  t h e  31 data f i e l d s  shown i n  F igure 52. The f i e l d  
names are  shown t o  the  l e f t  o f  t he  colons. The data s to red  i n  the  f i e l d s  
a re  found t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t he  colons. 
The DATE-CREATED, DATELAST-MODIFIED, and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t h e  date t h a t  t he  
record  was f i r s t  s to red  i n  t h e  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  t h e  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
t h e  procedure which performed the  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t ion .  A l l  t h ree  o f  
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by the  appropr ia te  Data t r ieve  
e n t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. The f i e l d  SYSTEM conta ins the  fou r -  
charac ter  code which i s  used t o  represent a given system. S Y S T E L N A M E  i s  
t h e  FIPM name associated w i t h  t h e  system designat ion.  ITEM1 through 
ITEM15 are  t h e  Rocketdyne FMEA items which are  inc luded i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  
system. REFERENCE1 through REFERENCE10 conta in  the  f i ve -cha rac te r  codes 
which represent  var ious reference documents used t o  de f i ne  the  cu r ren t  
system. The f i e l d  PROPAGATIONS-FILECREATED i s  used by one o f  several  
Da ta t r i eve  procedures t o  c rea te  a corresponding f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  
propagat ion f i l e  f o r  t h i s  system. 
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DATE-CREATED : 11-Dec-1986 14:12:18.51 
SYSTEM : 8400 
SYSTEM-NAME 
HIGH-PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP 
I TEMl : 8400 
ITEM2 : K202 
ITEM3 : K205 
I TEM4 : K206 
ITEM5 : K208 
ITEM6 : K212 
ITEM7 
ITEM8 
ITEM9 
ITEM10 
I TEMll 
ITEM12 
ITEM13 
ITEM14 
ITEM15 
REFERENCE1 : RDOOl 
REFERENCE2 : RD002 
REFERENCE3 : RD003 
REFERENCE4 
REFERENCE5 
REFERENCE6 
REFERENCE7 
REFERENCE8 
REFERENCE9 
REFERENCE10 
PROPAGATIONS-FILE CREATED : YES 
DATE-LAST-MOD IF I ED 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE : SYS-STORE 
: 11-Dec-1986 14:23:28.22 
FIGURE 52. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN SYSTEMS 
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Addi t iona l  d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rmat ion  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  the  FMEA items 
may be obtained by p r i n t i n g  the  i tem number v i a  FMEA-ITEKNAME-TABLE o r  
FMELITEM-PART-NO-TABLE. Add i t iona l  data on any references shown may be 
loca ted  by f i n d i n g  t h e  record i n  domain REFERENCES w i t h  REFERENCE-NUMBER 
equal t o  t h e  appropr ia te  code. 
Modules Data F i l e  
There a re  105 records i n  the  domain MODULES which are associated 
w i t h  t h e  HPOTP FIPM. The cu r ren t  
inc luded i n  Reference 7 ,  Appendix C. 
con ta in  t h e  s i x  da ta  f i e l d s  shown i n  
t o  t h e  l e f t  o f  t h e  colons. The data 
r i g h t  o f  t h e  colons. 
data f o r  each o f  these records are  
A l l  o f  t he  records i n  domain MODULES 
Figure 53. The f i e l d  names are shown 
stored i n  t h e  f i e l d s  a re  found t o  the  
DATE CREATED : 1 1 - D e c - 1 9 8 6  1 5 : 5 6 : 1 0 . 0 2  
SYSTEM-MODULE : B 4 0 0 0 0 1 0  
SYSTEM-MODULE-NAME 
F IRST-STAGE TURBINE BLADE DAMPERS 
SYSTEM-MODULE-FUNCT I O N  : 
ALTER VIBRATIONAL MODES OF 1ST-STAGE TURBINE BLADES 
DATE-LAST-MOD I F I ED 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE : 
FIGURE 53. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN MODULES 
The DATLCREATED, DATE-LAST-MODIFIED, and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t he  date t h a t  the  
record was f i r s t  s to red  i n  the  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  the  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
the  procedure which performed the  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t ion .  A l l  th ree  o f  
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by the  appropr ia te Data t r ieve  
en t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. The f i e l d  SYSTEM-MODULE conta ins the  
composite e igh t -charac ter  code which i d e n t i f i e s  a given module. The f i r s t  
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f o u r  characters  a re  t h e  respec t ive  system and t h e  l a s t  f o u r  characters  are 
the  module number. SYSTEM-MODULE-NAME i s  the  F I P M  name f o r  t h i s  module. 
SYSTEM-MODULE-FUNCTION i s  a b r i e f  statement o f  t h e  func t i on  o r  purpose o f  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  module. 
Add i t iona l  d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rmat ion  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  the  spec i f i ed  
system may be obtained by f i n d i n g  the  record i n  domain SYSTEMS w i t h  the  
f i e l d  SYSTEM equal t o  t h e  appropr ia te code. 
F a i l u r e  Modes Data F i l e  
There are  260 records i n  t h e  domain FAILUREMODES which are 
associated w i t h  t h e  HPOTP FIPM. The cu r ren t  data f o r  each o f  these 
records are  inc luded i n  Reference 7 ,  Appendix D. A l l  o f  t h e  records i n  
domain FAILUREMODES conta in  the  11 data f i e l d s  shown i n  F igure  54.  The 
f i e l d  names are  shown t o  t h e  l e f t  o f  t he  colons. The data s tored i n  the  
f i e l d s  a re  found t o  the  r i g h t  o f  t he  colons. 
DATE-CREATED : 19-Nov-1986 14:54:35.22 
FMCODE : B4000050WRRBB4000040 
DESCRIPTION 
ABRASION DUE TO MECHANICAL CONTACT BETWEEN COMPONENTS WITH RELATIVE MOTION 
(1ST-STAGE TURBINE BLADES WITH 1ST-STAGE TURBINE STATOR) 
EFFECT1 
REDUCED SPEED (RPM) OF SHAFT ASSEMBLY 
EFFECT2 
INCREASED VIBRATION OF SHAFT ASSEMBLY (TURBINE END) 
EFFECT3 
REDUCTION OF TURBINE EFFICIENCY 
EFFECT4 
INCREASED TORQUE VALUE FOR HPOTP (GROUND TEST) 
EFFECTS 
EXTREME REDUCTION I N  L I F E  OF 1ST-STAGE BLADES AND 1ST-STAGE STATOR 
EFFECT6 
DATE-LAST-MODIFIED : 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE : 
FIGURE 54. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN FAILUREMODES 
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The DATE-CREATED, DATE-LAST-MODIFIED, and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t h e  date t h a t  t he  
record was f i r s t  s to red  i n  the  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  the  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
the  procedure which performed the  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t ion .  A l l  t h ree  of 
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by t h e  appropr ia te Data t r ieve  
e n t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. FMCODE i s  a 20-character code which 
i d e n t i f i e s  and descr ibes a p a r t i c u l a r  f a i l u r e  mode. The cons t i t uen t  
elements o f  t h i s  f a i l u r e  mode code are d e t a i l e d  i n  F igure 55. DESCRIPTION 
i s  a b r i e f  statement which inc ludes s p e c i f i c  d e t a i l s  on t h e  f a i l u r e  mode. 
EFFECT1 through EFFECT6 are q u a l i t a t i v e  statements which descr ibe probable 
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  f a i l u r e  mode. 
B 4 0 0 0 0 5 0 W R R B B 4 0 0 0 0 4 0  
1 - SOURCE-SYSTEt1 
2 - SOURCE - SYSTEt.l-MOOULE 
3 - F A I L U R E  - MODE-SUBMODE 
4 - ACCOMPLICE-SYSTEM 
5 - AC COMP L I CE-S Y STEM-MODU L E  
FIGURE 55. ELEMENTS REPRESENTED BY FMCODE 
Add i t i ona l  d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rmat ion  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  source and 
accomplice systems may be obtained by f i n d i n g  the  records i n  domain 
SYSTEMS w i t h  t h e  f i e l d  SYSTEM equal t o  the  appropr ia te codes. Add i t iona l  
data on t h e  source and accomplice modules may be located by f i n d i n g  the  
records i n  domain MODULES w i t h  SYSTEKMODULE equal t o  t h e  respec t ive  
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codes. The f a i l u r e  mode and submode may be obtained by p r i n t i n g  the  
abbrev ia t ion  v i a  FAILURLMODE-SUBMODE-TABLE. 
Connections Data F i l e  
There are  198 records i n  the  domain CONNECTIONS which are 
associated w i t h  t h e  HPOTP FIPM. The cu r ren t  data f o r  each o f  these 
records are  inc luded i n  Reference 7, Appendix E. A l l  o f  t he  records i n  
domain CONNECTIONS conta in  the  f o u r  data f i e l d s  shown i n  F igure 56. The 
f i e l d  names are  shown t o  the  l e f t  o f  t he  colons. The data s to red  i n  the  
f i e l d s  a re  found t o  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t h e  colons. 
DATE-CREATED 
COD E-NUMB E R 
DATE LAST M O D I F I E D  : 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE - : 
: 1 8 - D e c - 1 9 8 6  10: 40: 23.62 
: B4000380LQO2TZ9101000 
FIGURE 56. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN CONNECTIONS 
The DATE-CREATED, DATE-LAST-MODIFIED, and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t he  date t h a t  t he  
record  was f i r s t  s to red  i n  the  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  the  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
t h e  procedure which performed the  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t i on .  A l l  t h ree  o f  
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by the  appropr ia te  Data t r ieve  
e n t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. CODLNUMBER i s  a 21-character code 
which i d e n t i f i e s  and descr ibes a s p e c i f i c  connection. The cons t i t uen t  
elements o f  CODE-NUMBER are  shown i n  F igure 57. 
Add i t iona l  d e s c r i p t i v e  in fo rmat ion  p e r t a i n i n g  t o  the  respec t ive  
systems may be obtained by f i n d i n g  the  records i n  domain SYSTEMS w i t h  the  
f i e l d  SYSTEM equal t o  the  appropr ia te codes. Add i t iona l  data on the  two 
modules invo lved may be located by f i n d i n g  the  records i n  domain MODULES 
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w i t h  SYSTELMODULE equal t o  the  respec t ive  codes. The connect ion type and 
q u a l i f i e r  may be obtained by p r i n t i n g  t h e  abbrev ia t ion  v i a  
CONNECTION-TABLE. 
B 4 0 0 0 3 8 0 L Q 0 2 T Z 9 1 0 1 0 0 0  
1 -  
2 -  
3 -  
4 -  
5 -  
6 -  
S Y STEM-A 
S Y STEM-I-lODULE-A 
CONNECTION 
UNANTICIPATED-CONNECTION 
SYSTEM-B 
S Y STEM-MODU LE-B 
FIGURE 57. ELEMENTS CONTAINED I N  CODLNUMBER 
F a i l u r e  In fo rmat ion  Propaqations Data F i l e  
A l l  o f  t h e  8213 records i n  the  domain PROPAGATIONLB400 are  
associated w i t h  t h e  HPOTP FIPM. A p a r t i a l  l i s t i n g  o f  t h e  cu r ren t  data f o r  
each o f  these records i s  inc luded i n  Reference 7, Appendix F. A l l  o f  t he  
records i n  domain PROPAGATIONLB400 conta in  the  20 data f i e l d s  shown i n  
F igure 58. The f i e l d  names are  shown t o  the  l e f t  o f  t he  colons. The data 
s to red  i n  t h e  f i e l d s  are found t o  the  r i g h t  o f  t h e  colons. 
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DATE CREATED : 1 8 - A p r - 1 9 8 6  13:31:20.30 
F M C O ~ E  : B4000010FAVF- - - -0000  
CODE-NUMBER : B4000010ME- -FB4000050  
SIGNAL-TYPE : VIBRATION 
S I GNAL-UN I T S  : ACCELERATION-G 
DIMENSIONS : 1  
: 1  
MAX FREQ-OR-TIME : 3 
FT UNITS- : HERTZ 
PARAMETER : AMPLITUDE 
PARAMETER-UNITS 
SYMPTOM-DURATION : 1 
I ND I CATES-FA I LURE 
COMMENT1 
V IBRATION AMPLITUDE CHANGES WITH CRACK GROWTH 
COMMENT2 
NATURAL FREQUENCY MAY CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF CRACKING 
COMMENT3 
P O S S I B I L I T Y  OF TRENDING GROSS VIBRATION AND TEMPERATURE LEVELS 
DATE LAST-MODIFIED : 2 - S e p - 1 9 8 6  1 4 : 2 2 :  18.33 
S I GNAL-QUAL I TY 
MIN-FREQ OR-TIME : 2 
: SAME AS SIGNAL U N I T S  
PER 100-OF-ONSET : 2  
: T 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE : FIP-MODIFY 
FIGURE 58. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN PROPAGATIONS-B400 
The DATE-CREATED, DATLLASTJIODIFIED,  and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t h e  date t h a t  the  
record  was f i r s t  s to red  i n  the  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  t he  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
the  procedure which performed the  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t ion .  A l l  th ree  o f  
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by the  appropr ia te  Data t r ieve  
e n t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. FMCODE i s  t he  20-character code which 
i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  f a i l u r e  mode being propagated. The elements o f  
t h i s  code a re  descr ibed i n  the  previous subsect ion on f a i l u r e  modes. 
CODE-NUMBER i s  t he  21-character code which s p e c i f i e s  the  connection t o  
which t h e  g iven f a i l u r e  in fo rmat ion  has propagated. The in fo rmat ion  
contained i n  t h i s  code i s  discussed i n  the  e a r l i e r  subsection on 
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connections. SIGNAL-TYPE identifies the physical nature of the failure 
information such as vibration, thermal, etc. SIGNAL-UNITS are the units 
of measure associated with the specified signal. DIMENSIONS is the 
spatial resolution which can be obtained from a specific signal type 
(e.g., thermal is a one-dimensional signal while acoustic can provide two- 
dimensional information). SIGNALQUALITY is an estimate of the relative 
strength of the given failure signal at this particular location 
(connection) . MALFREQ-ORTIME and MIN-FREQ-ORTIME define the 
frequency/time range associated with this signal. FT-UNITS are the 
physical units associated with the maximum and minimum frequency/time. 
PARAMETER identifies the sensitive or important feature of the failure 
signal such as amplitude. PARAMETERUNITS are the units assigned to a 
particular parameter. SYMPTOM-DURATION is an estimate of the time between 
the initiation of a detectable, symptomatic signal and the actual 
component failure. PERIOD-OF-ONSET is a projection of the operational 
time which can be accumulated before failure symptoms are likely to occur. 
INDICATES-FAILURE is a true or false statement of whether the given 
failure information indicates that the failure has occurred. COMMENT1 
through COMMENT3 are brief statements which provide additional data 
pertinent to the failure information propagation being described. All of 
the various unit fields are assigned by the Datatrieve input procedure 
based on predefined relationships. 
Additional descriptive information pertaining to the given 
FMCODE may be obtained by finding the record in domain FAILUREMODES with 
the identical value for this field. 
References Data Fi 1 e 
There are three records in the domain REFERENCES which are 
associated with the HPOTP FIPM. The current data for each of these 
records are included in Reference 7, Appendix G. All of the records in 
domain REFERENCES contain the 13 data fields shown in Figure 59. The 
field names are shown to the left of the colons. The data stored in the 
fields are found to the right of the colons. 
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DATE-CREATED : 20-Nov-1986 15:47:21.52 
REFERENCE-NUMBER : RDOOl 
AUTHOR1 
AUTHOR2 
AUTHOR3 
AUTHOR4 
DOCUMENT-TITLE 
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TECHNICAL MANUAL, SSME DESCRIPTION AND OPERATION 
(INPUT DATA), SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE, PART NUMBER RS007001 
DOCUMENT-SOURCE : ROCKETDYNE 
DOCUMENT-NUMBER : E41000, RSS-8559-1-1-1 
DOCUMENT-DATE : 05-APR-1982 
CONTRACT-NUMBER : NAS8-27980 
DATE-LAST-MOD IF IED : 
MODIFY ING-PROCEDURE : 
FIGURE 59. SAMPLE RECORD FROM DOMAIN REFERENCES 
The DATLCREATED, DATLLASTJODIFIED, and MODIFYING-PROCEDURE 
f i e l d s  a re  used f o r  t r a c k i n g  purposes. DATE-CREATED i s  t h e  date t h a t  t he  
record  was f i r s t  s to red  i n  t h e  data base. DATE-LAST-MODIFIED i s  t h e  date 
o f  t h e  most recent  record mod i f i ca t ion .  MODIFYING-PROCEDURE i d e n t i f i e s  
t h e  procedure which performed t h e  l a s t  record mod i f i ca t i on .  A l l  t h ree  o f  
these f i e l d s  a re  au tomat ica l l y  assigned by the  appropr ia te  Data t r ieve  
e n t r y  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  procedures. REFERENCE-NUMBER i s  a f i ve -cha rac te r  
code assigned t o  t h e  reference dur ing  data en t r y .  This number is  
generated by t h e  i n p u t  procedure. AUTHOR1 through AUTHOR4 are  any authors 
which are  l i s t e d  f o r  t he  reference being c i t e d .  DOCUMENT-TITLE i s  the  
t i t l e  o f  t h e  repo r t ,  book, e tc .  DOCUMENT-SOURCE i d e n t i f i e s  the  
organ iza t ion  o r  company which produced the  i tem being referenced. 
DOCUMENT-NUMBER i s  any i d e n t i f y i n g  number assigned by the  source 
o rgan iza t i on  o r  company. DOCUMENT-DATE i s  t he  date o f  pub l i ca t i on .  
CONTRACT-NUMBER i nd i ca tes  the  government con t rac t  number under which the  
work was performed. 
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SSME FIPM DRAWINGS 
In addition to the high-pressure oxidizer turbopump FIPM drawing 
discussed in the previous section, FIPM drawings were generated for the 
following nine SSME systems: 
A150 - Heat exchanger (HE) 
A200 - Main injector 
A330 - Main combustion chamber (MCC) 
A340 - Nozzle 
A600 - Fuel preburner (FPB) 
A700 - Oxidizer preburner (OPB) 
8200 - High-pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) 
B600 - Low-pressure fuel turbopump (LPFTP) 
B800 - Low-pressure oxidizer turbopump (LPOTP) 
All of the FIPM drawings are included in Appendix B of this report. 
The heat exchanger (A150) FIPM drawing depicts a total of 36 
modules. Of this number, 24 are modules of A150 while the remaining 12 
are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 68 connections. 
51 of these are internal to this system while 17 are external connections. 
A total of 69 failure modes have been identified for the various modules 
comprising system A150. 
The main injector (A200) FIPM drawing depicts a total of 52 
modules. Of this number, 36 are modules of A200 while the remaining 16 
are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 123 connections. 
77 of these are internal to this system while 46 are external connections. 
A total of  95 failure modes have been identified for the various modules 
comprising system A200. 
The main combustion chamber (A330) FIPM drawing depicts a total 
of 28 modules. Of this number, 18 are modules of A330 while the remaining 
10 are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 42 
connections. 29 of these are internal to this system while 13 are 
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external connections. A total of 48 failure modes have been identified 
for the various modules comprising system A330. 
The nozzle (A340) FIPM drawing depicts a total of 54 modules. 
Of this number, 41 are modules of A340 while the remaining 13 are modules 
of external systems. The drawing also shows 88 connections. 63 of these 
are internal to this system while 25 are external connections. A total of 
132 failure modes have been identified for the various modules comprising 
system A340. 
The fuel preburner (A600) FIPM drawing depicts a total of 43 
modules. Of this number, 27 are modules of A600 while the remaining 16 
are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 100 connections. 
70 of these are internal to this system while 30 are external connections. 
A total of 89 failure modes have been identified for the various modules 
comprising system A600. 
The oxidizer preburner (A700) FIPM drawing depicts a total of 43 
modules. Of this number, 27 are modules of A700 while the remaining 16 
are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 94 connections. 
62 of these are internal to this system while 32 are external connections. 
A total of 85 failure modes have been identified for the various modules 
comprising system A700. 
The high-pressure fuel turbopump (B200) FIPM drawing depicts a 
total of 101 modules. Of this number, 94 are modules of B200 while the 
remaining 7 are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 197 
connections. 181 of these are internal to this system while 16 are 
external connections. A total of 281 failure modes have been identified 
for the various modules comprising system B200. 
The low-pressure fuel turbopump (B600) FIPM drawing depicts a 
total of 54 modules. Of this number, 47 are modules of B600 while the 
remaining 7 are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 99 
connections. 89 of these are internal to this system while 10 are 
external connections. A total of 123 failure modes have been identified 
for the various modules comprising system B600. 
The low-pressure oxidizer turbopump (B800) FIPM drawing depicts 
a total of 49 modules. Of this number, 44 are modules of B800 while the 
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remaining 5 are modules of external systems. The drawing also shows 89 
connections. 81 o f  these are internal to this system while 8 are 
external connections. A total of 150 failure modes have been identified 
for the various modules comprising system B800. 
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HPOTP DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT 
Present Instrumentation 
There is presently instrumentation for eight different 
measurements on the HPOTP. These measurements are shown in Table 17. 
These sensors can pick up information for many failure modes as shown in 
the FIPM output listings in Table 18. The problem is in isolating the 
component failing from the information available. This is especially true 
for the accelerometers, which can detect information for over 81 failure 
modes. Also, most of the information available cannot directly determine 
if a failure i s  imminent or has occurred, but can only give an indication 
of the environment the components are subjected to for trending 
information. On the positive side, only a few of the failure modes have 
been a problem, so even though their is a possibility of many failure 
modes having the same signature, there is a high probability that it can 
be narrowed down to a few failure modes. 
The FIPM model assumes that the system depicted is in the near- 
normal state and that it models the propagation of failure information, 
not the failure itself. The failure information at each sensor will be 
discussed along with the possible capability to discriminate the 
individual failure modes from the information at each sensor. Then, with 
knowledge of the critical failure modes and instrumentation under 
development, possible test points have been investigated for isolation o f  
the important failure information. These test points will be discussed 
later in this section. 
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TABLE 18. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR CURRENT INSTRUMENTATION 
CODE-WER : A 1 W  8#30 QA HO f B 4 0 0  WOO 
SIWL-TYPE : M#UL (DEORCLS-K) 
PARMETER : A Y P L I W E  ( W E  AS SI- UNITS) 
1 B 4 0 0  OO40 FA TF 
2 8 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 W E R  
3 B 4 0 0  OOOO FA TF 
4 UOO 0120 W ER 
6 ,400 0167 FA Tf  
6 8 4 0 0 O O O O W E R  
7 B 4 0 0  0120 FA TF 
0 UOO 0283 FA TF 
@ B 4 0 0 O O O O F A T F  
10 B 4 0 0 W O O U R E R  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
a 
7 
8 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
I S  
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
1141 
1 E* 
1 E M l  
1 E* 
lE+Ol  
1 E* 
1 E 4 1  
lE+01 
1 E* 
i e+Oi  
1 E+Ol 
11+01 
1E+Ol 
1 E 4 1  
1 E 4 1  
1E+01 
1c+01 
( E a 1  
1E*1 
1 c e 1  
l e e 1  
1c+01 
1E-1 
lE+01 
ir+Oi 
lE-01  
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-02 
. .  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1s-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
It-01 
1E-01 
(E-01 
1E-01 
(E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
(E-01 
1E-01 
St- 
SECONDS 
SE WNDS 
1 E M 1  
( E M 2  
l E M 1  
1E-2 
1 E 4 1  
1 E M 2  
1E+O1 
1E*1 
l E + O l  
1 E M 2  
lE* l  
1E+01 
1 E M l  
1 E M 1  
1 E M l  
lE+o l  
1E+O1 
lE+01 
1c-1 
1E+O1 
1E+01 
( E M 1  
1E-1 
1LM1 
1 E M 1  
1 E 4 2  
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E M 2  
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
lE+O2 
1E+02 
l E M 2  
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E 4 2  
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E a 2  
1E-2 
1 E M 2  
1 E+02 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
c 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
f 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
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TABLE 18. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR CURRENT INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
CODE-MM8ER : 6400 0170  QA HQ T 6400 0180  
SIQNAL-TYPE : PRESSURE (PSIA)  
PARAMETER : W L I W D E  ( S U E  AS SI- UNITS) 
1 6400 0180  LK TL ---- oooo 1 1 
2 6400 0 1 7 0  LU TL ---- oooo 1 2 
C O D E - m E R  : 6400 0 2 6 0  QI HE F C200 @@lo 
SIGNAL-TYPE : PRESSURE (PSI*)  
PARAMETER : AMPLITUDE ( S U E  AS SI- UNITS) 
1 B400 0 2 2 0  D f  SD ---- oooo 1 4 
2 B400 0200  D f  SD ---- oooo 1 4 
CODE-UER : 1400  03so L a  02 F ~ a o o  aaio 
SIQNAL-TYPE : PRESSURE (PSIA)  
PARAMETER : AMPLITUDE ( S U E  AS Sf- UNITS) 
1 6400 0370 UR CV ---- oooo 1 0 
2 6400 0380 YR CV ---- oooo 1 1 
C O D E - W E R  : 6400 0380 LO 0 2  F B400 0390 
SIQNAL-TYPE : PRESSURE (PSIA)  
PARAMETER : AMPLITUDE (SAME AS SIQNAL UNITS) 
1 B400 a 3 0  FA I P  ---- oooo 1 0 
2 6400 0300 WR CV ---- oooo 1 1 
3 9400 0370 WR CV ---- oooo 1 3 
4 B400 0 5 9 0  FA I P  ---- oooo 1 3 
5 6400 0390 FA I P  ---- oooo 1 4 
WDE-HnaER : B400 0570 YE CP F 6400 0000 
SI--TYPE : VIBRATION (ACCELERATION-G) 
PARAMETER : UlPLItuM (SAME AS SIQNAL UNITS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I 
8 
7 
8 
a 
1 0  
11 
12 
0400 0070 a Ip 6400 -0 
B400 0080 FA V f  ---- oooo 
B400 0 1 2 0  F A  I M  ---- oooo 
B400 0230 FA V f  ---- oooo 
B400 0240 f A  VF ---- oooo 
B400 0 2 7 0  f A  VF ---- oooo 
~ 4 4 0  0 2 8 0  rlr vr ---- oooo 
B400 0287 FA V f  ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0287 r1 SL ---- oooo 
B400 02@3 FA V f  ---- oooo 
6400 0310 F I  SL ---- oooo 
6400 0330 FA VF ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 E+03 
1 E+03 
1 E a 3  
1 E+03 
1E+OS 
1 €+OS 
1€+02 
1 €+OS 
lE+OS 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 €+os 
1 c+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E#4 
1 E* 
1E+04 
1E+00 
1E+00 
1c+oo 
lE+00 
1L+O1 
lE+O1 
1 E -02 
1E+O1 
lE#1 
1E-02 
1 E -02 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+01 
1E+01 
1E+O1 
1c+o1 
lE#1 
1E#1 
lE+Ol 
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HSRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E#1 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+Ol 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E#l 
1E-01 
1 e a 2  
1 ~ 2  
1 E#2 
1E+02 
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
1E#1 
1E+Ol 
1E+O2 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1€+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O 1 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
lE+Ol 
1E+Ol 
1 E+OO 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E#2 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
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TABLE 18. FAILURE INFORMATION FOR CURRENT INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2 0  
2 1  
22  
23  
2 4  
2s 
2 s  
27  
28  
2 9  
30 
31 
3 2  
33 
3 4  
35 
39 
37 
38 
39 
4 0  
41  
42  
43 
44  
45  
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
5 1  
52 
I3 
1 4  
55 
w 
5 7  
58 
19 
60 
5 1  
52 
53 
e 4  
65 
0400 0330 rx SL ---- oooo 
0400 0350 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  0300 F A  IM ---- oooo 
B400 03- FA V f  ---- oooo 
0400 0380 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0390 F A  I M  ---- oooo 
0400 0 5 4 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0550 F A  VF ---- oooo 
0400  0133 FA IM ---- oooo 
0400 0157 F A  VF ---- oooo 
0400 0157 F I  SL ---- oooo 
0400 0190 WR P I  ---- oooo 
0400 -90 WR RE ---- oooo 
0 7 1 0  WR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0 7 1 0  UR RE ---- oooo 
8400 0720 UR P I  ---- oooo 
0400 0 7 2 0  WR RE ---- oooo 
0400  0730 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400  0730 YR RE ---- oooo 
0400  0740  WR PT ---- oooo 
0400  0 7 4 0  YR RE ---- oooo 
0400  0750 CIR RO 1400  0740  
B400 0 7 5 0  WR RE 0400  0750 
0400 0760 W PT ---- oooo 
0400 0760 WR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0080 FA I M  ---- oooo 
0400  0 2 9 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  0350 FA I M  ---- oooo 
0400  0380 F A  I M  ---- oooo 
0400  0403 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0403 F I  SL ---- oooo 
0400 05bo F I  SL ---- oooo 
8400 0557 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 OS87 FI SL ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  0583 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  0583 FI SL ---- oooo 
0400  0153 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0113 F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0750 F A  VC ---- oooo 
0400  0 4 1 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 050O FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0130 F A  VF ---- oooo 
0400 0170 UR RB 0400 0080 
0400 0770 FA VF ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  0790 FA VF ---- oooo 
0100 0700 PI SL ---- oooo 
0400  0680 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0680 F I  SL ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  ows FA VF ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  OSes F I  SL ---- oooo 
5400 0570 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  0580 FA VF ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  0580 F I  SL ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
1 E M  
1E+04 
1E+M 
1E- 
1 E+o4 
1E+04 
1 E + M  
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lE* 
lE+04 
1 €+Of 
1 E+07 
1 E M 7  
1E+07 
1 E+07 
1E+O7 
lE+07 
1 €+07 
1E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+03 
1E+03 
1 E+07 
1€+07 
1E+04 
1 E + M  
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 c*o4 
1 E+o4 
1 E+o4 
1 E+o4 
1E+o4 
lE+04 
1 E + M  
1E+04 
1E+o4 
(E+- 
1E+04 
1 E+o4 
1 E+04 
11- 
1 E+o4 
1c+o4 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E + M  
1 E+04 
( E M 1  
lE+Ol 
1E+01 
l t + O l  
1E+Ql 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1E+01 
1 E a l  
1E+Ol 
I t 4 1  
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 E+o4 
1E* 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
lE*  
1€+04 
1E+04 
1E* 
1E+O1 
1E+01 
lE+04 
1E+04 
1E+O1 
1c-1 
1E+O1 
lE+01 
1t-1 
1E-1 
1E+O1 
1E-l 
lL*1 
1E+o1 
1 E M l  
1E+01 
1E+O1 
1E+01 
I t 4 1  
1E+O1 
lE+01 
1c-1 
1E-l 
lE+01 
1 E M 1  
1E-1 
lE+Ol 
1E+01 
1E+O1 
1 E M 1  
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
MRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
I t - 0 1  
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1 E +02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E+Ol 
l E M 1  
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
l a - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E*1 
1E+0l 
l e e 1  
1E+O1 
lE+o l  
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+02 
1E+Ol 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
( E e l  
1 E M 2  
1E*1 
1E+02 
lE+01 
1E+02 
1E+O1 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1E+01 
1e+02 
leu12 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
(E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
lE+O2 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+00 
1E+W 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+0l 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+00 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
f 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
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TABLE 18. FAILURE INFORMATION FOR CURRENT INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
66 
67 
08 
om 
70 
7 1  
7 2  
73 
74  
78 
76 
77 
78  
7 0  
BO 
8 1  
1400 OSOO f A  IM ---- oooo 
B400 0600 f A  VF ---- oooo 
UOO 0610  f A  V f  ---- oooo 
B400 0610  f1 SL ---- oooo 
B400 0620 f A  V f  ---- oooo 
1400  0630 FA IM ---- oooo 
B400 0670 UR Itl D400 06- 
1400 0780 FA V f  ---- oooo 
0400 0000 f A  V f  ---- oooo 
0400 0000 F I  SL ---- oooo 
0400 0470 f1 BN ---- oooo 
B400 0460 f1 DN ---- oooo 
0400  0600 f A  I M  ---- oooo 
8400 0620 FA IM ---- oooo 
B400 0720 f1 BN ---- oooo 
B400 0730 f I  ON ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
UIDE-WMDER : ,400 0620 La 02 r WOO 0630 
SI--TYPE : PRESSURE (PSI*) 
PMAMETER : *WPLINDL (SAME AS SIGNAL UNITS) 
1 UOO OSOO FA IP ---- oooo 1 1 
2 0400  0670 WR CV ---- oooo 1 1 
3 8400  0633 FA IP ---- oooo 1 3 
4 B400 0630 FA IP ---- oooo 1 4 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1E+04 
1 E W  
1 E W  
1 E+04 
lE+cn 
1E+04 
1E+04 
l E W  
1 E W  
1E+04 
1 c+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+O4 
1E+O2 
1E+OS 
1 E M 2  
lE+O2 
1 E 4 1  
1€+01 
1E+O1 
1 E 4 1  
1E+Ol 
1 E 4 1  
1 E 4 1  
1 E M 1  
1c-1 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
lE+O1 
lE+01 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E-02 
lE+Ol 
1E-02 
1E-02 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+O1 
1E+O2 
1E-01 
1E+O1 
lE+OZ 
lE+02 
I t 4 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
I € - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+O1 
lE+OZ 
1 E M l  
1E+01 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+OO 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
l f - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+O1 
1 E+O2 
1 E+oo 
1E+Ol 
F 
F 
f 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
t 
t 
f 
F 
f 
F 
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1. LPOTP Discharge Pressure (HPOTP Pump Inlet) 
8400 0350 LO 02 F 8800 9910 PRESSURE 
The pressure sensor upstream of the pump may be able to detect 
cavitation in the pump. An increase in amplitude above 1000 Hz could 
indicate cavitation. This measurement could be used to trend wear and 
loads due to cavitation for trending life limits of the affected parts. 
In conjunction with the discharge pressure and turbine outlet temperature, 
some determination of the turbopump performance could be made. The 
performance loss might indicate cavitation, turbine efficiency loss, or 
other degradation phenomena. It would also help to have flow and 
temperature information at these points. The pressure sensor can also 
detect pressure surges that might fracture the ducts upstream of the HPOTP 
which are not shown on the HPOTP FIPM. 
2. HPOTP Discharge Pressure 
B400 0380 LO 02 F B400 0390 PRESSURE 
In conjunction with the inlet pressure and turbine outlet 
temperature, trending of the performance of the pump. along with cavitation 
related failure modes may be possible. Also, pressure surges that might 
fracture the ducts and cause leaks can be monitored for trending 
information. A large enough pressure surge might warrant inspection of 
the ducts during post-flight inspection. 
3. Preburner Pump Discharge Pressure 
B400 0620 LQ 02 F 8400 0630 PRESSURE 
Trending of preburner pump cavitation is possible along with 
This monitoring pressure surges that might fracture ducts and manifolds. 
measurement may also be helpful in determining overall pump efficiency. 
4. Preburner Pump Discharge Temperature 
B400 0620 LO 02 F 8400 0630 TEMPERATURE 
Can be used for trending information about thermally induced 
loads on components in the preburner pump. Along with the discharge 
pressure, some assessment of pump performance can be made. It would also 
be helpful to have flow information and inlet pressure and flow 
information. Since the performance of both pumps are related, the inlet 
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and outlet sensor information from the main pump could be helpful in 
evaluating performance. 
5. HPOTP Turbine Di scharqe Temperature 
A150 9930 GA HG F B400 0080 TEMPERATURE 
The turbine exhaust temperature measurement can be used for 
trending information on the thermal loading and possibly the erosion 
process for the hot gas section parts. Also may help determine preburner 
problems which are not a part of this FIPM. 
6. HPOTP Secondarv Turbine Seal Drain Pressure 
B400 0170 GA HG T B400 0180 PRESSURE 
This pressure measurement may detect excess leakage in turbine 
seals which could be critical if hydrogen-rich hot gas mixes with liquid 
oxygen from the pump-end of the turbopump. 
7. HPOTP Intermediate Seal Helium Purqe Pressure 
6400 0260 GA HE F C200 9910 PRESSURE 
This pressure measurement can be used to determine that the 
proper helium pressure is supplied to the intermediate seal to separate 
LOX from hydrogen-rich hot gas. High pressure may indicate clogging in 
the supply line and low pressure might indicate excessive leakage in seals 
or upstream supply problems. If the helium supply to the seals is cut-off 
or restricted, a catastrophic failure o f  the pump would be imminent as 
hydrogen gas would mix with LOX and into the bearings. 
8. HPOTP Radial Accelerometers 
B400 0570 ME CP F 6400 0600 VIBRATION 
The housing accelerometers pick up almost every vibration 
related failure mode signal in the pump. There is a wealth of information 
available, but great difficulty in isolating the failure modes. General 
prognostic monitoring of dynamic loading may be achieved with the 
accelerometers, but this will not be very precise and will require 
research into developing a life assessment o f  each component in relation 
to the vibration signal and time. Detection of bearing failure modes in 
the nearby 1st and 2nd bearings may be possible since the accelerometers 
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are close to the bearings and the signal strength is good. Some seal 
rubbing failure modes may be detectable since they will produce 
distinctive spikes in the frequency domain related to the operating RPM of 
the shaft. 
Test Point Analvsis for Possible Future Instrumentation 
There are several instrumentation concepts under development to 
These failure modes and the monitor for several important failure modes. 
i nstrumentat i on under devel opment are : 
Bearing faults (wear, 
pitting, & ball -cage 
resonance) 
Turbine blades 
Performance parameters 
Bearing Deflectometer, 
Isotope Wear, 
Acoustic Emission Sensor 
Optical Pyrometer 
Shaft Speed Sensor 
Ultrasonic Flowmeter 
FIPM output of several test points that correspond to these 
sensors and several other test points that show promise are listed in 
Table 19 and are analyzed for their potential to monitor various failure 
modes in the following paragraphs. 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE INSTRUMENTATION 
a D E - m E R  : D 4 0 0  oobo ME -- F 0400 0140 
SIan*L-TYPE : THE- (DCQREES-K) 
PAlULlLtER : NWLITWE (SAME AS SI- WITS) 
1 D400 0130 DF SD ---- oooo 1 1 
2 0400 ooso FA tu ---- oooo 1 2 
3 0400  0080 FA TF ---- oooo 1 2 
4 0400  0050 FA VF ---- oooo 1 2 
WDC_WW.ER : 0400 oobo WE -- C 0400 0140 
SI--WPE : VIBRATION (*CCLLERATION-Q) 
P-ER : mLIruDt (SAME AS SI- WITS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
S 
e 
7 
6 
1 0  
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
I S  
16 
17 
18 
1s  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
a 
0400  0 4 1 0  UR RI 0400 0170 
0400 0410 UR M 0400 0100 
0400 0410 UR RI 0400 OlDO 
0400  0410  UR M 0400 02- 
0400  0070 FA IY ---- oooo 
0400  0070 UR M 0400 0000 
0400  0070 UR M 0400  0080 
0400  O l e o  f A  w ---- oooo 
0400  o400 f A  IY ---- oooo 
0400 o400 UR U D 4 0 0  0300 
0400 o400 UR RB D 4 0 0  0370 
D 4 0 0  0 4 4 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
D400 0 1 8 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  01% UR U B400 0110  
D400 0470 PI BN ---- oooo 
0400 0480 FI w ---- oooo 
WOO 0720 FI BN ---- oooo 
uoo 0730 rI BN ---- oooo 
UOO oo#) r A  IY ---- oooo 
0400 0140 r A  w ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  o m  r1 SL ---- oooo 
D 4 0 0 0 0 8 O U R R B U O O O W O  
0400ooboURwUOOooM) 
UOO 0 4 1 0  r A  w ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
B 
1 D 4 0 0  0430 UR PT ---- oooo 1 0 
2 0400 0430 UR RE ---- oooo 1 0 
3 0400 0450 a PT ---- oooo 1 0 
4 0400 0460 UR RE ---- oooo 1 0 
S UOO 0010 FA lT ---- oooo 1 2 
6 0400 0070 FA VF ---- oooo 1 2 
1 E M  
1 E* 
1 E- 
1 E W  
It- 
1 €+os 
lE+OS 
1 €+os 
1 L+04 
1 E M  
lE+O8 
lE+04 
1E+04 
1 E M  
1E- 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E- 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 E- 
l E- 
1E+04 
i t u n  
lE+Ol  
lE+Ol 
1c-1 
1E+O1 
1 E* 
1 E- 
1E-02 
1E+O3 
1 E+O3 
1 E+O3 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lL+Ol  
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
lE+Ol  
1 E M 1  
1E+O1 
( E M 1  
lE+Ol  
lE+Ol 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
lL+O1 
1L+Ol 
1E+O1 
lL+Ol  
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
1 t -01  
IC-01 
l t + O l  
1 E+O3 
le-oi 
SECONDS 
O E M  
SECOWOS 
S L M  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
M R T Z  
WRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
S E M  
SECOWOS 
st- 
S E M  
SI- 
S E W S  
lE+02 
1E-02 
1E+O3 
1 E+O3 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1L+O1 
1E+O1 
I t - 0 1  
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
lE+O2 
I t - 0 1  
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1E+O2 
lE+02 
lE+O1 
1E-01 
It-01 
1L-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1 c+O2 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+O 1 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol  
1c+O1 
1 E+03 
lE+Ol  
1E-02 
1 E+O3 
1E+O3 
1 E+OO 
1 E M  
1 E+OO 
l t M  
1E-01 
1€+00 
1E+OO 
lE+02 
1E-01 
l t M  
1 E M  
lE+02 
lE+O2 
1 E M  
(E-01 
I t - 0 1  
1L-01 
It-01 
1E-01 
1 E+O2 
lE#2 
lt- 
1 E M  
1E+Ol 
1E#3 
1E+O3 
1E+O3 
1 E+O3 
1 E a 2  
1E+O3 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
f 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
F 
f 
T 
T 
f 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
f 
T 
T 
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TABLE 19. FAILURE INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
W O E - M E R  : B400 0070 ME -- F UOO 0150  
S I m - T Y P E  : VIBRATION (*CCELERATIffl-Q) 
PARMETER : MPLITUOE ( S M E  AS SI- UNITS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
1 
7 
8 
8 
10 
11  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2 0  
2 1  
22  
2 3  
2 4  
2 5  
2 6  
27  
28 
2 9  
30 
3 1  
32 
33 
3 4  
35 
30 
37 
39 
40 
a8 
B400 0050 FA I M  ---- oo00 
~ 4 0 0  0400 FA vr ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0400 VR CV ---- oooo 
DUX)  0430 UR PT ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0430 NR RE ---- oo00 
1400 0450 VR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0450 YII RE ---- oo00 
DUX) 0470 a PT ---- oo00 
DUX) 0470 RE ---- oooo 
DUX) 0480 UR PT ---- oo00 
B 4 0 0  0480 VR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0480 YR PT ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0480 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 OS20 a PT ---- oooo 
B400 0 5 2 0  YR RE ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0050 UR RB B400 0040 
B400 0050 VR RB B400 -0 
uoo oleo r A  vr ---- oooo 
~ O 4 O O ~ R B B ~ o # o  
UOO O4OO a RB B400 0370 
B400 0440 FA W ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0870 YR M B400 -0 
B400 0870 UR RB B400 W80 
B400 O4OO FA I M  ---- oooo 
DUX) 0 4 1 0  VR M B400 0170  
DUX) 0 4 1 0  YR M B400 0180  
B400  0 4 1 0  a RB B400 0200  
~ 4 0 0  470 r I  BN ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0480 r1 BN ---- oooo 
B400 0070 FA I M  ---- oo00 
~ 4 4 0  0140 r A  vr ---- oooo 
DUX) 0 1 5 0  FA W ---- oooo 
B400 0150 UR RB B400 0110  
B400 0180  F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0 7 2 0  f I  W ---- oooo 
B400 0730 F I  Iw ---- oooo 
B400 0070 a M DUX) OQO 
B400 0070 a W DUX) 0080 
uoo 0410 rA vr ---- oooo 
BMO 0410 UR RB BMO 01.0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE* 
l a 4 7  
1 E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1E+O7 
1 E M 7  
1 E M 7  
1 E+O7 
1E+O7 
1 €+Of 
1E+O7 
1 E 4 7  
1 E 4 7  
1 E a  
1 E a  
1 E+04 
1 E- 
1E- 
1 E+04 
1 E M  
1 E M  
1 E+04 
I t a  
1 E- 
1 c* 
1 E M  
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1 E a  
1E+04 
l E W  
1E+04 
1 E M  
1 E a  
1 L+04 
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
1E+Ol 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
11- 
11- 
1 E* 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E 4 1  
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1 E 4 1  
l f + O 1  
lE+O1 
1 E+O 1 
lE+Ol 
1E+Ol 
lE+Ol 
( L a 1  
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
lE+O1 
l E # l  
1E+O1 
lE+Ol  
1E+Ol 
lE4-01 
lE+Ol 
1E+Ol 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E-01 
1E+04 
1E+O2 
1E-2 
l a 4 2  
1 E 4 2  
l E M 2  
1E+02 
1 E M 2  
1 E M 2  
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
( E M 2  
lE-2 
1 E 4 2  
lE+o l  
lE+Ol  
1E+02 
1E+Ol 
l E + o l  
1c-2 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1L-01 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
11-1 
lE#1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E M 2  
lE#1 
1E+Ol 
11-01 
1E-01 
1E+Ol 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
1 E+04 
1 E+O2 
l E 4 2  
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+OO 
1E+00 
1 E+02 
1E+OO 
1E+00 
lE+02 
1 E+00 
1E+00 
1E-01 
1 E+OO 
1 E+00 
1 L+OO 
1 E+00 
1E-01 
I € - 0 1  
1E-01 
1 L+O2 
lE+02 
1 E+OO 
1€+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1 E- 
1 E+OO 
lE+O1 
f 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
f 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
CODE-HYIER : 0400 0030 QA HQ F 8400 oo40 
SIan*L-TYPE : (DEQREES-K) 
PAIWIETER : WLItUDE (Urn AS SI- WITS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
e 
7 
8 
8 
10 
0400 0007 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0080 YR ER ---- oooo 
0400 0 1 2 0  FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0 1 2 0  WR E l  ---- oooo 
B400 0030 UR ER ---- oooo 
0400 oO40 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 oO40 YR ER ---- oooo 
8400 WOO FA TF ---- oooo 
1400  0060 WR ER ---- oooo 
8400 0080 FA TF ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
WOE-NUIIER : 0400 OOH) QI HG F 0400 OOW 
SIOUL-TYPE : "HERWL (DEQREES-K) 
PAIWIETER : AMPLITUDE (SWE AS SI- WITS) 
0400 0 1 2 0  FA TF ---- oooo 
1400 0120  WR LR ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0040 f A  TF ---- oooo 
0400 oO40 WR ER ---- oooo 
8400 0000 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 OOW WR ER ---- oooo 
8400 0080 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 OOIO WR ER ---- oooo 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
7 
8 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
8400 ooso FA 1Y ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0080 FA TF ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  ooso r A  vr ---- oooo 
B400 0070 FA IY ---- oooo 
B 4 0 0  0070 FA TF ---- oooo 
8400 0070 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 om0 FA I Y  ---- oooo 
M O O  W70 FA TF ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0070 r A  vr ---- oooo 
1400 0140  FA TF ---- oooo 
8400 0 1 4 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0150  FA T t  ---- oooo 
0400 0160  FA T f  ---- oooo 
0400 oleo r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0400 FA IY ---- oooo 
0400 O40O FA TF ---- oooo 
1400 0400 r A  vr ---- oooo 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
lE+Ol 
1 E- 
1E+Ol 
1 E- 
l E-
lE+O1 
1E- 
1E+01 
1 E+oo 
lE+Ol 
lE+O1 
1 E- 
1 E M 1  
1 E+oo 
1E+01 
1t- 
1E+O1 
1 E- 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E M 7  
1 E+07 
lE+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 C+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 Em7 
lE+07 
1 C+07 
1 E+07 
lE+07 
1 E M 7  
1 E M 7  
1E-01 
1E-02 
(E-01 
1E-02 
1 E -02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
I t - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
1E-01 
1E-02 
l e - 0 2  
1E+04 
1 E+o4 
1 E+oe 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E* 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+oe 
1 E- 
S E W S  
SECONDS 
SECOIJDS 
SECONDS 
SECONDS 
SECOK)S 
SECONDS 
SECOWS 
SI- 
SECONDS 
SEComS 
SECOWDS 
SECDNDS 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1 E M l  
1E+02 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
lE+O1 
1 E M 2  
1E+O1 
1E+O2 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
1E+01 
1E+02 
lE+01 
1 E+O2 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
(E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
I t - 0 1  
I f - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
lE+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+O2 
11+02 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
(E-01 
1E+02 
1E+03 
1E-01 
1E+O2 
1E+03 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1E+03 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
r 
r 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
r 
t 
T 
T 
T 
T 
t 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
t 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
18 0400 0440 FA W ---- oooo 2 1 
18 0400 FA TF ---- oooo 2 1 
2 0  0400 OM0 FA VF ---- oooo 2 1 
2 1  8400 oibo FA vr ---- oooo 2 2 
22  0400 0 4 1 0  FA T f  ---- oooo 2 2 
2 3  0 4 1 0  FA VF ---- oooo 2 2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I 
8 
7 
a 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1s 
16 
17 
18 
18 
20 
2 1  
22  
2 3  
24 
21 
26 
27 
28  
28  
30 
3 1  
32  
0400 0 2 4 0  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0280 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0287  FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0287  FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0283 FA IP ---- oooo 
8400 0283  FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0293 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0283  LK FA ---- oooo 
0400 0293 LK PO ---- oooo 
0400 0330 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400  0350 FA I N  ---- oooo 
0400  0350 FA T f  ---- oooo 
0400 0350 FA VF ---- oooo 
UOO 0380 FA I N  ---- oooo 
0400 0380 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0380 FA W ---- oooo 
0400 -eo FA IN ---- oooo 
UOO ob00 FA W ---- oooo 
0400 0810 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0830 FA VF ---- oooo 
e400 o w 0  r A  I N  ---- oooo 
0400 0600 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 OOOO FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0620 FA I N  ---- oooo 
0400 0 6 2 0  FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 0 0 2 0  FA V f  ---- oooo 
0400 0640 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 os50 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0506 FA TF ---- oooo 
0400 OWS FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0200 FA TF ---- oooo 
uoo 02e0 FA w ---- oooo 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
m D E - W E R  : 0400 0290 ME -- F 0400 0850 
S I W T Y P E  : VIBRATION (ACCELERATIWJ-0) 
PIRAYETER : W L X N D t  (SAME AS SI- UNITS) 
1 1400 OO40 FA I Y  ---- oooo 1 0 
2 0400 OO40 FA VF ---- oooo 1 0 
3 uO0oobomwo400oO40 1 0 
lL+O7 
lE+O7 
1 E+O7 
1E+O7 
1E-7 
1 E-7 
1 €+Of 
1 E+07 
1E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 E M 7  
1 E+07 
1 €+07 
1 E M 7  
1 E+O7 
1E+O7 
1 €+Of 
1 €+Of 
lE+O7 
lE+O7 
1 E a 7  
1 E M 7  
1€+07 
1E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 €+Of 
1 E-7 
1 E-7 
1 E 4 7  
1 E+O7 
1 E M 7  
1 €+Of 
1 E M 7  
1 E 4 7  
1 E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 €+Of 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+os 
1 E+04 
1 €+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+OS 
1E+O4 
1 €+04 
1 E+04 
1 E* 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+04 
1E+O4 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1 €+04 
1€+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
lt+04 
1€+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 t+04 
1 €+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+04 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HFRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
M R T Z  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
11-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
l l - 0 1  
(E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
I € - 0 1  
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lE-01  
1E-01 
I t - 0 1  
1E+O1 
1€+01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1€+01 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+W 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
I f - 0 1  
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1€+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 €+02 
1E-01 
lE+O1 
l E + W  
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
1 
1 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
Dolp i n PROPMATI--0400 
R u .  sig. r m .  ~nq. ti- S p .  Pd. Im. 
No. 011. Qual .  T l r  TI- Un l t  Our. Ommt F a l l .  
21-Apr-1087 20:33 
YU. M l n .  F r r q .  
4 
1 
0 
7 
8 
0 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
11 
10 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
21 
2s 
27 
20 
2s 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
3a 
37 
38 
30 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
41 
46 
47 
48 
48 
50 
11 
12 
13 
54 
111 
56 
U O O ~ U R M B . 0 0 ~  
UOO WOO FA IY ---- oooo 
uoo 0100 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0120 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0240 r1 SL ---- oooo 
0400 0300 UR cv ---- oooo 
UOO 0370 FA W ---- oooo 
UOO 0370 UR CV ---- oooo 
uoo =BO r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 o400 r A  IY ---- oooo 
0400 o400 UR cv ---- oooo 
0400 0400 UR M B400 0300 
B400 0430 UR PT ---- oooo 
UOO 0430 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0450 UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0450 UR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0470 UR P l  ---- oooo 
,400 0470 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0400 UR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0480 UR RE ---- oooo 
1400 0400 UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0400 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 OMK) WR RB B400 0490 
B400 0510 UR M B400 0520 
MOO 0520 UR PT ---- oooo 
B400 OS20 UR RE ---- oooo 
0400 MOO FA vr ---- oooo 
0400 0630 r A  VF ---- oooo 
0400 0670 UR RB 0400 0680 
0400 0770 r* vr ---- oooo 
0400 07.0 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 07.0 FI SL ---- oooo 
0400 ooao r A  vr ---- oooo 
1400 0070 UR M 0400 WOO 
MOO 0120 FA IN ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  210 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0230 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0250 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0250 rI SL ---- oooo 
o m  0270 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0270 r1 SL ---- oooo 
uoo 0287 r A  vr ---- oooo 
uoo 0287 rx SL ---- oooo 
0400 0203 r A  vr ---- oooo 
0400 0310 r1 SL ---- oooo 
HOO 0320 FA vr ---- oooo 
0400 0320 r1 SL ---- oooo 
0400 0330 r A  vr ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0330 r1 SL ---- oooo 
0400 03BO r A  IY ---- oooo 
0400 0300 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0300 FA vr ---- oooo 
0400 0200 r A  vr ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1E* 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+os 
1 E+04 
1 E + M  
lE+04 
1E* 
1 E+O7 
lE+O7 
1 €+Of 
1 E+O7 
(€+Of 
1E+O7 
1E+O7 
1E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1E+03 
1E+03 
1E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+CH 
1E+04 
lE+04 
lf+04 
lE+04 
11- 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
lE+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 e+04 
ic+os 
1c-1 
lE+O1 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lL+Ol 
1E+Ol 
lE+Ol 
1E+Ol 
1L+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
i E + 0 4  
lE+O4 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lt+O4 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 L+04 
1 t+O4 
lL+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+04 
1 L+04 
1E+O1 
lt+Ol 
1E+O1 
1EM1 
1E+O1 
1L+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1E#l 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1€+01 
lE+Ol 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HE RTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
lE+02 
lE+01 
lE+Ol 
1 E+O2 
1E+O1 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1E+Ol 
lE+O2 
1€+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1E+O2 
1 e+o2 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1€+02 
1E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
lE+O2 
lE+Ol 
1E+02 
lE+02 
1L+O1 
1€+01 
lE+ol 
(E-01 
1E+O2 
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1E+Ol 
1 E+02 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1c+O1 
lE+01 
1 EM2 
1E+O1 
1 E+O2 
1E+01 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
ie+Oi 
1 E+OO 
1E-01 
1E+O2 
1E+O1 
1 E +02 
1€+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+O2 
1 L+O2 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1 E-2 
1 E+OO 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
1 L+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+OO 
1 E+00 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1 L+O2 
1 L+00 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1L+O2 
1E+O1 
1E+00 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+o2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1€+02 
1E+02 
lE42 
lE+02 
1L-01 
1 E+O2 
1€+02 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
r 
r 
r 
r 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
r 
r 
r 
r 
r 
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TABLE 19. FAILURE INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
I7 
58 
59 
80 
81 
82 
83 
8 4  
86 
67 
88 
89 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
7s 
78 
77 
78 
78 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
05 
8 8  
87 
88 
19 
a0 
81 
82 
83 
94 
96 
86 
07 
B400 03u) FA IM ---- oo00 
B400 0410 YR RB B400 0200 
B400 OS00 FA VF ---- oooo 
UOO OS10 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0560 FA VF ---- oooo 
,400 0580 FI SL ---- oooo 
B400 OS70 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 OS80 FA W ---- oooo 
a400 omo r1 SL ---- oooo 
0400 OS90 FA IM ---- oooo 
a400 FA VI ---- oooo 
B400 0010 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0610 F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0620 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 -30 FA IM ---- oooo 
B400 W70 UR RB a400 WSO 
a400 0780 F A  VF ---- oooo 
b400 0800 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0800 F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0070 YR RB B400 0080 
B400 0080 F A  I M  ---- oooo 
8400  0080 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0240 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0310 FA VF ---- oooo 
a400 03- FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0380 FA IM ---- oooo 
MOO 0630 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0540 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 OS66 F A  VF ---- oooo 
B400 OW0 FA IM ---- oooo 
0400 0620 FA IM ---- oooo 
B400 0720 F I  BN ---- oooo 
B400 07JO FI BN ---- oooo 
B400 0290 FA VF ---- oooo 
UOO 03- F A  1M ---- oooo 
B400 0410 FA VF ---- oooo 
UOO OS50 FA VF ---- oooo 
a400 OS6s FI SL ---- oooo 
0400 0470 F I  BN ---- oooo 
8400 0400 FI BN ---- oooo 
B400 OSW FI SL ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
WOE-nUlER : UOO 03M LO 02 f 6400 0390 
PARAMETER : IYPLITUDE (SAME AS Sf- UNITS) 
sroru-npr : rLw (u-MASS PER SEQWD) 
1 a400  0360 YR cv ---- oooo 1 0 
2 B400 0370 UR CV ---- oooo 1 1 
1E+04 
1 E+OS 
1€+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E W  
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E- 
lE+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 €+os 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1 E+04 
1 €+os 
1 €+os 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HE,RTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HfRTz 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E-01 
lE+O1 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
lE+01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
lE+Ol 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E-01 
lE+01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
It-01 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E-01 
lE+O1 
1 E+02 
1E-1 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lE+O1 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E* 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E+02 
lE+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E* 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E* 
1E-01 
1E+01 
1E+02 
lE+O2 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
lE+O1 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
F 
f 
F 
F 
F 
F 
T 
t 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
DouIn PROPItATIWJ400 21-Apr-1887 20:33 
Max. M l n .  Froq. 
R.C. SIg .  frrq. fmq. TI- syr. pe. Id. 
No. D I I .  -81. T I N  TIN U n I t  Cur. Onsot F 8 f 1 .  
W D E - m E R  : 0400 0410 ME -- t MOO 0060 
S I Q N A l j Y P E  : RPM (RPM) 
PARAMETER : MPLITUDE (SAME AS SI- W I T S )  
1 0400ooboWRRo0400oO40 1 3 
2 0 4 0 0 O O S O W R M B 4 0 0 ~  1 3 
3 0400 0070 WR M 0400 OOW 1 3 
4 0400 0070 UR M 0400 0080 1 3 
5 0400 0070 UR M 0400 0050 1 3 
6 0400 0070 WR M 0400 0060 1 3 
7 0400 0150 WR M 0400 0110 1 4 
W D E - W E R  : 0400 0410 ME -- F 0400 
SIWAL-TYPE : RPM (RPM) 
PARMETER : FREQUENCY (HERTZ) 
1 1400 0410 VR RB 0400 0170 1 5 
2 0400 0410 YR RB 6400 oiao 1 5 
3 0400 0410 UR Ro 0400 0180 1 S 
4 0400 0410 WR M 0400 0200 1 5 
C O D E - W E R  : 0400 0 4 1 0  ME -- t 0400 OW0 
SIWAL-TYPE : VIBRATION (ACCELERATION-Q) 
PARMETER : AWLIfLIDE (SAME AS SI- UNITS) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
I 
7 
0 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
16 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
0440 0070 f A  IN ---- oooo 
0400 0430 WR RE ---- oooo 
6400 0450 WR RE ---- oooo 
8400 0470 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0470 WR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0480 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0480 WR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0480 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0480 WR RE ---- oooo 
0400 OS20 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 OS20 WR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0080 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0080 WR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0710 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0710 UR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0720 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0720 WR RE ---- oooo 
0400 0730 WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0730 UR RE ---- oooo 
0 4 0 0  0740 UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0740 UR RE ---- oooo 
0400 07M) WR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0750 UR RE ---- oooo 
0400 UR M 0400 oO40 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
lE+03 
1 E+03 
1 E+03 
1 E+03 
lE+04 
lE+07 
1E+07 
1 E+O7 
1 C+07 
1 E+O7 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 C+07 
1 E M 7  
lE+07 
1 E+07 
lE+07 
1E+O7 
1 E-7 
1s-7 
1 E M 7  
1 E+07 
1 E a 7  
1 E+07 
1 E M 7  
1 E M 7  
1 E a  
1 E+O7 
1 E+OO 
1 E+OO 
lE+OO 
1 E+OO 
1 E+OO 
1 E+OO 
1 E+OO 
1 E+02 
1 E 4 2  
l e 4 2  
1 E M 2  
1E#1 
1E+O4 
1E+04 
1 E* 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1 E a  
1E+04 
1E+O4 
1 E+04 
1E+01 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
WRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E#2 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1€+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1 E +02 
1E+02 
1 E+OZ 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1c+02 
1 E+02 
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 €+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 c+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1c+o2 
1 E+02 
1E+O1 
1 E+00 
1€+00 
1 E+00 
1 E+OO 
1 t+W 
1E+00 
1E+W 
lE+W 
lE+00 
1 E+00 
1 c+oo 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+OZ 
1€+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E M 2  
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 c+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E M 2  
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 L+00 
ic+o2 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
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INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
25 
20 
27 
20 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
31 
3e 
37 
31 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
BO 
51 
52 
I3 
54 
55 
sa 
I 7  
2a 
3a 
49 
6400 ooso m RD 6400 oom 
6400 0070 m RD 6400 
6400 0070 M 6400 0080 
n400 0400 FA vr ---- oooo 
6400 0400 UR cv ---- oooo 
6400 0430 UR PT ---- oooo 
6400 0450 UR PT ---- oooo 
6400 0700 FA V r  ---- oooo 
6400 0140 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0150 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0150 YR u 6400 0110 
6400 0180 FA V f  ---- oooo 
m400 Oleo FI SL ---- oooo 
6400 0400 W U 6400 O W 0  
6400 o*oo UR M 1400 0370 
6400 0440 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0670 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0670 YR CV ---- oooo 
6400 0400 FA I Y  ---- oooo 
1400 0060 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0060 F I  SL ---- oooo 
6400 0670 FA I Y  ---- oooo 
6400 M70 YR M 6400 0650 
6400 -70 WR M 6400 0680 
6400 0410 UR M 6400 0170 
n400 0410 UR Iu 6400 0180 
1400 0410 UR Rm 6400 0200 
6400 0410 FA VF ---- oooo 
6400 0470 F I  W ---- oooo 
6400 0400 F I  BN ---- oooo 
6400 0720 f1 BN ---- oo00 
B400 0730 F I  BN ---- oooo 
0400 0410 UR RE BUM oiao 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
I 
5 
C O D E - W E R  : 6400 OS20 ME -- F 6400 OS30 
SI(H*L-TYPE : ACDUSTIC (ACOUSTIC EVENTS) 
PARAMETER : MPLITUDE ( S U E  AS SI- UNITS) 
1 6400 OS00 FA VF ---- oooo 2 0 
2 6400 0510 FA VF ---- oooo 2 1 
3 6400 0530 FA VF ---- oooo 2 1 
CODE-nulER : 6400 OS20 ME -- F 6400 OS30 
SI--TYPE : VIBRATION (MCELERATIW-Q) 
P M E T E R  : MPLITUDE ( S U E  AS 31-L UNITS) 
1 6400 0240 FA w ---- oooo 1 0 
2 n400 02ao FA VF ---- oooo 1 0 
3 0400 0350 FA I M  ---- oooo 1 0 
4 6400 MOO YR RE ~ 4 0 0  o4ao 1 0 
5 6400 OS40 FA VF ---- oooo 1 0 
1E* 
1E* 
1 €+os 
1 E+04 
1 E* 
1E+O7 
1E+O7 
1E+04 
lE+M 
1 E+04 
1 E M  
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1E- 
1 E* 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1E+os 
1E+O4 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+W 
1 E + M  
lE+os 
1 E M  
1E* 
1 E+OS 
1€+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E47 
1E+O7 
1 E+O7 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+03 
1 E+04 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE*1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+04 
1 E* 
1 E+Ol 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
I t 4 1  
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+o1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1c-1 
lE+O! 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
lE*l 
1E+O1 
1E+Ol 
1 E e l  
lE+Ol 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
lE+Ol 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E+o1 
lE+O1 
1 E+O 1 
1 E+04 
1E+02 
lE+O2 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1E+O1 
lE+02 
1E+O1 
1E-1 
lE+O1 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
lE+O1 
1E-01 
1E+Ol 
lE+O1 
lE+O1 
1E#1 
1c-1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lE+O2 
1 E+O2 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E + W  
1E+W 
1 E + W  
lE+04 
1E+02 
1E-2 
1€+02 
1E-2 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+00 
lE+02 
1 E +02 
1E+00 
l E + W  
1E+O2 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
It-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1€+ 0 0  
1E+00 
1c+00 
1E+00 
1c+oo 
1 E + W  
lE+Ol 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1L-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
lE+02 
1E-01 
lE+00 
1E+O2 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
F 
f 
f 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
6 
7 
8 
8 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
11 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
21 
28 
27 
20 
29 
30 
31 
32 
B400 0561 F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0720 F I  W ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  730 rr BN ---- oooo 
B400 0280 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 O400 FA I Y  ---- oooo 
1400 0480 FA VF ---- oo00 
B400 OS10 UR R8 B400 OS20 
~ 4 0 0  OS- FA vr ---- oooo 
B400 0410 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0430 UR PT ---- oooo 
UOO 0430 VR RE ---- oooo 
1400 0470 WR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0470 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0490 WR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0490 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0800 FA V f  ---- oooo 
B400 04% UR PT ---- oooo 
1400 0410 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0480 UR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0480 WR RE ---- oooo 
6400 OS10 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0520 UR PT ---- oooo 
B400 OS20 UR RE ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  01130 FA vr ---- oooo 
B400 0850 F I  SL ---- oooo 
B400 0470 F I  W ---- oo00 
B400 0480 F I  BN ---- oooo 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
WDE-HWER : 1400 0770 IIE -- F B400 0790 
SIWL-TYPE : ACOUSTIC (ACDUSTIC EVEmS) 
PARAMETER : Y Q L I N D E  ( S H E  AS SI- W I T S )  
1 B400 0780 FA VF ---- oooo 2 1 
2 B400 0780 FA V f  ---- oooo 2 1 
3 1400 moo FA V f  ---- oooo 2 1 
4 B400 0770 FA W ---- oooo 2 2 
S B400 0790 FA VF ---- oooo 2 2 
WDE-WMDER : UOO 0770 YL -- F 1400 07- 
SIWL-TYPE : VIBRATION (ACCELERATION-G) 
P W E T E R  : YPLITUOE ( S M E  AS SI- W I T S )  
B400 0470 FI BN ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0480 r i  BN ---- oooo 
UOO OS70 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0600 FA V f  ---- oooo 
B400 0620 FA VF ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  oeeo rt SL ---- oooo- 
B400 0670 UR RE 1400 06% 
B400 0720 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0730 FA VF ---- oooo 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
-1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
11- 
1 E+04 
lE+04 
1 E M  
1 E+03 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+07 
1 E47 
1 EM7 
1 €+Of 
1 €+Of 
1 €+Of 
1 E+04 
1 E+O7 
1 €+Of 
1 E+07 
1 E47 
1 E+04 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+07 
1 EM7 
1E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+04 
1 L e 4  
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E M  
1 E+OS 
1 E+OS 
1E+Ol 
1E+O1 
1E-l 
1E#1 
lE+Ol 
1E+01 
1E+O1 
lE+Ol 
1E+O1 
1L+04 
1 E+o4 
1f-4 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
lE+Ol 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+o4 
1E+O1 
1f#4 
11+04 
lE+Ol 
1c+O1 
1E#1 
1E#1 
i e w  
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E* 
1 E W  
1E+04 
lE#1 
lE+Ol 
1L+O1 
1E+O1 
lE#1 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1E#l 
1E#1 
WRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
H E R R  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
lE+Ol 
1E-01 
1L-01 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
1E+O1 
lE+02 
1E*2 
1 E+02 
1€+02 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1f+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
lE+Ol 
1E-01 
le-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lf-01 
1E-01 
It-01 
1E-01 
1E+O2 
1 E+02 
1 E+O2 
1E#l 
lE+Ol 
1E#l 
1E+Ol 
lE+02 
(E-01 
1E-01 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E+O1 
1 E+OO 
1E+02 
1E+01 
lE+02 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
1E+O2 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1€+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
lE+O2 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E-01 
lE-01 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+00 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
1 
T 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
1 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
T 
F 
F 
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TABLE 19. F A I L U R E  INFORMATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE 
INSTRUMENTATION (CONTINUED) 
lo 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
10 
17 
18 
10 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
20 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
B400 07SO UR RB a400 0740 
0400 07- UR M B 4 0 0  0700 
0400 0670 UR M B400 0880 
B400 WOO UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0600 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0710 UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0710 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0720 YR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0720 UR RE ---- oooo 
m400 0730 UR PT ---- oooo 
0400 0730 UR RE ---- oooo 
B400 0740 UR PT ---- oooo 
B400 0740 UR RE ---- oooo 
m4oo 07so FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0780 WR PT ---- oooo 
a400 0780 UR RE ---- woo 
0400 0800 FA VF ---- oooo 
0400 0800 FI SL ---- oooo 
B400 0410 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0770 FA VF ---- oooo 
B400 0780 FA V f  ---- oooo 
B400 0700 FA VF ---- oooo 
E400 0700 FI SL ---- oooo 
~ 4 0 0  0720 r1 BN ---- oooo 
B400 0730 FI ON ---- oooo 
1 1 
1 1 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 3 
1 4 
1 4 
1 E+03 
1 E+03 
1 E a  
1 E+07 
1 E47 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
lE+07 
lE+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+07 
1 E+04 
11+07 
1 E+07 
1 €+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E + M  
1 E+04 
1 E+o4 
1 E+04 
1 E+o4 
1 E+04 
1E-1 
lE+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1 E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
1E+04 
lE+04 
1E+04 
lE-1 
1E+04 
1E44 
lt#l 
1E-l 
1L-1 
lE+01 
1E+O1 
lE+oi 
1E+O1 
1E+01 
1c-1 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
M R T Z  
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
WRTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
&RTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
HERTZ 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1E+Ol 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1E+02 
1€+02 
1€+02 
lE+02 
1E+02 
lE+02 
lE+02 
1E42 
1E+02 
1E+O1 
1E+O1 
1 E+02 
1€+02 
1 €+02 
1E+01 
1E-01 
1E-01 
lE+00 
1 E+OO 
1 E* 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1 €+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+02 
1 E+02 
1E+02 
1 E+O2 
1 E+02 
1E+O2 
lE+02 
1 E+02 
lE+02 
lE+Ol 
lE+O2 
1 E+02 
1E+O2 
1E+02 
1E-01 
1E-01 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
1 
1 
T 
T 
T 
1 
F 
T 
1 
F 
T 
T 
F 
F 
F 
T 
T 
T 
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At the first connection (Bearing #3 outer race), the signal from 
bearing #3 failure modes is very strong in the high frequency range. The 
only other high frequency information is from fracture-generated acoustic 
signals (see same connection with parameter - ACOUSTIC), but are a lower 
signal level than the bearing fault signals. The second connection, where 
Bearings #3 and #4 support block mounts to the pump housing, shows that 
signals from both bearings can be detected, but the signal levels are much 
lower and fracture-generated acoustic signals from nearby parts are at the 
same signal level or higher. This would make it difficult to extract the 
bearing failure information from that of other components except for the 
ball-cage resonance type failure, denoted by the FI BN (Friction- 
Binding) failure mode. The ball-cage resonance failure mode from all the 
bearings can be readily detected at the second location. The third 
location, near bearings #1 and #2 spring isolator, shows the capability of 
detection all the failure modes of these two bearings. 
2. Turbine Blade Fracture Detection 
B400 0050 ME -- F B400 0140 THERMAL 
B400 0070 ME -- F B400 0150 THERMAL 
There are two major failure modes an optical pyrometer can 
detect and isolate. In looking at the FIPM output for a thermal signal 
type, fracture of the blades and lack of coolant flow to the rotor from 
the coolant nozzle ring can be detected. The frequency response of the 
pyrometer must be very high to measure a temperature profile of each blade 
as it passes. To detect the lack of coolant flow to the rotor, a long 
term increase in the RMS value of the temperature is required for 
detection and isolation. The optical pyrometer could be very useful in 
reducing the inspection time of the turbine blades. To detect fractures 
in the 1st (0050) and 2nd (0070) stage turbine blades would require two 
pyrometers. The only other method of turbine blade crack detection would 
require an acoustic emission sensor mounted in the shaft or rotor to 
detect fracture propagation. This method has two problems. First, the 
signal must be transmitted from the shaft to the housing by telemetry and 
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second, the influence of other fracture failure modes would mean that two 
sensors would be required to locate the fracture acoustic signal by the 
difference in arrival time between each transducer mounted at different 
locations. 
3. Shaft Speed Sensor (RPML 
B400 0410 ME -- F 8400 0660 RPM, VIBRATION 
There is ongoing development to add a shaft speed sensor to the 
HPOTP which can be used for pump performance, but also may be an excellent 
method to detect rubbing failure modes. The sensor being developed uses 
four magnets imbedded concentrically in a nut fastened to the shaft. As 
the components rub, instead of a steady sine wave signal, there will be 
glitches in the time domain signal, which should show up as sidebands of 
4X the RPM frequency. Another non-intrusive method to measure turbopump 
RPM is using an ultrasonic doppler technique to detect the impeller blade 
passage. The ultrasonic doppler transducer method may also detect bearing 
problems and imbalance problems (same location, but with parameter- 
VIBRATION), since it may detect shaft vibration at much higher frequencies 
than the shaft RPM. This transducer might not be able to isolate the 
individual failure mode for each part, but could be effective in 
discriminating specific classes of failure modes, such as wear by rubbing, 
wear by cavitation, bearing faults, fracture by impact, and vibration 
fatigue trending. At any of the above test points, shaft imbalance (8400 
0410 FA VF) caused failures i s  detectable. The best detection position 
for this failure mode is the shaft using the ultrasonic doppler transducer 
mounted to the pump housing. This the shaft imbalance would be 
characterized by a sharp peak in the frequency domain at the shaft RPM 
frequency, slightly less than the shaft RPM frequency, or multiples of the 
RPM frequency. 
4. HPOTP Pump Outlet Flow - Ultrasonic Flowmeter 
B400 0380 LO 02 F B400 0390 FLOW 
Other than flow information for monitoring and control of system 
performance, high frequency information might be useful in detection of 
pump cavitation. 
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HPOTP ACCELEROMETER DATA REVIEW 
The high amplitude signals at 2X cage frequency found in the 
data from the HPOTP radial accelerometers during tests 7500283 and 7500284 
are consistent with the results of the cage instability study conducted by 
Battelle several years ago (Reference 8). The 2X cage frequency signal is 
typical of a marginally stable, marginally unstable, or unstable cage. A 
high-frequency signal above 4 kHz would be indicative of an unstable case 
only. The 2X frequency was picked up very easily by the pump radial 
accelerometers and could easily be used for diagnostic monitoring of the 
bearing cage instability problem. There is not much noise in this region 
of the frequency spectrum, and a peak for an extended period of time could 
be used trend for inspection of the bearings or even shutdown of the 
engine if the high-frequency information is detected. Detection of 
signals at both frequencies would give a two-level indication of an 
imminent failure. The high-frequency data was not shown on any of the 
plots reviewed, so it was difficult to determine if the cage resonance was 
only marginally stable or unstable. The force required to cause 
structural failure of the cage would easily be produced by a very 
unstable case and might be produced by a marginally stable case according 
to the same analytical study. 
The analytical study mentioned above used a Battel le-developed 
computer code called BASDAP to determine the sensitivity of cage 
instability to various design parameters and the resulting affect on the 
structural integrity of the race. The conclusions and recommendations 
from this study are included in Appendix C. The 2 X  cage frequency 
(approximately 450 Hz) can be seen in the plot in Figure 60 of the 
relative angular displacement of the cage versus time. This is a 
marginally stable case where the cage is moving back and forth relative to 
the balls and impacting them. In this case, there is just enough energy 
dissipated in the system for the oscillation to slowly die out and prevent 
an unstable condition. The amplitude is high enough to cause relatively 
high impact forces on the cage. In a completely unstable case shown in 
Figure 61, the 2X cage frequency is superimposed on the high-frequency 
instability in the time domain. Therefore, energy at 2X indicates at 
least there is a marginally unstable environment, but energy at much 
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higher  f requencies (above 4 kHz) must be detected t o  v e r i f y  a completely 
unstable case. 
l a ' -  F 
".'O0 t 
1 -- 
I '- 
FIGURE 60. IMPACT OF CAGE AND BALLS AT APPROXIMATELY 450 HZ. CALCULATED 
BY BASDAP FOR A MARGINALLY STABLE CASE (Reference 8) 
i -- i I 1  a 10.101 E lo.m 
- .w 
- .aw 
4 
FIGURE 61. HIGH-FREQUENCY CAGE INSTABILITY WITH 2X FREQUENCY 
SUPERIMPOSED. CALCULATED BY BASDAP (Reference 8) 
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The HPOTP radial accelerometer data for tests 7500283 and 
7500284, plotted in the frequency domain at 3.6 second intervals, shows 
predominant peaks at 2X cage frequency (about 430 Hz) and smaller peaks at 
l X ,  3x, and 4X cage frequency. The 2X peak can clearly be seen in the 
plot in Figure 62 at 265.2 seconds into test 7500283. These peaks 
suddenly disappear about 200 seconds into test 7500284 as seen in the 
waterfall plot in Figure 63. At this point the cage has probably 
disintegrated and the test ended at 309 seconds. Upon examination of the 
bearings, the cage was gone and pieces were found in the MOV downstream of 
the pump. The bearings were worn in excess of 15 mils and if the test ran 
much longer, the balls would probably have been thrown out of the races 
and the turbopump would quickly be destroyed and most likely take out the 
who1 e engine. 
C 
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e 
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0.1 
0.01 
FIGURE 62. TEST 7500283 HPOTP RADIAL ACCELEROMETER 135' FREQUENCY 
VERSUS ACCELERATION PLOT AT 265.2 SECONDS 
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2X cage frequency was evident in HPOTP 4101 during tests 902- 
409 through -410. This problem does not seem to be an isolated incident. 
The bearings are run at very high speed with poor lubrication and are very 
prone to a cage instability failure mode. Detection with the preburner 
pump radial accelerometers looks quite feasible. In discussions with Mr. 
Preston Jones at NASA MSFC, the accelerometer signal has a bandpass filter 
with cutoff frequencies of 50 and 2500 Hz. The accelerometer is capable 
of measuring signals above 10 kHz and some of the recent data has shown 
signals in the 3500 to 6000 frequency range that could be evidence of a 
cage instability problem. Unfortunately, all the plots we have currently 
are from 50 top 1300 Hz. 
This is the first time a particular failure mode has been 
detected by the pump housing accelerometers. The housing accelerometer 
data has been examined for indications of bearing defects for some time 
without much success. A recent study on detection of power plant axial- 
flow fan (Reference 9) shows that the most effective frequency band to 
monitor for bearing faults and wear is in the 30 to 60 kHz range as seen 
in Figure 64. Detection in the lower frequency. range is difficult, 
s .  In 
ngs in 
20 kHz 
i s  not 
because energy input from other sources, such as rotordynamic effec 
most cases, the bearing had to have sustained major damage to be 
detectable at frequencies under 15kHz for these large roller bear 
the fans. Since the recorder is only capable of measuring below 
and much of the signal from bearing defects can be above 20 kHz, it 
surprising that information on the bearing condition could not be 
obtained from the accelerometer data. Since the accelerometer has a 
resonance at approximately 30kHz and may provide useful information to 60 
kHz, bearing condition information could possibly be detected by extending 
the data recording capabilities. The resonance could be used for 
increased sensitivity in this frequency range or impedance compensation 
could be provided to flatten the frequency response curve of the 
accelerometer. 
174 
0 ,  
-30 
-a 
-50 
-eo 
-70 I I I 1 I I I I I I I 
0 20 40 80 bo loo 
(Thwwnds) 
Frequency. H2 
FIGURE 64. VIBRATION SPECTRAL DATA FOR THE BEARING SERVICE LIFE 
I N  A POWER PLANT AXIAL-FLOW FAN. (REFERENCE 9) 
In conclusion, the bearing cage instability analysis results 
correlate with findings from the pump accelerometer data analysis on the 
recent tests. Since the bearings operate at such high speeds with poor 
lubrication, diagnostic monitoring of this problem should be considered. 
The data analysis from these two tests indicates that the present 
accelerometers can be useful in monitoring o f  this failure mode and 
possibly other bearing faults, such as race and ball defects. It will 
require more extensive analysis and data recording capabilities up to 50 
kHz with the present accelerometers. 
Recommendations for further testing to determine the pump 
housing accelerometers capabi 1 ity as a diagnostic/monitoring tool are: 
Remove the 2.5 kHz low pass filter for some of the tests 
Increase recording capabilities on ground tests to well above 
the 30kHz resonant frequency of the accelerometers. 
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When evidence o f  cage instability or  bearing defects occur, 
remove and examine that bearings post-test for Val idation of 
the measurements. 
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ON-BOARD CONDITION MONITORING 
to the SSME condition monit ring system u ed on 
board the Space Shuttle must be carefully studied in terms of the overall 
impact on engine and vehicle systems. The primary item involved from the 
engine perspective is the controller. On the vehicle side, changes to the 
SSME diagnostic system could affect the Orbiter telemetry and recording 
systems. Relatively minor changes to the system could have wide-ranging 
implications depending on the reserve capability associated with these 
other systems. This task reviewed the various elements of the current on- 
board condition monitoring system and evaluated the potential impacts 
associated with possible changes to the SSME monitoring approach. 
SSME Control 1 er 
As described in Reference 6, the controller operates in 
conjunction with the engine sensors, valves, actuators, and ignitors to 
provide self-contained engine control, checkout, and monitoring. A 
controller i s  mounted on each of the three SSMEs. The controller provides 
the following six functions: 
On-board checkout 
Engine start .readiness verification 
Engine sequencing (start & shutdown) 
Closed-loop engine control 
Engine limit monitoring 
Acquisition of engine maintenance data. 
The controller samples sensor outputs and updates instructions to the SSME 
every 20 milliseconds. The controller uses a dual redundant design which 
allows normal operation after the first failure and fail-safe shutdown 
after a second failure. 
The controller is functionally divided into five subsystems each 
of which is fully redundant. These subsystems include: 1) input 
electronics, 2) output electronics, 3) computer interface electronics, 4) 
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digital computer, and 5) power supply electronics. The controller 
organization is shown in Figure 65. The primary subsystems involved in 
condition monitoring are the input electronics, the computer interface 
electronics, and the digital computer. The input electronics receive data 
from the various sensors, condition the incoming signals, and convert the 
signals to digital values for processing by the computer. The engine 
sensors are divided into three categories: control , limit, and in-flight 
data. Both the control and limit sensors are dual redundant. The in- 
flight or maintenance sensors are not redundant. The computer interface 
electronics control the input data to the computer, the output commands 
from the computer, and the overall flow of information within the 
controller. The interface electronics also provide the connection between 
the controller and the Orbiter's engine interface unit (EIU). This 
connection is used to transmit engine status and data to the vehicle over 
dual redundant channels. The digital computer is programmable to allow 
modification of engine control and monitoring algorithms. The computer 
has a memory capacity o f  16,384 words (17 bit words, 16 bits for storage, 
1 parity bit). 
FIGURE 65. SSME CONTROLLER ORGANIZATION 
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The flight acceleration safety cutoff system (FASCOS) is another 
system related to condition monitoring which operates in combination with 
the engine controller. As shown in Figure 65, the FASCOS is a separate 
engine-mounted unit which is connected to both the SSME controller and the 
Orbiter EIU. The FASCOS receives vibration data from the turbopump 
accelerometers and shares this information with the controller. If 
vibration levels exceed a specified limit, FASCOS communicates this 
information to the EIU resulting in engine shut down. The FASCOS system 
has been undergoing extensive testing but has not been flown in a fully 
activated mode. 
. 
Orbiter Telemetry and Recording Svstems 
The Orbiter radiofrequency (rf) systems and data services are 
summarized in Reference 8. The principal elements connected with the SSME 
condition monitoring function are the FM signal processor, the data 
record/playback system, and the S-band FM transmitter. The FM signal 
processor accepts inputs from the SSMEs, the recordlplayback system, the 
Orbiter television system, and the payloads and selects the source for 
transmission by the S-band FM transmitter. The data record/playback 
system consists of two 14-track recorders with a capacity of up to 80 
minutes each. One recorder is assigned as the operations unit while the 
other is designated as the payload unit. The S-band FM transmitter 
p r o v i d e s  a s i n g l e  wide-band d a t a  channe l  from t h e  O r b i t e r  t o  t h e  ground 
stations . 
The S-ban 
and can provide the 
Real-t 
1 SSME 
Real-t 
FM transmitter operates at a frequency o f  2250.0 MHz 
following downlinks (one at a time): 
me engine data (3 channels 8 60 kbps each) 
data dump 8 60 kbps (one rate 8 16:l) 
me television 
Real-time attached payload data 
1 PCM telemetry dump 8 192 kbps 
1 PCM telemetry dump 8 128 kbps. 
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The S-band FM data is routed from the Ground Space Tracking and Data 
Network (GSTDN) to the Space Shuttle Mission Control Center (MCC) at the 
NASA Johnson Space Center. Both real-time and playback engine data is 
communicated to the MCC at a rate of 1.544 Mbps. 
Implications of SSME Monitorinq Chanaes 
Changes in the current on-board engine monitoring system could 
have significant impacts on some or all of the hardware and software 
elements described above. In addition to the purely technical 
considerations, it also will be necessary to evaluate any proposed changes 
from the prospective of the current Space Shuttle certification and 
operational procedures. This subsection discusses some of the 
implications associated with potential changes in the SSME diagnostic 
system. 
Information on the condition of the SSME could be enhanced 
through the addition of sensors which would target specific types of 
failure information. The hardware impacts associated with this approach 
would include new access ports or mounting provisions, wiring harnesses, 
and connections to the controller input electronics. The resulting 
information could be processed and utilized inside the controller, 
recorded for later evaluation, or telemetered to the ground. 
A factor to be considered in adding new on-board instrumentation 
is the increased weight associated with the sensors and wiring harnesses. 
While the weight of a few transducers and wires seems relatively minor, it 
must be remembered that the payload capacity of the Space Shuttle will be 
reduced by an equivalent amount. It would be relatively easy to design a 
condition monitoring system which would target many of the high-priority 
SSME failure modes. Unfortunately, this system could never be flown 
because of its weight. A delicate balance must be achieved between the 
weight of the diagnostic system and the information derived from it. 
Another factor which affects both additional instrumentation and 
improved utilization of the current sensors is the on-board processing 
capacity of the controller. The condition monitoring capability o f  the 
current SSME controller (Block I) is limited by the internal memory. 
Insufficient capacity is available to process significant amounts of new 
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information. The Block I1 controller, which is currently undergoing 
developmental testing, has an increased amount of internal storage. 
Unfortunately, the design specifications dictate that the Block I 1  
controller must be functionally identical to the current unit. This 
requirement seems to preclude accessing the additional capacity of the new 
design to expand the condition monitoring system. The computational 
capacities of both the Block I and I 1  controllers are insufficient for 
real-time diagnostic techniques such as expert systems or artificial 
intell igence (AI). 
A potential means for improving the information yield from the 
current instrumentation involves processing and/or recording an increased 
bandwidth signal. Examining a higher bandwidth signal could provide 
additional data concerning the condition of the component(s) being 
monitored. Increasing the bandwidth of the sensor signals would have a 
potential impact on a number of systems including the controller, the 
controller to EIU data channels, the FM signal processor, the data 
recording/playback system, the S-band FM transmitter, and the GSTDN to MCC 
communications channels. 
Most of the potential improvements to the on-board SSME 
condition monitoring system would involve hardware changes of one kind or 
another. Even if these modifications could be accomplished within all o f  
the current component capabilities, a significant effort would be required 
to validate and certify the changes. The characteristics of the modified 
condition monitoring system and its interactions with the other engine 
components would have to be thoroughly understood and documented. In 
general, a condition monitoring system improves the availability of the 
item being monitored. The reliability of the overall system will usually 
be degraded due to the added diagnostic components which can also fail. 
Improvements in the on-board SSME condition monitoring system will require 
many years of careful and deliberate design, testing, and evaluation. 
Changes in the on-board SSME condition monitoring system also 
would require corresponding changes in the operational criteria and 
procedures. To be effective, the data being collected must be analyzed, 
displayed, and utilized in the decision-making process. The revised 
operating guidelines should be defined and exercised during the 
developmental testing of the modified diagnostic system. 
. .  
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SSME CONDITION MONITORING DEVELOPMENT 
The task of postulating a development program and schedule for 
an improved SSME condition monitoring system is complicated by the 
changing nature of the engine hardware. Both NASA and Rocketdyne are 
constantly studying ways to improve the performance, reliability, and 
maintainability of the engine. These studies have produced new component 
designs as well as modifications to the current components. This section 
discusses some of the on-going SSME development programs. In addition, 
some specific condition monitoring needs, which are independent of the 
hardware, are outlined. The possible time frame and resources associated 
with improving the SSME monitoring system are also discussed. Finally, a 
document which outlines the requirements for future rocket engine 
condition monitoring systems is described. 
Three major SSME hardware programs are currently in progress or 
anticipated. The first of these is the Phase I1 high-pressure turbopumps 
being developed by Rocketdyne. The design changes incorporated in these 
pumps are intended to extend the service life of the turbine blades and 
bearings. The Phase I1 turbopumps are undergoing certification testing at 
this time. A second program was awarded to Pratt and Whitney in 1986 to 
develop alternate turbomachinery designs, primarily the high-pressure 
turbopumps. The Pratt and Whitney turbopumps wi 1 1  be interchangeable with 
the current components. This program is still in the design and 
development stage. Ultimately, Pratt and Whitney will deliver prototype 
hardware to NASA for full-scale testing and evaluation on the 
oxygen/hydrogen technology test bed engine. A third program was recently 
announced by NASA. This program is similar to the alternate turbopump 
effort but encompasses the SSME powerhead, main combustion chamber, and 
nozzle. Test hardware also is likely to result from this program. 
Each change to the current engine design alters the failure or 
degradation rates of the individual piece parts. This shifting of the 
failure patterns alters the monitoring priorities on which the diagnostic 
and control systems are based. However, three specific items appear to 
be leading condition monitoring candidates regardless of the exact SSME 
hardware configuration. These items are turbine blade erosion/cracking, 
bearing wear , and hydrogen 1 eak detection. NASA , USAF , Rocketdyne , and 
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several other contractors currently are devel oping sensors to target these 
particular items. The turbine blades and bearings will no doubt be high 
priorities areas for any future high-performance rocket engine regardless 
of the propellant combination. The detection and isolation of hydrogen 
leaks also will be important for any engine which uses this particular 
fuel. Research and development activities related to these three problem 
areas should be expanded and accelerated. 
Much fundamental research remains to be completed before a 
comprehensive SSME condition monitoring system can be developed. The 
planned introduction o f  the oxygen/hydrogen technology test bed engine 
during 1988 will provide a new and valuable asset in the continued 
development of sensors, signal processing, and diagnostic logic. The test 
bed engine wi 1 1  provide an intermediate step between proof-of-concept and 
the current engine testing conducted at the National Space Technology 
Laboratories (NSTL) . Improvements in the SSME condition monitoring system 
will progress from the test bed engine to developmental testing at NSTL to 
actual implementation on flight engines. 
An overall development schedule for an improved SSME condition 
monitoring system can only be discussed in general terms. It is likely 
that the next three to five years will be dominated by technology 
development and demonstration. The results of this research must then be 
factored into the actual design of any new diagnostic elements. This 
process could easily require another two to three years. Finally, the 
resulting system would be required to undergo two to three years o f  
testing before used on Space Shuttle missions. The total time required to 
perform the necessary research, design the hardware or software, and 
certify it for flight could be from seven to ten years. While this may 
seem excessive, it is consistent with the general development cycle for 
major aerospace programs. 
The resources required to develop and certify an improved 
condition monitoring system would depend on the selected configuration 
and the level of sophistication. The historic funding levels for this 
area would not be sufficient to accomplish any significant improvements in 
the time frame discussed above. However, there has been an expansion of 
the resources allocated to condition monitoring in the past year. These 
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increased levels must be continued if near-term (5-10 years) improvements 
are to be real ized. 
Over the past four years, the importance of condition monitoring 
systems has risen significantly. This fact is confirmed by the number of 
current studies concerned with condition monitoring. The increased 
emphasis is the result of both safety and reliability concerns and a 
desire to reduce the maintenance required between flights. This 
heightened awareness also has been accompanied by an expanded view of the 
interactions between the condition monitoring system and the 
engine/vehicle. The USAF Astronautics Laboratory currently is conducting 
a study to define a vehicle health management system (VHMS) architecture 
for an advanced launch system. This contract seeks to define an overall 
approach for developing an integrated condition monitoring system. The 
VHMS envisioned by the USAF would encompasses the entire vehicle and not 
just the propulsion system. Because diagnostics are important for all 
vehicle subsystems, an integrated condition monitoring system will be a 
major factor in the design and development of advanced manned and unmanned 
launch vehicles. 
During the course of this study, NASA MSFC requested inputs on 
condition monitoring requirements for the advanced Space Transportation 
Booster and Main Engines. The output of this effort was a short document 
titled "Diagnostic Monitoring System Requirements for the Space 
Transportation Booster and Main Engines (STBE and STME)". A copy of this 
document was forwarded to NASA MSFC in July 1986. A copy is contained in 
Appendix D of this report. The document is divided into six sections 
which include: general discussion, diagnostic system considerations 
during engine design, key diagnostic parameters, ground-test vs. flight 
diagnostics, in-flight vs. post-flight processing and analysis, and 
contractor implementation plan. 
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MAIN ENGINE COST/OPERATIONS MODEL 
A reported task dealt with studies of, and enhancements to the 
Main Engine Cost/Operations (MECO) model. This model is a combination of 
(1) a (deterministic) simulation of the processes of use and refurbishment 
of engines and components, (2) a detailed cost model, and (3) report 
formats which provide both cost and event data. It was used by NASA 
Headquarters and MSFC in a variety of hardware requi rements/cost studies. 
Major activities on this task are summarized below. 
Cost Spread Functions for Budqet Planninq Exercise 
An adaptation of the MECO model was made to allow the conduct of 
budget planning exercises through the use of user-defined cost spread 
functions and delivery schedule. This modification provides cost 
summaries, by quarter, for both individual elements (e.g. , HPOTP) and the 
overall SSME system. It does not require a simulation to be run to 
generate the model data. 
ExDanded Cost Displavs 
The cost displays which were originally rounded to the nearest 
$1 million were revised and expanded to provide cost data rounded to the 
nearest $10 thousand. 
Revised Overhaul /Maintenance Procedures 
Based on discussions with NASA Headquarters and MSFC personnel , 
major revisions were implemented in the engine and component overhaul 
logic to more accurately simulate then-current practice. This involved 
bypassing/revising the monitoring requirement for engine overhaul in s in 
case of certain failures. 
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Assessment of a Stochastic Model 
A preliminary assessment of the requirements for, and benefits 
of, a stochastic version of the model was made and reviewed in informal 
discussions with the technical monitor. 
Assessment of Graphics Requirements 
A preliminary assessment was made of the potential for 
incorporating graphics into the model. This was reviewed informally with 
the technical monitor, who concluded that inclusion f graphics was not 
warranted at the time. 
On-Goinq Support/Minor Modifications 
From the initiation of the project until mid-1985, ongoing 
support in the form of advisory services and/or computer support was 
provided. In addition, a large number of relatively minor modifications 
were made to the program based on needs identified by the technological 
mon i tor. 
Documentation 
Flow charts o f  the overall model logic, are revised to be 
consistent with the modifications discussed above, were provided. These 
diagrams are intended to document the simulation sufficiently to provide a 
clear understanding of the underlying assumptions. The MECO logic 
diagrams are included as Appendix E of this report. 
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A-3 
PRIMARY STEPS IN DEVELOPMENT OF FIPM 
1) FIPM Drawing 
a) Assign unique designator t o  system 
b) Identify modules which comprise system 
c) Assign unique number t o  each module 
d )  Generate a descriptive name for  each module 
e) List the potential fa i lure  modes for  each module 
e) Identify physical connections between the modules 
2) FIPM Data Base 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d )  
e)  
f )  
Generate and enter data for  domain REFERENCES 
Generate and enter data for  domain SYSTEMS 
Generate and enter data for  domain MODULES 
Generate and enter data for  domain FAILUREMODES 
Generate and enter data for  domain CONNECTIONS 
Generate and enter data for  domain PROPAGATIONS - Q### * 
@### represents the four-character code for  the current system. * 
FIPM ABBREVIATIONS 
Failure Modes: 
BN - Binding 
CN - Connection 
CR - Corrosion 
CV - Cavitation 
DF - Deformation 
ER - Erosion 
FA - Fracture 
FI - Friction 
IM - Impact 
IP - Internal pressure 
LK - Leak 
MP - Material properties 
OX - Oxidation 
PD - Pressure differential 
PT - Pitting 
RB - Rubbing 
RE - Rolling element 
SD - Surface deposition 
SL - Slippage 
ST - Static loading 
TF - Thermal fatigue 
TL - Tolerance 
VF - Vibration Fatigue 
W R  - Wear 
Connections : 
CP - Common piece 
GA - Gaseous 
H2 - Hydrogen 
HE - Helium 
HG - Hot gas 
LQ - Liquid 
ME - Mechanical 
02 - Oxygen 
RE - Rolling element 
TP - Two phase 
ALLOWABLE F I P M  VALUES 
R e f e r e n c e  S o u r c e s  : 
AEROJ ET 
BATTELLE 
MARTIN MARIETTA 
NASA HDQ 
NASA MSFC 
PRATT & WHITNEY 
ROCKETDYNE 
F a i l u r e  M o d e s :  
CR OX - CORROSION: O X I D A T I O N  
D F  I M  - DEFORMATION: IMPACT 
D F  I P  - DEFORMATION: INTERNAL PRESSURE 
D F  S T  - DEFORMATION: S T A T I C  LOADING 
D F  SD - DEFORMATION: SURFACE DEPOSITION 
FA I M  - FRACTURE: IMPACT 
FA I P  - FRACTURE: INTERNAL PRESSURE 
FA S T  - FRACTURE: S T A T I C  LOADING 
FA TF - FRACTURE: THERMAL FATIGUE 
FA VF - FRACTURE: V I B R A T I O N  FATIGUE 
FI BN - FRICTION: BINDING 
F I  S L  - F R I C T I O N :  SLIPPAGE 
L K  CN - LEAK: CONNECTION 
L K  ER - LEAK: EROSION 
L K  FA - LEAK: FRACTURE 
L K  PD - LEAK: PRESSURE D I F F E R E N T I A L  
L K  T L  - LEAK: TOLERANCE 
MP SD - MATERIAL PROPERTIES: SURFACE D E P O S I T I O N  
WR CV - WEAR: C A V I T A T I O N  
WR ER - WEAR: EROSION 
WR PT - WEAR: P I T T I N G  
WR RE - WEAR: ROLLING ELEMENTS 
WR RB - WEAR: RUBBING 
ALLOWABLE FIPM VALUES (CONTINUED) 
C o n n e c t i o n s :  
GA H 2  - GASEOUS: HYDROGEN 
GA HE - GASEOUS: HELIUM 
GA HG - GASEOUS: HOT GAS 
GA 02 - GASEOUS: OXYGEN 
LQ H 2  - L I Q U I D :  HYDROGEN 
LQ HE - L I Q U I D :  HELIUM 
LQ 02 - L I Q U I D :  OXYGEN 
ME -- - MECHANICAL 
ME CP - MECHANICAL: COMMON P I E C E  
ME RE - MECHANICAL: ROLLING ELEMENT 
T P  H 2  - TWO PHASE: HYDROGEN 
T P  HE - TWO PHASE: H E L I U M  
T P  02 - TWO PHASE: OXYGEN 
S i g n a l s :  
ACOUSTIC 
ELECTRICAL 
FLOW 
PRESSURE 
RPM 
THERMAL 
TORQUE 
V I BRAT I ON 
WORN PARTICLES 
P a r a m e t e r s :  
AMPLITUDE 
FREQUENCY 
PHASE 
A-7 
REQUIRED DATA F I E L D S  
D o m a i n  REFERENCES: 
DOCUMENT TITLE [REPORT OR DOCUMENT TITLE: 1 * 
DOCUMENT-SOURCE [ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION : ] 
DOCUMENT-DATE  [DOCUMENT DATE (DD-MMM-YYYY) : ] 
D o m a i n  SYSTEMS : 
SYSTEM [SYSTEM: 1 
I T E M 1  [CONSTITUENT ROCKETDYNE FMEA ITEMS: 1) 3 
SYSTEM-NAME [SYSTEM NAME: ] 
REFERENCE1 [REFERENCE DOCUMENTS: 1) ] 
D o m a i n  MODULES: 
SYSTEM [SYSTEM: ] 
MODULE [MODULE: ] 
SYSTEM-MODULE - NAME [MODULE NAME: ] 
D o m a i n  FAILUREMODES: 
SOURCE SYSTEM MODULE 
FA1 LURE MODE SUBMODE 
ACCOMPLYCE - SYSTEM - MODULE. 
[SOURCE SYSTEM AND MODULE: ] 
[FAILURE MODE AND SUBMODE: ] 
[ACCOMPLICE SYSTEM AND MODULE: ] 
D o m a i n  CONNECTIONS: 
SYSTEM MODULE - A [SYSTEM AND MODULE A: 3 
CONNECTION [CONNECTION (TYPE AND Q U A L I F I E R )  : ] 
UNANTICIPATED CONNECTION [UNANTICIPATED CONNECTION (T  OR F) : 3 
s Y ST EM-MO D u L E-B [SYSTEM AND MODULE B: ] 
The i t e m  i n  b rackets  i s  the  da ta  p r o m p t  as i t  appears on t he  i npu t  
f o r m .  
* 
A - a  
REQUIRED DATA F I E L D S  (CONTINUED) 
D o m a i n  PROPAGATIONS-@### **: 
CODE NUMBER 
S I G N A L  Q U A L I T Y  
S I G N A L  TYPE 
MAX FREQ OR T I M E  
FMCODE- 
D I MEN S ~ O N S  
MI N-FR EQ-OR~T I ME 
PARAMETER 
I NDICATES~FAI LURE 
SYMPTOM DURATION 
PERIOD OF ONSET 
[CODE NUMBER: ] 
[SIGNAL QUALITY:  ] 
[FMCODE: ] 
[SIGNAL TYPE: ] 
[DIMENSIONS : ] 
[MAX. FREQ./TIME: ] 
[MIN. FREQ./TIME: ] 
[PARAMETER: 1 
[SYMPTOM DURATION: 3 
[PERIOD OF ONSET: 3 
[ I N D I C A T E S  FAILURE: ] 
@### represents  the  four-character  code f o r  t he  cur ren t  s y s t e m .  ** 
A-9 
DATA F I E L D S  WHICH CANNOT BE M O D I F I E D  
D o m a i n  REFERENCES: 
DOCUMENT T I T L E  
DOCUMENT-SOURCE [ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION : ] 
DOCUMENT-DATE  
[REPORT OR DOCUMENT T I T L E :  ] * 
[DOCUMENT DATE (DD-MMM-YYYY) : ] 
D o m a i n  SYSTEMS: 
SYSTEM [SYSTEM: ] 
D o m a i n  MODULES: 
SYSTEM [SYSTEM: 3 
MODULE [MODULE: ] 
D o m a i n  FAILUREMODES: 
SOURCE SYSTEM MODULE 
F A 1  LURE MODE SUBMODE 
ACCOMPLTCE-SYSTEM-MODULE 
[SOURCE SYSTEM AND MODULE: ] 
[ F A I L U R E  MODE AND SUBMODE: ] 
[ACCOMPLICE SYSTEM AND MODULE: ] 
D o m a i n  CONNECTIONS: 
Al l  Fields 
D o m a i n  PROPAGATIONS-@### **: 
CODE NUMBER [CODE NUMBER: ] 
FMCODE [FMCODE: ] 
S I G N A L  TYPE [S IGNAL TYPE: ] 
PARAMETER [PARAMETER: ] 
T h e  i t e m  i n  brackets i s  t he  da ta  p r o m p t  as i t  appears on t he  i n p u t  
f o r m .  
@### represents t h e  four-character  code f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  s y s t e m .  
* 
** 
A-10 
FORM FOR GENERATING F A I L U R E  INFORMATION PROPAGATION DATA 
SIGNAL-QUALIN: 0 1 2 3 4 5 
VERY WEAK MODERATE STRONG 
FMCODE: ---- ---- -- -- ---- ---- 
FAILURE MODE SYSTEM MODULE NO FAILURE CAILURE SYSTEM MODULE NO 
CODE ==== SOURCE MODULE ==== MODE SUBMODE = a =  ACCOMPLICE MODULE ===  
SIGNAL-TYPE: FLOW TORQUE RPM 
PRESSURE VIBRATION ACOUSTIC 
THERMAL ELECTRICAL WORN PARTICLES 
DIMENSIONS: 1 2 3 
MIN-FREO-OR-TIME: 1 E 
PARAMETER FREQUENCY AMPLITUDE PHASE 
PERIOD-OF-ONSET: 1 E  
INDICATES-FAILURE: T or F 
COMMENTl: 
(MAX BO CHAR.) 
COMMENT2 
(MAX 80 CHAR.) 
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RULES USED FOR SSME FIPMs 
MODULE SELECTION 
There are no f i x e d  r u l e s  f o r  spec i fy ing  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  modules 
se lected f o r  t h e  FIPM. I n  some cases, i n d i v i d u a l  p iece p a r t s  
from a p a r t s  l i s t  may be used. I n  o ther  cases, an assembly o f  
p a r t s  which has a s i n g l e  func t ion  and s t r a i g h t  forward f a i l u r e  
modes may be selected. I n  a l l  cases, t h e  dec is ion  w i l l  be based 
on t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  p a r t  o r  par ts .  Each f u n c t i o n  w i l l  be 
represented by a separate module. 
MODULE NUMBERING SCHEME 
A l l  modules o f  t h e  FIPM s h a l l  be uniquely  i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  
combination o f  a four-character  system code and a f o u r - d i g i t  
number. 
Example: B400 0010 
COMMON-PIECE CONNECTIONS 
When a s i n g l e  p a r t  serves m u l t i p l e  funct ions,  each f u n c t i o n  w i l l  
be represented as a d i s t i n c t  module. These modules w i l l  be 
connected by ME CP (MECHANICAL: COMMON PIECE) connections. The 
modules w i l l  be named as fo l lows:  
PART NAME -- FUNCTION 
Example: SHAFT ASSEMBLY 
SHAFT ASSEMBLY -- LUBRICATION PASSAGE 
FASTENERS 
Fasteners are represented i n  t h e  FIPM as a s i n g l e  module w i t h  a 
ME -- (MECHANICAL) connection t o  each o f  t h e  p a r t s  being jo ined.  
No d i r e c t  connection w i l l  be shown between t h e  p a r t s  being 
jo ined.  
Fasteners which j o i n  modules from two adjacent systems (e.g., 
B400 and B600) w i l l  be associated w i t h  t h e  upstream system. 
Example: The fasteners which a t tach  t h e  LPOTP Pump 
Discharge Duct (module o f  system B800) t o  t h e  Main Pump 
Housing -- I n l e t  Mani fo ld  (module o f  system 8400) w i l l  be a 
module o f  system B800. 
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RULES USED FOR SSME FIPMs (CONTINUED) 
FASTENERS (CONTINUED) 
For fasteners which join rotating components or are in close 
proximity to rotating components, increased vibration levels, 
etc. will be seen prior to fastener failure. 
Example: Seal fasteners 
For fasteners not joining rotating components or not in close 
proximity to rotating components, fastener failure must occur 
before higher vibration levels, etc. will be observed. 
Example: Duct fasteners 
WEAR: RUBBING 
The failure mode WR  RB is the result o f  an interaction between 
two modules. This failure mode will be associated with the 
moving module. The code used to describe this failure mode will 
include the name of the stationary (accomplice) module. 
LEAK: CONNECTION 
The failure mode LK CN represents a fluid leak which occurs at 
the connection between two modules. This failure mode will be 
associated with the module on the upstream side of the 
connection. The code used to describe this failure mode will 
indicate the module (accomplice) which forms the other half of 
the connection. 
Example: A leak at the connection between the LPOTP 
discharge duct (B800) and the main pump housing -- inlet 
manifold (B400) will be identified as a failure mode of the 
LPOTP pump discharge duct since it is the upstream module. 
UNANTICIPATED CONNECTIONS 
An unanticipated connection will always be indicated for 
components which include the following failure modes: 
LK CN - LEAK: CONNECTION 
LK ER - LEAK: EROSION 
LK FA - LEAK: FRACTURE 
LK PD - LEAK: PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL 
LK TL - LEAK: TOLERANCE 
W R  RB - WEAR: RUBBING 
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RULES USED FOR SSME FIPMs (CONTINUED) 
DUCTS 
A duct will be defined as being a module of the upstream system 
to which it is attached. 
Examples: LPFTP pump discharge duct is a module in the 
low-pressure fuel turbopump FIPM. High-pressure fuel duct 
is a module in the high-pressure fuel turbopump FIPM. 
VALVES 
A valve will be defined as being a module of the downstream 
system into which the flow is being controlled or modulated by 
the valve. 
Examples: The main oxidizer valve (MOV) is a module in the 
main injector FIPM. The anti-flood valve (AFV) is a module 
in the heat exchanger FIPM. 
EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS 
Any connections which exist between FIPM systems will be 
represented in the model of both systems. 
Example: The connection between the LPOTP discharge duct 
(system B800) and the main pump housing -- inlet manifold 
(system B400) will be represented in the FIPMs for both 
systems. 
The external connections will be appropriately identified on the 
FIPM drawing. Failure modes will not be identified for the 
module from the adjacent system. 
When generating failure information propagations, the signals 
will be propagated to the external connections. However, the 
information flow will not proceed through the adjacent system. 
SEALS 
For seals between a moving and a stationary part, the seal 
function will be associated with the stationary part. 
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RULES USED FOR SSME FIPMs (CONTINUED) 
ALLOWABLE VALUES 
The allowable values used for the SSME FIPMSs should be viewed 
as a dynamic set o f  parameters which can and should evolve as 
new models are developed. It is quite likely that models of 
additional engine components would. require new connections and 
new failure modes. 
Example: LQ N2 - LIQUID: NITROGEN 
A - 1 5  
GENERIC F A I L U R E  MODE DESCRIPTIONS 
CR OX - LOSS OF SURFACE MATERIAL THROUGH THE CHEMICAL PROCESS OF O X I D A T I O N  
DF I M  - ALTERATION OF PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS DUE TO IMPACT OF DEBRIS FROM 
UPSTREAM FAILURES OR CONTAMINATION 
DF I P  - ALTERATION OF PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS DUE TO EXCESSIVE PRESSURE 
LOAD I NG 
DF S T  - ALTERATION OF PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS DUE TO EXCESSIVE S T A T I C  LOADING 
DF SD - ALTERATION OF PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS DUE TO ACCUMULATION OF 
PARTICULATE MATTER 
FA I M  - CRACKING DUE TO IMPACT OF DEBRIS FROM UPSTREAM F A I L U R E S  OR 
CONTAMINATION 
FA I P  - CRACKING DUE TO EXCESSIVE PRESSURE LOADING 
FA S T  - CRACKING DUE TO EXCESSIVE S T A T I C  LOADING 
FA T F  - CRACKING DUE TO EXCESSIVE CYCLICAL AND TRANSIENT THERMAL LOADING 
FA V F  - CRACKING DUE TO EXCESSIVE C Y C L I C A L  AND TRANSIENT MECHANICAL 
LOAD I NG 
F I  BN - TIGHTENING DUE TO UNEXPECTED LOADING OR DIMENSIONAL GROWTH DURING 
OPERAT I ON 
F I  S L  - LOOSENING DUE TO EXCESSIVE CYCLICAL OR TRANSIENT LOADING 
(MECHANICAL OR THERMAL) 
L K  CN - LEAKAGE DUE TO I N S U F F I C I E N T  MECHANICAL COUPLING WITH 
ADJACENT COMPONENT ( 1 
L K  ER - LEAKAGE DUE TO COMPONENT BURN THROUGH CAUSED BY 
EXCESSIVE EROSION 
L K  F A  - LEAKAGE DUE TO CRACK PROPAGATION FROM FRACTURE F A I L U R E  
I-K PD - LEAKAGE DUE TO LOSS OF PRESSURANT 
L K  TL - LEAKAGE DUE TO DIMENSIONAL CHANGES CAUSED BY WEAR 
MP SD - ALTERATION OF THE PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE MATERIAL DUE TO 
ACCUMULATION OF PARTICULATE MATTER 
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GENERIC F A I L U R E  MODE DESCRIPTIONS (CONTINUED) 
WR CV - ABRASION DUE TO EXCESSIVE PRESSURE O S C I L L A T I O N S  CAUSED BY 
C A V I T A T I O N  
WR ER - ABRASION DUE TO HOT GASES AND PARTICULATE MATTER I N  FLOW 
WR P T  - LOSS OF SURFACE MATERIAL DUE TO EXCESSIVE C Y C L I C A L  AND TRANSIENT 
MECHANICAL LOADING 
WR RE - ABRASION DUE TO CONTACT FORCES BETWEEN ROLLING ELEMENTS 
WR RB - ABRASION DUE TO MECHANICAL CONTACT BETWEEN COMPONENTS W I T H  
R E L A T I V E  MOTION ( WITH 1 
APPENDIX B 
SSME F I P M  DRAWINGS 
(SEE SEPARATE VOLUME OF T H I S  REPORT) 
APPENDIX C 
EXCERPT FROM 
"HIGH-PRESSURE OXYGEN TURBOPUMP BEARING CAGE S T A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S "  
REPORT TO NASA MSFC BY 
BATTELLE COLUMBUS D I V I S I O N  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Combinations of operating conditions and cage dimensions were 
identified that can cause the cage of the HPOTP turbine-end bearings 
to be unstable. Furthermore, the high accelerations associated with 
the instabilities can be expected to cause forces sufficient to fail 
the cage (depending upon the actual strength of the cage under operating 
conditions). The forces on the cage developed under normal (stable) operating 
conditions were found to be tolerable. Therefore, maintaining stable 
operation of the cage appears to be important in successful operation 
of the HPOTP bearings. 
Cage stability was found to be particularly sensitive to the 
cage-race clearance, cage balance, and the lubricant film thickness between 
the balls and races (as it affects the ball-race traction). 
diametral clearances larger than 0.25 mn (0.01 in.) promote cage instabilities. 
In contrast, cage stability was found to be insensitive to ball-pocket 
clearance. Since small cage unbalances were predicted to cause instabilities, 
Cage-race 
the cages should be carefully balanced to minimize instability problems. 
Depletion of lubricant film thicknesses between the balls and races cause 
cage instability problems by increasing the ball-race traction, which 
underlines the importance o f  maintaining adequate lubrication for successful 
long-term bearing life. 
As a result of the study, several sensitive parameters affecting 
bearing dynamics were clearly identified. 
the bearings to minimize the likelihood o f  cage instability should enhance 
cage stability and associated bearing reliability. 
Therefore, modifications to 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analyses, the following specific recommendations 
are made to minimize cage instability and its associated effects on bearing 
degredation. 
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1. Maintain the diametral cage-race clearance 
at no more than 0.25 mm (0.010 in.). 
specifications on the drawing of bearing 007955 
for cage-race clearance are 0.38 mm (0.015 in.) 
to 0.74 mn (0.029 in.). 
be changed to reflect the 0.25 mm (0.010 in.) 
maximum allowable recommendation. 
The clearance between the balls and pockets 
in the cage should be no less than 0.54 m 
(0.025 in.). 
not affect cage stability, but adequate clearance 
is needed to avoid cage stresses from ball-speed 
variations caused by combinations of axial 
and radial loads. It is recomnended that 
the current drawing specification of 0.64 mm 
(0.25 in.) to 0.89 mm (0.035 in.) for ball-pocket 
clearance in the circumferential direction 
be modified to be 2.3 m (0.090 in.) to 2.5 mm 
(0.100 in.) to reflect this requirement. 
Dynamically balance the cages to minimize 
the effect of cage unbalance on stability. 
4. Continue efforts to understand and promote 
adequate lubrication of the ball-race interface. 
This analysis has shown the importance o f  
lubrication to cage stability, and previous 
Tasks have underscored the importance of 
lubrication to ball and race longevity. 
Long-term life of the HPOTP bearings depends 
critically on developing and maintaining 
lubricant films to separate the balls and 
races. 
Perform a more detailed analysis of the cage 
stresses developed in operation. While the 
BASDAP analyses provide data on the ball-cage 
Current 
This tolerance should 
2. 
The ball-pocket clearance does 
3 .  
5 .  
c-3 
forces,  the actual  stresses developed r e s u l t  
from a combination o f  these forces w i t h  the  
cage geometry and cons t ra in t s  by the ou ter  
(gu id ing)  race. 
o n l y  an approximate considerat ion o f  these 
stresses. 
Schedule a review meeting t o  be at tended 
by NASA, Rocketdyne, and B a t t e l  l e  personnel 
t o  review the imp l i ca t i ons  o f  the f i nd ings  
i n  t h i s  Task and determine what p r a c t i c a l  
steps can be taken t o  minimize p o t e n t i a l  
cage i n s t a b i l i t y  problems. 
The cu r ren t  study permi t ted  
6. 
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APPENDIX D 
STBE AND STME DIAGNOSTIC REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 
D-1 
DIAGNOSTIC MONITORING SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE 
SPACE TRANSPORTATION BOOSTER AND MAIN ENGINES (STBE and STME) 
General Discussion 
A diagnostic monitoring system shall be included as a key item in 
the design of both the Space Transportation Booster Engine (STBE) and the 
Space Transportation Main Engine (STME). The purpose of this system will 
be to acquire data relative to the performance and overall condition of the 
engine and its associated components. The data obtained from the diagnostic 
system will be used to characterize nominal engine operating conditions, 
quantify limits on key engine parameters, identify degradations in engine 
performance, warn of impending failures, and provide input on maintenance 
requirements. The information collected by the system may be processed and 
used on a real-time basis during engine operation, recorded for use in post- 
test or post-flight analyses, or utilized in a mode combining both real-time 
and post-operation processing. Anticipated benefits from the diagnostic 
system include improved identification and warning of anomalous engine 
conditions, extended intervals between engine inspections, and increased 
data on which to base maintenance decisions. To satisfy all of the 
objectives outlined above, it will be necessary to consider the diagnostic 
system as an integral part of the engine design and development program. 
The diagnostic monitoring system for the STBE and STME will 
include all elements necessary t o  fulfill the objectives discussed 
previously including appropriate sensors or procedures, signal conditioning 
and formatting devices, means for transmission and recording of collected 
data, on-board or ground-based processors, respective decision making 
criteria, and associated computational algorithms. It is recognized that 
the requirements for safety versus maintenance diagnostics vary widely in 
terms of speed, reliability, number of parameters, etc. The monitoring 
system must include provisions to accommodate this situation while fully 
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exploiting the joint data elements needed for both roles. The diagnostic 
system design will make maximum use of automated techniques and procedures 
where feasible to improve the overall quality and consistency of the engine 
data. However, the overall diagnostic system concept should also consider 
other appropriate techniques for determining engine condition and 
maintenance requirements such as human or human-assisted inspections, tests, 
or analyses. The respective roles of in-flight and ground-based processing 
and analysis must also be carefully evaluated in the design of any 
prospective engine monitoring system. The principal criteria on which 
diagnostic system trades will be based is flight safety but cost factors 
will also play a role in determining the final configuration and mode of 
operation. 
The diagnostic monitoring system, in addition to providing 
specific data relative to the engine and its components, shall be considered 
in the broader context of the overall maintenance and maintainability 
program for both the STBE and STME. The prior experience with reusable 
liquid rocket engines has shown that maintenance and maintainability are 
major factors in the overall operational costs attributable to the engine. 
Integrated planning in this important area may yield significant cost 
improvements for new engine designs. The diagnostic system interactions 
with and contributions to the maintenance/maintainabi 1 ity program must be 
evaluated during the formulation of the STBE and STME designs. 
Diagnostic System Considerations During Engine Design 
The diagnostic monitoring system will introduce four major 
considerations to the overall design of the STBE and STME. The first is the 
selection of the number and type of sensors required to implement the 
desired diagnostic strategy. This decision is strongly related to the 
overall level of confidence required in the diagnostic measurements and the 
issue of sensor reliability in the operating environment associated with 
large, high-performance, liquid rocket engines. The second is the 
incorporation of adequate provisions for sensor or inspection access to the 
required measurement locations. This access may or may not be intrusive to 
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the component being monitored depending on the particular sensor selected 
for the application. The third is the evaluation of the environmental 
conditions imposed on the sensors during engine operation. This issue must 
be addressed so that adequate protection or isolation can be provided where 
necessary. The final consideration is the computational capacity required 
in the engine controller to implement the selected diagnostic and control 
approach. In view of the items mentioned above, the diagnostic monitoring 
system must be considered from the very beginning of the engine design and 
development cycle. 
Key Diagnostic Parameters 
The parameters of particular importance in assessing engine 
condition and maintenance requirements are generally associated with the 
turbomachinery, combustion devices, propel lant/coolant flows, and 
actuator/valve positions. Specific parameters of interest include but are 
not limited to turbopump shaft speeds, turbopump torque levels, turbine 
outlet values, turbopump bearing condition, turbine blade stresses, main 
combustion chamber conditions, preburner chamber values, total oxidizer and 
fuel flow rates, flow rates associated with coolant or purge fluids, 
position of the main oxidizer and fuel valves, and information relative to 
the position or proper functioning of other critical valves and actuators. 
Another area of increasing interest pertains to new or novel approaches to 
detect and locate leaks in the various engine components. The fundamental 
physical measurements required to obtain the information described above 
include temperature, pressure, strain, acceleration, acoustic, and optical. 
The first four measurement types represent conventional sensors widely used 
in rocket engines and other similar applications. Acoustic and optical 
sensors are newer approaches but should be considered in view of their 
overall potential. The design of the diagnostic monitoring system also 
should carefully consider the sampling rate and signal format associated 
with the measurements. Current systems tend to use RMS (Root Mean Square) 
values sampled at discrete intervals on the order of 20 milliseconds. This 
type of monitoring eliminates the spectral content associated with the raw 
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signal. Careful consideration should be given to systems which can process 
the entire sensor output spectrum for at . least selected measurement 
parameters. 
Ground-Test Versus F1 i g h t  Diagnostics 
The diagnostic system shall be required to collect appropriate 
engine data in both the ground-test and flight environments. The 
requirements for the engine monitoring system will differ slightly in these 
two cases even though the basic goals o f  safe and efficient operations 
remain the same. The minimum diagnostic system will consist of those 
elements necessary to fulfill the flight monitoring and control functions 
as initially defined by the contractor. However, it is recognized that 
information obtained during developmental, test-stand firings will form the 
foundation for the overall understanding of the engine and its operating 
characteristics. This fundamental role may impose additional requirements 
for ground-test diagnostic data above and beyond those needed during actual 
flight operations. The proposed monitoring system. must consider the 
implications of this situation and provide the flexibility to accommodate 
additional measurements without major modifications to the engine hardware. 
Provisions should at least be made in the basic design for any access ports 
or mounting surfaces which may be required to support the various sensors 
or test procedures used during engine characterization. Requirements for 
additional test site facilities or equipment to support the ground-test 
diagnostic measurements should be specified also. 
In-F1 i g h t  Versus Post-F1 i g h t  Processing and Analysis 
The diagnostic system design shall address the relative need for 
real-time processing and analysis of engine data during flight. Information 
needed to assess engine condition, operating trends, and control responses 
must be available on a real time or near real time basis to satisfy safety 
considerations. Additional data pertaining to required maintenance actions 
which do not affect the current mission may be recorded for later review and 
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analysis. The monitoring system will provide the capability to handle both 
types of data and direct the respective information streams to the 
appropriate storage or processing devices. The information required for 
real-time monitoring and control of the engine may be processed and analyzed 
in several ways. The actual option used will depend on the selected engine 
control scheme and the relative role of the diagnostic system within that 
scheme. In all cases, the information from the various sensors comprising 
the on-board monitoring system will be collected, preprocessed, and 
formatted by the engine controller. Three potential sites exist at which 
the diagnostic data may undergo additional processing/analysis. The 
information may be transmitted to the ground for computer or human analysis, 
passed to the vehicle flight computers for processing and subsequent action, 
or analyzed directly by the engine controller in a self-contained mode of 
operation. The diagnostic system may use any, all, or some combination of 
these approaches to satisfy the in-flight monitoring requirements. 
Contractor Implementation Plan 
The prospective STBE and STME contractors shall include the 
diagnostic monitoring system as a required element in the preliminary engine 
design phase. The contractor must describe the proposed diagnostic system 
in sufficient detail to demonstrate that the concept meets all of the 
overall system objectives as outlined herein. The analyses and trades 
conducted during formulation o f  the proposed concept will also be discussed 
to demonstrate the rationale associated with selection of the major system 
elements or features. All interfaces between the diagnostic system and the 
engine or vehicle will be specified. The diagnostic system requirements 
associated with other engine or vehicle systems such as power, data storage, 
telemetry, etc. will be identified to the extent possible. The role of the 
diagnostic monitoring system in the maintenance/maintainability program for 
the respective engine will be described and any major contributions to 
improved maintenance/maintainability will be outlined. The contractor shall 
specifically discuss the overall approach to ground-test and flight 
diagnostics and define any unique test site requirements associated with the 
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selected engine monitoring system. The contractor also will discuss the 
preferred approach for the processing and analysis of in-flight engine data. 
The computational requirements imposed by the selected concept will be 
outlined with specific reference to engine, vehicle, and ground-based 
processors. The post-flight maintenance evaluation will be described to 
complete the definition of the overall diagnostic system and to allow 
assessment of the interactions between in-flight and post-fl ight monitoring 
requirements. 
APPENDIX E 
M A I N  ENGINE COST/OPERATIONS MODEL 
L O G I C  DIAGRAMS 
E- 1 
OPS PROCESSING: I PRE-MISSION START 9 
FOR EACH 
ENGINE 
FOR EACH 
COMPONENT Q- 
QN M I SS I NG 
L 
REPLACE 
MISSING 
T MISSION 
I 
0 END 
E-2 
CREATE THE 
ENGINE OR 
COMPONENT 
I-1 
USE PART 
FROM INVENTORY 
START 7 
ACCEPTANCE 
TEST OR 
[ INCREASE MTBR I 
EXPOSURE 
E-3 
OPS PROCESSING: 
POST-M I s s 1 ow 
WISSIOM 
R E W E  AN0 
DESTROY 
ENGINE CR ITEQ IP Ne". , , 
EVENT' 
( COMPONENT ;Jd'Tn?pRcw )-
c e-= WINTEYANCE 
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CONSUME 
CCWONE NT 
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START P 
FOR EACH 
COMPONENT 
+ 
REMOVE AND 
CONSUM 
COMPONENT 
REPLACE THE 
COMPONENT 
I BRING COMPONENT TO LIKE-NEW EXCEPT L L 1  
ASSEMBLE 1 ~ ENGINE I 
ACCEPTANCE 
TEST THE 
ENGINE 
1 
INCREASE MTBR 
EXPOSURE FOR 
ALL COMPONENTS 
A00 ENGINE r-3 
!WENTORY 
L&l 
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COMPONENT I MAINTENANCE START 7 
EVENT? Ql 
+I MINTENANCE 
,
00 MAINTENANCE 
FOR ALL LLs 
GREEN RUN 
COMPONENT 
1 
INCREASE MTBR 
EXPOSURE ON 
THAT COMPONENT 
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SELECT S A M  
ENGINE FOR 
F/C RUNNING 
I 
I 
F/C PROCESSING: 
START (7 
MISS I NG 
C W O N E N T  
I 
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